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
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**King Frederick William IV.
in the days of triumph against Napoleon.**

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HISTORY

OF THE

GERMAN PEOPLE

FROM THE FIRST AUTHENTIC
ANNALS TO THE PRESENT TIME

VOLUME TWELVE

MODERN GERMANY

The Downfall and the Restoration
1786-1848

Edited by
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CHAPTER I

THE DECAY OF PRUSSIA UNDER FREDERICK WILLIAM II (1786-1797)

FREDERICK THE GREAT, "Old Fritz," as his admiring people had called him in his later years, was dead. But what of the great state which he had built up? Must that too die, when left without his inspiring strength and wisdom? He had found Prussia one of the lesser German states; he had raised her to be one of the five great powers of Europe, the rival of the mighty Austrian emperors for the leadership in all Teutonic affairs. Could the Prussians keep their grasp upon that splendid leadership, when Frederick was no more?

One weakness in the stern old monarch's system became evident almost immediately upon his death. He had depended solely upon himself; he had bred up around him no school of younger men to understand his purposes, see with his wonderful vision, and so carry on his work. His highest ministers had, in his later

years, been mere clerks, doing blindly what he told them, running to him with every detail. Trained in this way they had become expert in trifles, masters of many petty formulas; but they made the mistake of assuming that the high art of government consisted in these trivialities. They thought it was their system which had made Prussia great, and they clung tenaciously to every tiny regulation and formality given them by the great Frederick. Sheltered behind his rules, they thought themselves invincible.

Moreover, the great monarch was succeeded by a king wholly unlike him in temperament. This was his nephew Frederick William, the son of Prince August William. When the new king in August of 1786 ascended the now powerful throne as Frederick William II, he was a comparatively young man, just approaching his forty-second birthday. He had lived loosely and evaded the hard discipline of his stern uncle's court. Now, brought into the glaring light of the throne, King Frederick William was resolved to show his people what a gorgeous contrast he would make to his gruff and bitter predecessor.

The new king was in truth a man of high and knightly ideals. Through all his reign he clung to his pledges of honor with a loyalty which put him at a costly disadvantage amid the false and

cynical diplomacy of the age, a diplomacy of which his uncle had been the master. The new king was also a kindly, sympathetic man, delighting to give pleasure to others. Unfortunately he proved too fond of his own pleasure, vivacious, full of light and laughter, eagerly seeking friends, and leaning much upon their judgment, yielding indeed too far to their desires.

For this gay and generous ruler to win the quick affections of his people, when they compared him with "Old Fritz," was an easy matter. He was soon given the title of the "Much-Beloved." Festivities at the court, which had been rare during the previous reign, became numerous and brilliant. They began, the moment the official period of mourning was ended, with a most elaborate and celebrated reception held on New Year's Day in 1787.

At first the new king acted energetically. He began by announcing his intention of conducting all government business personally—as his mighty uncle had done—and he demanded from every civic official "in addition to honesty and energy, the same strict obedience in the civil service as is exacted in the army." He retained in office the chief ministers of the close of the former reign, the counts of Finckenstein and von Hertzberg; but he soon ceased to give them

either the close supervision or the constant guidance of his uncle.

Soon indeed he lapsed into many feeble ways. He lived openly with mistresses, raising one of these, Wilhelmine Enke, to the rank of countess of Lichtenau. Later he contracted what was called a morganatic marriage with the countess of Ingenheim—though his queen, Friederike, was alive. And after this first “morganatic wife” died, he made a similar alliance with the countess Dönhoff. These freedoms were naturally imitated by others of his court, and the evil spread throughout the wealthier classes in the country.

Moreover the king soon fell under the sway of unwise favorites. His boyhood’s instructor, Wöllner, and the colonel of Bischoffwerder were the first of these. They won their influence over the well-meaning king by their enthusiasm for religion and for mystic research. Wöllner was appointed minister of justice in place of the eminent von Zedlitz, and in this office was the head of the “spiritual department.” He assumed as his particular duty the bringing back of true religion to a people which had become godless and immoral, and a clergy which rejoiced in flat denials of Church teachings. This “bringing back” was to be accomplished by official edicts and a censorship of religion. Posterity may be

pardoned for doubting the honesty of the intent; certainly, the deeds as they are recorded do not bear out the words. It was not so much a change of heart that was aimed at as a mere superficial observance of external forms, a sort of confession by the mouth alone. Lessing has pointed out that the previous enlightenment, so much talked of under Frederick the Great, had really consisted in nothing but liberty to express as many silly remarks against religion as one wished to make. But edicts, commissions for examination and new editions of catechisms could no more eliminate this "enlightenment" than the widest ramifications of a severe police spy system. Wöllner's ambiguous edicts opened the doors to hypocrisy and could be used easily against anyone who made himself obnoxious to the officials who were in power. This severity of Wöllner's system did indeed hurt real religious freedom, and gradually roused among the people a bitter resentment against the entire government.

Many of King Frederick William's kindly though despotic efforts in other directions would probably have produced valuable results—if only the king's ideas had been carried through with energy. Freedom of trade was favored by the reduction of tariffs, and by fixing each tariff at a permanent rate, publicly known, instead of

having temporary tariffs constantly changing. The merchant classes were particularly delighted by the elimination of the government monopoly on tobacco and coffee. The production of salt was increased to such an extent as greatly to augment the revenue to the state, without any increase in the price. Three million thalers * were expended in the first year of the new reign for industrial and road work. The city of Ruppın, which was destroyed by fire in August, 1786, was rebuilt by the king's order at his own expense, costing a million and a half of thalers.

In education also there was considerable improvement. State schools were brought under a uniform management through the establishment of an *Oberschulkollegium*, a body of practical pedagogues. For the army there was the formation of an *Oberkriegskollegium* (chief war college). A more humane and gentle method was also proposed for training soldiers, a method which was followed for a time at least in the regiments at Potsdam and Berlin. Innovations were attempted in the *Generaldirektorium* and in the finance department, by which the former personal management of the king was to be replaced by collective official duties. The judges

* The *thaler* of 1786 had a purchasing power equal to nearly two dollars of the present day. Its exact monetary equivalent in present United States coin is 73.4 cents.

who had been dismissed because of the notorious "Arnold" litigation were declared innocent. This declaration really was the first establishment of the civil-service idea, according to which no official in the service of state or community may be dismissed without trial and just cause. This civil-service privilege, combined with the general increase of salaries to state and community officials, naturally improved the latter's material conditions, leading to much greater independence and to higher ideals of the fulfillment of duty.

Art, too, received monetary support. Frederick William was, as the great Frederick had been, a practical musician, playing the 'cello quite acceptably, and he encouraged music. His interest and appreciation of architecture found expression in the splendid Brandenburger Thor, of Berlin, built by Langhans in 1789-93, in imitation of the entrance to the Acropolis at Athens. Finally the great Code of Civil Rights was formulated and issued in 1794, though not without much opposition. All these and other innovations, however, were due not so much to a careful study of the needs of humanity, as to a more general, almost maudlin, love of that humanity on the part of the king.

In the matter of foreign politics there was at first a noticeable indecision. All of the king's

ministers were desirous of emerging from that political "loneliness" in which the state had been plunged by Frederick's wars, but Count Finckenstein desired an alliance with France, while Hertzberg favored a *rapprochement* with England. Hertzberg soon won the king to his policy. Frederick William had in the previous reign taken a large part in forming an alliance of the lesser German princes in which Prussia was the leader. But this leadership was upheld by no definite authority, and under French intrigue Prussia soon found herself in her own league on a merely equal footing with the smaller and smallest princes. Hertzberg wished to throw off this "cross of higher politics." He hoped to bring about a northern union of Russia, England, Sweden and Prussia, in which the latter was to be given a leading rôle, and by reason of which it would be the arbitrator of Europe. Hertzberg believed Prussia's salvation depended on permanent opposition to Austria. At one time he hoped, with Russia's help, to crowd Austria further eastward. The first factor in such a political calculation was an alliance with England, and this Hertzberg expected to obtain through the members of the House of Orange, who were naturally serving British interests.

Holland, at this time, was much excited over

the discovery of plots against her territory which were directed by Emperor Joseph of Austria. Moreover, the sturdy little republic was torn between warring factions of monarchists and democrats. Both England and France were grasping at the opportunity which thus seemed to offer itself for mastering Holland; but in these subtle schemes France was far in the lead. England, therefore, was only too glad to accept the proffered assistance of Prussia—made especially valuable because of the close family ties between the reigning family of Prussia and the stadtholder Wilhelm V. For a long time King Frederick William insisted upon peace. But his sister was insulted during a trip through Holland by members of the Patriots—that is to say, the party leaning toward France. She was kept prisoner for several hours and was refused an apology by the Holland government, while France declined to become a negotiator in the matter. Then at last Frederick William was aroused. He sent 24,000 Prussian soldiers over the Dutch frontier; and these occupied the entire country, after overcoming some minor difficulties, such as the resistance of the small fortress Weesp, near the Zuyder Zee. It seemed as if, once for all, Holland was to be removed from both French and English influence, and was to sur-

render the mouths of the Rhine to Prussia. There was even talk of Holland's joining the Alliance of the German Princes under Prussia; and Karl August of Weimar was particularly active in this plan.

King Frederick William missed the opportunity. He sought to be magnanimous, and declared himself satisfied with strengthening the rights of the stadtholder of Holland and receiving an apology for his sister's treatment. Hertzberg concluded an alliance with England, to which Holland became a party. Prussia refused to claim any advantages from Holland for its Rhine trade, and did not even ask an indemnity for the military expenses which she had incurred by occupying Holland. Hertzberg hoped that this moderation would strengthen England's influence on the Continent, thereby giving him a valuable weapon in his own struggle against Austria and Russia. The choice thus made by Hertzberg was not a happy one, and it did not fulfill his expectations. If he had calculated on bringing Russia to his side, or on separating France from Austria, he was mistaken, and particularly in his chief intent of obtaining from Prussia the Polish cities of Thorn and Danzig and the counties of Posen and Kalisch. He suggested that Austria should restore Galicia to helpless Poland and should re-

ceive in exchange Moldavia and Wallachia from the crumbling Turkish power. In return for the surrender of Galicia to Poland, he suggested that Poland should hand over to Prussia the districts he desired. As might have been expected, no one of the other countries was greatly enamored of the cleverly conceived plans of the Prussian minister. But if the successes of Austria and Russia against the Sublime Porte should lead to an alliance between Prussia and Turkey, for which Hertzberg began intriguing, and if he could offer to much harassed Poland Prussia's help against Russia, and to Sweden (which was greatly worried by Denmark, an ally of Russia) a sudden rush of the renowned Prussian troops against Danish Schleswig—then, indeed, a war against both Austria and Russia might prove a profitable investment. Prussia at that time was at the height of her power and the Prussian monarchy apparently had the deciding voice in European politics. Each Prussian official believed in himself and great plans were made for the future. One splendid war was to give Prussia her own way everywhere.

Everything was ready, and Prussia had already started comprehensive mobilizations, when Emperor Joseph of Austria died, and his brother and successor, Leopold, ascended the

Austrian throne. The new ruler had other ideas and plans than his predecessor. He immediately held out the hand of friendship to Prussia. King Frederick William, without paying any attention to the protests of Hertzberg, cordially accepted the proffered friendship. On July 27, 1790, the convention of Reichenbach was signed, in which Austria surrendered her Turkish conquests, but retained Belgium and other districts, while Prussia dropped all further claims to Polish territory, even to Thorn and Danzig.

This new treaty constituted a complete change of front for Prussia. Her preparations for mobilization had progressed so far as to cost about 40,000,000 thalers. Moreover, new enemies had been made by her threatening attitude; and Austria's real assistance had not been gained after all. On the contrary, Prussia had shown a yielding spirit which Leopold later used to his own advantage. Only Austrian interests had been considered in the arrangement, while those of Prussia and her allies had been completely neglected; the treaty, therefore, contained within itself the germs of future disputes. At the same time, the German Princes' Alliance was ignored, Leopold was elected emperor without one dissenting voice, and Austria regained its old preëminent position in the Ger-

man empire. Even in Poland, whose strengthening was solely in the interests of Austria, Frederick William did not oppose Leopold. Prussia was defeated in the entire field of foreign politics: in the empire, in Poland, in Sweden, in Turkey and in England, and—what was even more serious—the attitude of faith in Prussia to which the German 'Princes' Alliance had persistently clung was now changed to a feeling of distrust and disgust.

At the very moment when Prussia thus alienated all her supporters, the terrific breakers of the French Revolution sounded nearer and nearer and the spray began to touch the thrones of Europe. When the French captured their king upon his flight from Paris and placed him in prison, Frederick William's knightly heart was filled with pity at the news, and he prepared for war with enthusiasm to save the unfortunate king. The emperor Leopold, however, was slow to come to the assistance of his sister, Queen Marie Antoinette, and to demand satisfaction and reparation for the damages inflicted on the western frontiers of the empire. A treaty was signed in July of that year between Prussia and Austria, in which both states guaranteed to each other their respective possessions. On the occasion of a personal meeting between the emperor and the king, which

Bischoffwerder arranged on August 25, at Pillnitz, Prussia even gave up her claims to the exchange of Lausitz for the Franconian districts, the incorporation of which into Prussia was imminent. But against the terrible French Revolution nothing more than a formal protest was made; and after Louis XVI had taken the oath of allegiance to the new constitution, all intention of immediate intervention was dropped. With the express assurance that they had no intent to interfere in French affairs, Prussia and Austria, on February 20, 1792, signed a defensive alliance at Vienna. This agreement was the more necessary because the empress of Russia was intent upon utilizing the difficulties of Prussia and Austria in the West for carrying out her plans against Poland.

Suddenly, on April 20, 1792, France herself declared war, and while Prussia and Austria were still discussing the military operations to be started, French troops crossed the frontier on the 29th of that month. A few weeks later, Russian armies invaded Poland, and, although this latter invasion more intimately concerned Prussia's rights, King Frederick William placed his army at the service of Leopold against France. Questions of great importance were awaiting decision both on the Rhine and the Vistula, and while everybody made suggestions as

to how to solve them, all were decided against the empire. The French invasion should have found Austria, Prussia, and the whole empire united and armed, but, because Prussia had surrendered to the Viennese government in nearly everything, it had lost the confidence of the smaller princes and had become a mere follower in the wake of the Hapsburgs. The war started slowly, chiefly because of the death of Leopold and the subsequent coronation of the new emperor, Francis, at Frankfort. This coronation—as if the people suspected it would be the last—was conducted with special pomp and splendor. Frederick William here met the emperor, after having viewed the Franconian possessions which he had inherited on the resignation of the childless margrave Christian Frederick Karl Alexander. Everybody in Prussia declared that the whole war was being waged in the interests of Austria. The troops as well as the general officers resented being called on to fight at the side of their old “hereditary” enemy; and it required the whole sense of duty which Frederick William possessed, as a champion of the imperiled king of France, to hold him to an ally who demanded for himself not only Bavaria but even Ansbach-Baireuth.

How was it possible that such a campaign could end in victory—a campaign which lacked

unity among the allies and unity in command. Frederick William demanded an immediate attack and an energetic advance, but the duke of Brunswick, commander-in-chief, preferred a careful, methodical warfare against the undisciplined French troops. As a result, neither of the plans succeeded. The nonfulfillment of obligations on the part of Austria; the disillusionment of the armies who, through trusting in the optimistic reports of the escaped French aristocrats, had come to imagine that they would be hailed with delight by the French population; the bad weather; lack of provisions and the outbreak of dangerous epidemics; all these combined to make the war in the first year a complete moral failure. True, the Prussians and Austrians, after the capture of Longwy and Verdun, advanced in the Champagne district, but after a bombardment of Valmy they decided to withdraw, despite the fact that the French general Dumouriez evacuated his positions. The French, being thus left unopposed, crossed the Rhine. Mainz opened its doors without resistance, Frankfort was sacked and burned, and a republic was proclaimed in Mainz. In the last days of 1792, the Austrians were beaten at Jemmapes, and Savoy and Nice were declared incorporated with France. On January 21, 1793, the unfortunate King Louis

XVI was beheaded on the scaffold by his infuriated subjects.

During these discouraging defeats in the West, Prussia managed to maintain its prestige in the East to the extent of sharing in the second division of Poland. This was conducted by Catherine of Russia on September 25, 1793. The so-called Great Poland, as well as the old German cities of Thorn and Danzig, totaling about 22,000 square miles, became Prussian territory. Russia, it is true, gained four times as much, but it was out of the question for Prussia to fight a war with Russia in addition to the unfortunate campaign with France. Far more disquieting was the fact that Austria, although it had agreed to the division of the spoils, showed severe displeasure over Prussia's share. The alliance between the two countries, which since the execution of Louis XVI had been deprived of its only real cause, the defense of royalty, naturally weakened. The Austrian minister of foreign affairs lived habitually in a spirit of hatred and jealousy of Prussia.

There were some military successes against the French. The Austrians drove them over the Meuse after the capture of Maastricht, and formed a junction with the English. The Prussians recaptured Frankfort, and on this occasion the Prussian crown prince met, for the

first time, his future wife, Princess Luise of Mecklenburg. The German armies conquered Mainz in July, 1793, beat General Moreau at Pirmasens on September 14, and General Hoche at Kaiserslautern on November 28, despite the latter's numerical superiority. But the opportunity for a united advance, at the same time as there was civil war in the Vendée and in the south of France, had been lost. The siege of Landau had to be raised; and the Austrians were soundly thrashed at Wattignies, in Belgium, by General Jourdan. The political dissension showed its insidious effects more and more on the military fields.

Frederick William persisted in the war against the French republic, although Polish affairs more nearly required his attention. He was encouraged in his course because England pledged itself to furnish monetary assistance, which he greatly needed. (Hague Treaty of April 19, 1794.) Not even the second splendid victory which the Prussians gained at Kaiserslautern on May 23, under the command of Möllendorff, nor the victory on September 18-20 under the command of Hohenlohe, could change the situation. The Indian summer of Prussian military glory, as these victories are now called, was not able to ripen any of its fruits. The political sky again became heavily overcast. Minister

Thugut of Austria succeeded in preventing further monetary help from England, because the Prussian armies were not able to make up for the crushing defeat which the English and Austrians sustained at Fleurens, June 26. The victorious Prussian army had to retreat in October, being helpless through lack of supplies.

About this time another Prussian army suppressed the revolution of Kosciusko in Poland, under the very eyes of the king himself. When Kosciusko had been defeated and Cracow captured by the Prussians, the Russians under Suwarow captured Warsaw, and the third and final "Partition of Poland" was arranged. All the efforts of Russia and Austria were concentrated upon excluding Prussia from these final spoils of Poland, or, at the very least, on giving her as little as possible. Russia naturally took the largest share, although Austria managed to get about 20,000 square miles in West Galicia, and, in addition, Bosnia, Serbia, Venetia and Bavaria, the obtaining of which had been the aim of Austrian politics for many years past. It was therefore a real success on Austria's part to be able to hand Prussia only a slice of territory of 18,000 square miles, including Warsaw. This territory, obtained by compromise with the Austrian and Russian *landhunger*, brought no real blessing to the state of Prussia.

One thing had now become clear even to King Frederick William. The war in the West, carried on without a particle of enthusiasm, in a slow, lazy, haphazard and unsuccessful manner, could have no result, except to help Austria in the acquisition of Venetia and Bavaria. To assist Austria in this robbery was opposed to all Prussian interests. Austria's slipshod fulfillment of its obligations in the conduct of the war, and the distinctly hostile feeling shown in Vienna, London and St. Petersburg, clearly relieved the Prussian king from all obligations toward Austria. The lack of money ruined every Prussian campaign; and statesmen as well as military officers, Finckenstein, Alvensleben, Lucchesini and Möllendorff, urged the conclusion of peace with France. Count Haugwitz, who conducted Prussia's foreign affairs after the resignation of Hertzberg, was especially emphatic in advising an immediate peace. He saw that the sole salvation of Prussia and indeed of all North Germany from its financial danger lay in the establishment of a strict neutrality. Haugwitz represented to King Frederick William that the smaller German princes had called on Prussia for protection and mediation, and that the king could not longer resist their just demands.

It was only after long hesitation and with considerable reluctance that King Frederick

William, in ill health from his Polish campaign, decided to negotiate with France for peace. The actual treaty was signed on April 15, 1795, at Basel. In this treaty all the lesser German princes, both North and South, were included—something that the king of Prussia had long schemed to accomplish, as it tacitly acknowledged his leadership among all the German princes. But what were the conditions that Prussia had to accept? The entire left bank of the Rhine, including the Prussian districts of Cleves, Geldern and Mors, were turned over to France—not exactly surrendered, but promised. In return for this concession, Prussia obtained France's promise to see to it that Prussia should be indemnified in the interior of Germany as soon as Austria and the empire as a whole concluded peace with France. The energetic language of Prussian diplomacy at that moment prevented the French from enforcing the terms of the promise within treaty; but on August 5, 1796, a second treaty was signed in which the territory was actually ceded, while Prussia was to be reimbursed from the little ecclesiastical German states which France was planning to wipe out entirely.

Was this the Prussia of Frederick the Great—a Prussia which gave away the Rhine to France? Surrendered the river to revolutionary

France, whose monarchy at one time had been forced to accept the offer of alliance from Prussia and whose boastful armies had been defeated so ignominiously at Rossbach? It is true the treaty presented the possibility of a peaceful commerce between the two countries, and the "line of demarcation" between South and North gave hope of inviolate neutrality for North Germany, and for an early peace with the empire itself. Yet the very fact that so poor a peace could have been concluded showed clearly how deep the state had sunk. Prussia was in dire need of funds and a commission which the king had appointed in 1794, consisting of the ministers Struensee, von Goldbeck, von Alvensleben and Werder, and the general Geusau, had come to a "most depressing" conclusion. The commissioners gave up all hope for a foreign loan, and the idea of a special war tax met, even in the commission, the most violent opposition. The only practical result of the conferences was the formal and urgent request for the establishment of this feeble peace.

Nothing could show better the impotency of the government and the difference between this reign and that of the great Frederick. The king himself was won over to the peace treaty by representations showing that his own negotia-

tions for peace would undoubtedly be followed by peace on the part of the empire. But the bitterness caused by the treaty everywhere plainly showed that Prussia had lost her former position, while the continued attempts of France to push Prussia further away from the Rhine clearly indicated the desires and hopes of the French republic. It was a slight consolation at this time to hear of the experiences of faithless Austria, which, although able to beat back the French armies of Jourdan and Moreau, under the command of the archduke Karl, was severely beaten in the Italian campaign by General Napoleon Bonaparte and was forced to conclude an even humbler peace at Campo Formio. But this consolation vanished when the text of the treaty with France showed that Austria had decided not to hand over to Prussia the promised districts in the interior of Germany. Of what value to Prussia was the gaining of some small territory south of the Main River, when Austria and France had united to humble her! What was the use of obtaining the wide Polish steppes in the East, un-German and undeveloped, promising nothing but profitless trouble, a mixing of a pure German state with Slavic interests, and increasing the jealousy of Austria and Russia! Where were the hopes of maintaining a leading rôle in northern Germany,

when the confidence and respect of the lesser princes had been utterly destroyed.

As yet, Berlin did not realize that it was at the treaty of Reichenbach that Prussian glory had started to decline, and that the treaty of Basel had changed glory to disgrace. But Berlin did feel the loss of prestige, and saw the shattering of its hope of attaining a leading position as a European power. Frederick William was crushed under the weight of despair, saddened by the defeat of all his fond expectations and his benevolent intentions. Even in the bosom of his own family he was destined to miss that happiness which at first seemed promising. How proud had he been to receive the princesses of Mecklenburg, Luise and Friederike, as wives of his two sons, on Christmas, 1793! With the highest regard he had looked upon Crown Princess Luise, the "princess of princesses," as he called her! But her husband, the crown prince Frederick William, retired with her from court life to his private castle at Paretz. The queen also withdrew from court and lived separately from the king, mostly in Monbijou, and after 1790 in Freienwalde-on-the-Oder, where the natural mineral waters were greatly valued at that time. On November 15, 1797, both the queen and the crown prince were summoned in haste to the Marble Palace at

Potsdam, where King Frederick William lay fatally ill. He died the following day, November 16, 1797, after much suffering.

The problems of state which Frederick William left to his successor were infinitely difficult, but the inherent health and virility of the Prussian state promised to survive its outward dignity, if only a period of peace would give it the chance to recuperate. But could any one expect that the terrible forces raging on the French side of the Rhine would leave Prussia to peace and quiet?

CHAPTER II

NAPOLEON OVERRUNS GERMANY (1797-1807)

KING FREDERICK WILLIAM III inherited from his father an extremely perplexing situation and a dangerous throne. We have seen the difficult situation in which Prussia stood at the death of Frederick William II. Finance is the most important factor in a state which, like Prussia, had been built up by the most careful and economical administration of all its resources. And her financial prosperity had suffered a heavy blow. It was not that the state faced actual bankruptcy, as has been since declared, but the descent on the steep slope leading to it had certainly been started. The treasury was not only empty, but had issued promissory obligations to an amount almost equal to the total funds which it had possessed at the time of the death of Frederick the Great. A national debt of 48,000,000 thalers, however, was not beyond the ability of a virile people to provide for, and as a matter of fact this debt

was not nearly so great as the debts of some other states. Prussia had been enlarged by more than 40,000 square miles; and yet this increase in territory did not carry with it an increase in revenue of more than 1,000,000 thalers. Commerce and trade had continued to build on the foundations given them by Frederick William I and Frederick II, and were in a fair way to prosper without further assistance. They did honor to their masters. Just at this time the lines of trade were extending in all directions; the Silesian linen trade, particularly to Spain and its colonies, had greatly increased; trade with Poland, rich in lumber and grain, had begun; and the export of grain from Danzig to England quadrupled in the period 1790-1801. Prussian exports via Danzig to England increased from a hundred thousand pounds sterling in the early part of the eighteenth century to over three hundred thousand pounds in 1780, to 688,348 pounds in 1790, to 1,733,946 pounds in 1800, and to 2,220,031 pounds in 1805. The number of Prussian ships passing through the Sound had been between 200 and 300 annually in the decade 1770-80; it increased to 1,621 in 1798, and 2,012 in 1804. In the year 1799, when French trade suffered a sudden halt, the harbor of Bordeaux would have been entirely "dead," had it not been for the 120 vessels under

the Prussian flag which loaded and unloaded cargo there. The number of cattle also had increased extraordinarily, while the increase in population was astonishing. There was no doubt, therefore, that taxes could have been increased without difficulty, and that the credit of the state had not been exhausted. What was needed, however, was a return to the old Prussian system of economy and a complete change in governmental views and tactics. As a matter of fact, Prussia succeeded in accumulating a treasury fund of 17,000,000 thalers during the next few years.

Still more necessary than the financial reorganization of the government was the reorganization of the army, which, because of the vacillating campaigns against France, had lost confidence in itself. Its officers had been decimated in number, and the survivors were sadly in need of better training. These officers had forgotten that their first duty was to serve the state, and had begun to consider their privileged position among other men not as a reward for services rendered, but as a presupposed right, and as a sufficient reason for pride and snobbishness. As long as the outer military forms were observed, people thought that this was still the army of the great Frederick. Instead, it was sadly inferior. Yet even these weaknesses and follies

could have been conquered. The sleeping spirit of the Prussian army was not dead, and could have been revived. Indeed, the Spartan bravery and moral stamina of many officers were soon to be proven!

Among civil officials, the old routine and outward forms were scrupulously observed. Many officials still thought they saw in these forms the true salvation of Prussia. Others, however, realized how decayed the old system was and were quite ready to give the jewel the new setting which it required in order to sparkle, as in the years gone by. The main trouble in officialdom was the spreading of conceit, snobbishness, silly pride and the insufferable air of "know-it-all." This united with a decided immorality and frivolity, instead of the old honesty and the old high morale. To deny belief in a living God was still considered good form among the aristocracy, and this was accompanied usually not by any real study or knowledge but by a superficial half knowledge which was surely, as history proves, worse than absolute ignorance. The hypocrisy, combined with the outward signs of religion and churchgoing, which had been fostered by Wöllner, did not tend to decrease the immorality and lust of the bourgeoisie. A veritable dry-rot had attacked the army and the bureaucracy, the aristocracy, nay even the peo-

ple themselves. An insidious poison had entered into all the pores of the civic body; but there was still left enough vital force to kill off this dry-rot, to counteract the effects of the poison by a powerful antidote. But to accomplish such a result there was needed "a deep religious awakening, an energetic and true faith, which alone could conquer this evil spirit of base passion and immorality."

In the state of Prussia, which so frankly depended upon the work and guidance of its rulers, it was chiefly the personality of the ruler himself which must give this necessary impulse. The new king, Frederick William III, had the high truth and earnestness required for his difficult task. But nature, unfortunately, had refused him that knack of quick and even harsh decision which is one of the things a ruler must possess, although the private citizen may well afford to go through life without it. Frederick William realized that, in order to improve conditions in the state, it was not only necessary that the ruler should show personal ability, but also that the people should enjoy a long period of peaceful development. To maintain such a period of peace was his main desire.

Meanwhile—and who in the world does not know it now—the influence of true honesty, morality and piety which surrounded his court

itself was absolutely beyond all calculation in its results on all circles of official and social life in the state. One need only pronounce the name "Queen Luise" in order to characterize the pure atmosphere in which the royal House of Prussia at that time lived and moved. She, and she alone, need be mentioned in order to explain at once the real reason for the gradual change which came over this previously licentious people. The pen almost refuses to name in the same sentence the weaknesses, the boundless licentiousness, the base passions, avarice, frivolity and outright immorality which had held so many of the German people in thrall—and the graciousness, magic influence, absolute moral purity, love of truth, sincere piety and beautifully unblemished mind of the queen. Untouched and undefiled, she had passed through the filth of her contemporaries, so supremely majestic in her true German womanliness that not the minutest speck of that mud ever came even to the hem of her garment. Innumerable judgments of her contemporaries are filled with the praise of the queen, who was "as beautiful as an angel." Even Goethe, the able judge of the German woman's heart, could not resist the influence of her graciousness. A Frenchman expressed himself as surprised by her harmonious gentleness, her amiability and captivating grace,

her charm and majesty. He fancied he saw one of those apparitions, so vividly described in the fairy tales of old. An Englishman, who attempted to describe her personality, merely spoke in general praise of her graciousness and the sunlike brightness of her expressive eyes, for fear, as he said, of being adjudged insane because of an extravagant use of adjectives. Even the Poles, obstinate and hostile as they were against the royal House of Prussia, fairly worshiped Queen Luise. She stood before the German people as a miracle, and her influence upon all hearts and minds was truly miraculous. But this is the influence of the German woman—that she works in the still background until gradually, very gradually, the effects of her work break forth in splendor. And Queen Luise represents the highest development of the German woman. Not with ambitious schemes and plans, but with her own life, her own heart and mind, her whole existence—such is the work of the German woman! Not in fierce strife, in storm and stress of world struggle, not with the weapons of man, which would only lower her from her high state of dignity—but with the whole effort of a pious heart, the truth expressed in her spiritual life, and the humility which needs not realize her own greatness—such is the work of the German woman, the

helpmate of her husband. And such has been her influence on the fate of the German people and on mankind!

Such a woman was Queen Luise; and for this reason she became the blessing of her husband, the blessing of the Prussian and the German people, and an important factor in Prussian history. She still lives and works in the hearts of the present generation. She conquered the hearts of her own people and forced them to change their lives for the better. Unconscious of her own power, she yet caused the reformation of Prussia, both at the head and in the limbs. She spent her days in loving companionship with the king, and in the mutual exchange of love and confidence, in the joy over his two sons. The heart of the king, cramped and crushed by pedantic education, revived with her, and rejoiced in the joy and the cheer of living. The king hated nothing worse than public pompous appearances; he was most happy when in the circle of his family and relatives, though he welcomed the occasional presence of a few intimate friends, such as Colonel von Köckeritz. In their presence he would forget all rules of etiquette, and would joke and tell anecdotes in so free and easy a manner that even that strict guardian of court etiquette, the *Oberhofmeisterin* Countess Sophie von Voss, gave up all attempts

to enforce the rules, and laughed and joked with the rest of the company to the limit of her vivacious nature.

King Frederick William, acting in the spirit of his queen, soon started upon the renovation of the state. He did not immediately try to set forth a comprehensive plan with which to stem the threatening disaster; for he did not consider himself strong and able enough to attempt such a task. Moreover, his unfortunate education had created in him a shyness and timidity which did not dare to maintain in the council chamber, with energy and force, the plan which his own mind had clearly shown him to be the best. The firm energy with which Frederick William I crushed the snake of Evil was lacking in the simple and straightforward character of this king; and the iron rules which the great Frederick had laid down still seemed to the new and untried king too valuable and too sacred for him to change. Even the most capable heads at that time failed to realize that the old days had passed, and that new days had come with a demand for new institutions and new rules. But though the weeds in the state were not at once torn out by the roots, their growth above ground was at least cut down. The countess of Lichtenau, former mistress of the king's father, was arrested and put on trial. The proceedings

did not result in a verdict, but the countess disappeared from public life thereafter. On November 22, 1797, the king signed a cabinet order, which instructed the higher officials of all state authorities to require of all employees the strictest fulfillment of duties, and an exemplary moral conduct in the whole administration. Wöllner's examination commission, the police investigations of the religious beliefs and teachings of clergymen, and all other obnoxious details of the "religious edict" were subjected to scathing criticisms and abolished. Wöllner himself, who heard brazenly the indignation of the king, was dismissed, together with the worst of his creatures, in 1798. The censorship was relaxed somewhat, at least for the moment. Important steps were taken toward the better conduct of foreign policies. Other reforms included the reorganization of the army; restoration of the finances; establishment of a satisfactory code of jurisprudence; a better distribution of taxes; lightening of the burdens of the poor; the complete abolishment of serfdom; and the improvement of the educational system—in short, improvements in nearly all fields of state endeavor and state enterprise. These changes went far to win the hearts of the people for the young king, but they were not sufficient for the complete reorganization

and rehabilitation of the structure of the entire state—which had now become a matter of absolute necessity.

The conduct of foreign affairs became enfeebled by unfortunate methods. The one man authority and responsibility of previous kings was shifted into a sort of "cabinet government"—in the sense that the ministers no longer presented the bare result of their work to the king who thereupon gave the decision. Instead of this, cabinet-counselors delivered their reports combined with advice, so that their manner or method of delivery exerted a strong influence on the king's decision. In this connection one should not forget that the officials of these cabinets, among whom Mencken and Beyme were certainly equal to their tasks, fulfilled their duties in a highly satisfactory manner. Yet even the chief ministers, Count Haugwitz and the Freiherr von Hardenberg, were often uncertain and vacillating when confronted with matters of such serious consequence as those which came up for decision in that parlous period. Hence, while orders were issued in their names, the king himself had to make the final decision far more frequently than was generally believed. The weight of responsibility in those days of grumbling and revolutions naturally made him the more hesitant. Moreover, he had

been kept away from state affairs for long, and his innate love of peace and quiet restrained him from giving dangerously decisive orders, although these might seem to be required for the best and boldest service of the state.

Let us look to the first state affairs which fronted the new king. By signing the Peace of Basel, Prussia had no idea of breaking away from the empire. On the contrary, she believed she was thereby hastening an imperial peace. Now, however, the empire cast loose from Prussia. Austria abandoned her on one side; and the smaller princes flocked to the standard of revolutionary France on the occasion of the peace at Rastatt. It was still possible, of course, for Prussia to maintain the semblance of peace with France; but it was inevitable that the state-demolishing tendencies of the French dictators must lead, sooner or later, to a complete breach. Everywhere—in Italy, in Holland, in Switzerland, on the Rhine—the French pressed forward with inexorable persistency. A landing of French troops in England had to be abandoned; and a coalition against France was formed by England, Austria and Russia. Prussia was thereon invited to an alliance with France; but Frederick William III refused to link himself with the forces of aggression and submitted rather to the loss of some of his territory on

the right bank of the Rhine. He maintained a strict neutrality, which was expected to gain peace and inviolability for all of North Germany. Berlin made a careful distinction between the wild and clamorous régime that held sway in France and the French state; it saw in the latter the natural ally of Prussia. But the plans of the French republic spread wider and wider, and the breaking up the German empire was no longer the last goal nor main purpose of French statesmen. Their schemes went much further than those of the former monarchy. To force Austria out of the German empire; to press Prussia back over the Elbe; to create between Russia and Prussia irreconcilable conditions; to hit England in its most tender spot—that of trade with the Continent of Europe; and to separate the small German princes into two large groups, North and South, holding both groups in strict control—those were the ambitious plans of the French dictators. From this it must be clear that, if the Prussian state was to save itself from annihilation, it would have to fight a war to the knife.

In the meantime, Bonaparte, who had made himself first consul of the French republic through the *coup d'état* of the 18th Brumaire, smashed the coalition of the great powers, and forced Austria to accept the peace of Lunéville,

in which it received the possessions of the ecclesiastical dignitaries in place of the territories which it lost on the left bank of the Rhine. Prussia, in order to increase her strength and to regain a leading rôle in North Germany, as well as with the idea of becoming a protector of Bavaria against Austria, now started on a new course, which she hoped would result in the salvation of the whole empire. By secularizing all ecclesiastical territories within her borders Prussia hoped to gain a more compact military strength, especially toward her western frontier. France and Russia, however, compelled Prussia to look for territory in another direction; and in March, 1802, King Frederick William, with tears in his eyes, signed the order to occupy Hanover, to prevent its falling into the hands of the Russians or French. Hanover had belonged to Britain, so that this compulsory step set Prussia and Britain hopelessly at odds. The chance of an alliance with Russia also collapsed after the assassination of the emperor Paul and the coronation of Alexander. Thus aid could no longer be expected from that source for any plans looking to the strengthening of Prussia. Negotiations with Austria led to a temporary settlement of the question of compensation for Prussia's abandoned territory, but could not smooth over the differences of opinion concern-

ing secularization of the church-electoralates. Napoleon, secure in the consent of Russia and temporarily at peace with England (Treaty of Amiens), finally compelled Prussia to sign an agreement on May 23, 1802, in which the marquis of Lucchesini and Beurnonville fixed the Prussian compensations. Later, on February 25, 1803, these compensations were included in the final agreement by which Napoleon reorganized Germany. Prussia by this treaty received the bishoprics of Paderborn and Hildesheim, the major part of Münster, the cities Erfurt, Mühlhausen, Nordhausen, Goslar and several Thuringian districts in the central part of Germany, a rich compensation of about 3,460 square miles with 500,000 inhabitants. There was great rejoicing over this in Memel and Königsberg, where a meeting took place in the summer of 1802 between Frederick William III and the emperor of Russia. But those territories which had been the special aspiration of Prussia had been refused by Napoleon. Prussian hopes for a leading position in South Germany were gone; the pushing back of Prussia from the Rhine had eliminated the last strong opponent of France; and the leadership of North Germany, which had been called Prussia's hegemony, was now completely collapsed.

A new struggle now threatened between

France and England, against which Napoleon ever nourished the most violent enmity. The Russian emperor Alexander leaned toward Britain, so Napoleon not only collected an army on the lower Rhine but also occupied Hanover, which seemed to offer the only guarantee against the possible loss of all the French colonies. Napoleon also made preparations to throttle British trade on the Elbe and the Weser and to dominate the Hansa towns. It was clear that such attacks by Napoleon interfered with the interests of Prussia, injured Prussian commerce, and violated the neutrality of North Germany. A state which permitted such a seizure of its rights to pass unchallenged must thereby lose every shred of respect and dignity. Count von Haugwitz repeatedly told this to King Frederick William; but the latter maintained that even a victorious war with France would entail more suffering than the minor encroachments of the French, and gave his consent only to the sending of diplomatic protests. Many of these were presented without noticeable result. Prussian diplomacy even began to work toward new alliances with France and Russia. Prussia offered to restrain Austria from an attack on Napoleon, provided the latter refrained from the further worrying of North Germany. But Russia declined an alliance which was not strictly against

France; and Napoleon named unheard-of conditions, refused any and all guarantees to maintain peace in Germany and only sought to lull Prussia to sleep by a reiteration of mere general promises of friendship and good will. The Prussian ambassador at Paris repeatedly declared that the continental war was inevitable, but Freiherr von Hardenberg, who had superseded Count von Haugwitz in April, 1804, declined to attribute either to Emperor Alexander or to Napoleon the warlike intentions which both harbored in their minds. When Napoleon crowned himself emperor of France on May 18, 1804, every one hoped that this meant the return to peaceful times; and Prussia decided, at any rate, to maintain a careful neutrality. She declined each invitation to join a war against Napoleon, particularly the invitation of Russia. The other powers grew so incensed against Prussia that Russia planned to attack her and wrest away all her eastern provinces. England and Austria are said to have given their consent to this plan.

In the fall of 1804, Russia mobilized its troops on the eastern frontier of Prussia. The new coalition against France now included England, Russia, Austria and Sweden, and seemed complete. If war ensued, the neutrality of North Germany was bound to be assailed by both sides, unless the French could first be driven out of

Hanover. There could be no doubt that this province would be separated from England in the course of final peace negotiations; and it was of the utmost importance to Prussia to be in possession of this province, which controlled the mouths of the Elbe and Weser. This strengthening of Prussia's military position would also serve to increase the commerce of North Germany. In fact, the acquisition of Hanover formed the central point of all the Prussian foreign politics of the time. This acquisition would be greatly facilitated by an active occupation of the province, while the lack of such occupation must serve to draw Prussia into the war of the powers against Napoleon.

When this great war actually burst out against Napoleon, Prussia was thus led into the most extraordinary series of contradictory changes. Yet it should be remembered that the maintenance of peace and neutrality for the northern part of Germany remained Prussia's foremost aim throughout. For a time all her aims seemed attained. The news of the imminent violation of Prussian neutrality by the Russians, who planned to force a way through this country to the south of Germany, precipitated military mobilization in the East. Then suddenly Napoleon, trusting implicitly in the well-known peaceful inclinations of Frederick William, violated

Prussian neutrality in the most flagrant manner by sending an army through Ansbach. The Prussian people rose in anger and fury at this arbitrary proceeding, and demanded war for the defense of the honor of the whole German Fatherland. For an instant it seemed as if even the king would be carried away by this popular clamor and would grip the sword against the usurper. He first granted permission to Russia to send troops through Prussian territory, and ordered the immediate occupation of Hanover. Yet he still hoped to maintain the neutrality of North Germany. Emperor Alexander, in order to convince the king of the necessity of going to war, came personally to Berlin, and there, on November 3, 1805, took place that memorable meeting at the bier of King Frederick the Great, when both rulers swore everlasting friendship—a treaty in which Prussia promised armed neutrality, several changes in her European policy, and the early rescue of German territory from French troops.

For a long time previous to this meeting there had been in existence in Berlin, and in the whole of Prussia, an association which violently demanded an immediate war with France, and at the head of this party stood a man of unusual ability, Prince Louis Ferdinand of Prussia. Moritz Arndt had already started to fling his

wild Pomeranian fury at the insolent usurper from France, in his famous *Zeitgeist* (Spirit of the Times), and his words created unbounded enthusiasm. The weak and noncommittal agreement between the emperor and king did not suit this war party at all; and when Count Haugwitz returned from a visit to Napoleon with the latter's haughty answer to Frederick William's propositions, they seemed completely bereft of reason. Napoleon had just dealt a fatal blow to Austria and to the whole coalition of his foes by his victory at Austerlitz; and Count Haugwitz, seeing the victorious emperor of the French in his tent after the battle was not willing to risk the anger of Napoleon. Instead of presenting in full the demands which had been formulated in Berlin, he agreed to acknowledge the French conquests and to cede the territories of Cleves, Nürnberg and Ansbach, in return for the whole of Hanover (December 15, 1805). When Berlin attempted to make the acceptance of these terms conditional on France's making peace with the rest of Europe, Napoleon tore up the treaty which had just been signed. Prussia had demobilized and was absolutely impotent to resent Napoleon's high-handed methods. He compelled Prussia to sign an alliance with him, by which it promised to close all the harbors of the North Sea and Lübeck against

England. This closing of the ports meant an inevitable war with England.

But even the acquisition of Hanover, Prussia's promised reward for so much danger, was now uncertain. French troops, despite the Peace of Pressburg between France and Austria, were not withdrawn from South Germany. To the heavy suffering which their presence caused, Napoleon added a further violation of rights by uniting Wesel to France, and also the abbeys of Essen, Werden and Elten, and the new grand dukedom of Berg. It was but natural that Prussia deeply resented the indignities heaped upon it, and the king, long suffering under the blows to the national pride, trembled with fury at the despotic course of the insolent Corsican. But, better than others, he knew the weaknesses of the state and realized the deep suffering and privation which would follow upon war, wherein others imagined nothing but glory, victory and fresh laurels. Least of all did the king desire to be drawn into a war against Sweden, into which Napoleon tried to force him, by urging him to drive the Swedes from Lauenburg. On the contrary, Frederick William persisted in maintaining friendly relations with Russia, which was standing in near relationship to Sweden.

The formation of a North German Federation was a plan ostensibly brought forward by Na-

napoleon at this time, and he even offered to the king of Prussia the title of Emperor of North Germany. Secretly, however, the French emperor meant to have no rival, and he was only flattering Prussia while he terrified the Austrian emperor by these empty fancies. Then, being urged on by Napoleon, and violating all historical rights, sixteen of the little princes of the Rhenish Confederation abandoned the German empire and joined the Corsican on July 17, 1805. Their German troops entered the service of the emperor! There was no Germany any longer; and Emperor Francis surrendered the imperial German crown on August 6.

At this Frederick von Gentz, the great German journalist, called upon the people in impassioned words to rise in their might against Napoleon. Gerhard Johann David Scharnhorst urged the Prussian nation, for the sake of its honor and its existence, to draw the sword from the scabbard. Realizing the coming misery and trouble, Freiherr Heinrich von Stein, minister of finance, begged the king to abolish at once all the ills of the body politic, chiefly the cabinet; and in September the queen, the princes and the famous generals Stein, Blücher and others solemnly petitioned the king to dismiss his advisers and to choose new ones. No one could doubt any longer that the stupendous collection

of troops reported from Westphalia by Blücher, and from Regensburg by Ambassador Count Görtz, were directed against Prussia. Not only was it the evident intention of France forcibly to wrest Hanover from Prussia, but the presence and continued advancing of French troops served to undermine completely the authority of the state in Hanover and its independence at home. It became also more and more probable that Napoleon would come to a full understanding with England and Russia, with the result that Prussia would stand unsupported, and must face an immediate invasion by France both from the South and the West.

Still hoping for peace, Prussia made little effective preparation against such an attack, although plans were arranged for meeting the demands which war would make upon the state treasury. On the advice of Stein, Prussia decided to issue, in January, 1806, its first paper money, and actually did issue in the course of this year notes totaling four and one-half million thalers, the smallest of which had a face value of five thalers.

Napoleon was now requested to withdraw his troops. Instead of acceding to this demand, Napoleon, who was awaiting the signature of Emperor Alexander to a peace treaty which already had been signed by the latter's representative,

objected to withdrawing while Prussia was under arms, and sought to gain time by requesting instead the immediate demobilization of Prussia. In addition, the shrewd French ruler sent word to the Guelph kings of England, assuring them of the ultimate possession of their native land (Hanover). This message of Napoleon was promptly revealed to Prussia and decided the war—to the great joy of the hot-headed patriots. Napoleon himself had hoped to postpone the decisive moment yet a little longer, while Frederick William still hoped to avoid it altogether. Now that war was certain, the king's doubts of the strength and preparedness of his army found a number of supporters, the more so as it seemed clear that the small Prussian army would have to fight the enormous French forces single-handed. Moreover, the French would be assisted by the princes of the Rhenish Bund, who were only too glad to range themselves under the colors of the victorious Corsican. Any aid from the armies of Russia was still far away; and Saxony, though Prussia's ally, secretly sought Napoleon's hand of friendship.

At the very beginning of the war there were mistakes. The plans of Scharnhorst were either cast aside or poorly executed. The army, only partly mobilized, was to march through Thu-

ringia and attack the French army in Franconia, where it was not thought to be very numerous. Because of his excessive modesty, King Frederick William refrained from taking the chief command of the armies, and conferred it on the duke of Brunswick. The latter was of great age, as were nearly all the generals and higher officers of the staff. He accepted the honor of the command with great reluctance and endeavored to throw the responsibility on the king, who accompanied the army in the field, and on the war council, which was called together with ever-increasing frequency. The situation in the Prussian army is characterized by Scharnhorst, who wrote from headquarters: "I know what *ought* to be done, but what will be done—the gods alone may know!" And yet the French attack was imminent.

In order to compass the crossing of the Saale River, the prince of Hohenlohe sent an advance guard under the command of Prince Louis Ferdinand to Rudolstadt. The French occupied Coburg, and Prince Louis decided to attack them—although the idea of crossing the Saale had in the meantime been abandoned. The French employed against Prince Louis their famous "tirailleur tactics," enveloped the Prussian troops and beat them decisively on October 10, 1806. This blow in

itself acted as a damper on the enthusiasm of the army, and its effects were not lessened by the report that the young prince, the hope of all the patriots, the "war god," the darling of the army, on whom all eyes had been centered, had lost his young life on the battlefield. He had redeemed the "solemn manly word" which he and the generals von Blücher and von Rüchel had given in the preceding December at Erfurt, to "risk our lives or not survive this war in which glory and great honor await us; for political freedom and liberal ideas will be crushed and suffocated if it ends disastrously."

A still more dreadful fate was in store for a general who in the last campaigns had gained many laurels—a prince who had scorned the golden chain of the Rhenish Bund, and had hastened to his post of duty in the Prussian army. Instead of occupying, as he had been ordered, the left bank of the river Saale, Prince Hohenlohe retreated to the right bank, and while the Prussian headquarters were thus left unaware of the coming of the enemy, Napoleon marched forward irresistibly. On October 12 he reached a position directly in the rear of the Prussian army, and occupied Naumburg, while Marshal Davout conquered the Saale-ford at Kösen. The Prussians faced about and looked toward their own capital. On October 14 the

twin battles of Jena and Auerstädt were fought. At Jena Hohenlohe succumbed to the great numerical superiority of the enemy, and despite heroic bravery on the part of his troops, was beaten decisively and forced into a retreat which soon changed into a headlong flight. "Rather die a thousand times than live again through such an experience," said Gneisenau, later.

Compared to this disaster, the Prussian army seemed fortunate at Auerstädt, where Scharnhorst used his entire force and ability. With bravery worthy of their old glorious reputation, the Prussians fought against the enemy, and were in a fair way of enveloping and capturing the whole French army. Scharnhorst told his battalions that they had saved the Prussian monarchy—but the expected reinforcements failed to arrive at the right moment. The duke of Brunswick had been severely wounded in the fighting and there was no longer a chief in command; each general acted as he thought best. General von Kalkreuth remained stationary with his reserves of three full brigades on the heights of Eckartsberga, near Naumburg, and 21 battalions with 44 cannon, which had orders to watch the crossings of the Saale at Naumburg and Bornburg, also stayed away from the battle. As a result Davout was enabled to surround the Prussians and the battle was lost for the latter,

despite the enormous losses and complete exhaustion of the French armies.

Nobody realized as yet that not only was the battle lost, but that Prussia herself was lost, and yet such was the case. The arrogance of the insolent conqueror, who immediately after the battle demanded from Prussia a contribution of 159 million francs, as from a conquered land, began to show its bitter fruit. The Prussian army disbanded during the retreat, and the reserves were beaten in a battle near Halle. The fortresses were poorly garrisoned and provisioned, while their commanders were old and incapacitated soldiers. But even granting these conditions, there has never been in the history of the world such a demonstration of cowardice, dishonesty and meanness as was shown during the following months. Erfurt, Magdeburg, Stettin, Küstrin and the Silesian fortresses opened their doors without even a semblance of resistance, and each evil deed of this kind brought forth more evil and trickery. Prince Hohenlohe, who had managed to reach the Uckermark with some of his troops, was cheated and blinded by a deliberate falsehood which Joachim Murat communicated to him concerning the strength of his own troops. Despite the vigorous attack of Prince August of Prussia in the field, Prince Hohenlohe capitulated with his

forces. It was of no use that Blücher had for hours, under the most difficult conditions, tried to relieve him; that Scharnhorst had attacked the enemy with incredible courage both from flank and rear, and later invaded Mecklenburg, thereby compelling the enemy to send several army corps after him. It was useless that Blücher himself had fought valorously before Lübeck, and even in the streets of the city against the French preponderance. Without munitions, provisions and arms, he was compelled to surrender to the enemy. Heroic deeds had been performed here and there, but misfortune pressed on, regardless of individual valor. On October 24 the French entered Berlin, and Napoleon himself visited the tomb of the great Frederick. He removed from the bier of the hero-king the latter's sword, bandolier and military decorations—probably as the crowning honor to the dead ruler! On October 27 he held his official, triumphant entry into Berlin.

He met with many signs of meek servility, the dazed Prussian bureaucracy executing without hesitation most of the Napoleonic orders. But soon the people began to be oppressed by excessive demands for money, while the public buildings and royal castles were deliberately plundered in the most flagrant violation of international rights. Even the great stone quadriga,

a symbol of victory which Frederick William II had erected on the Brandenburg Thor, was removed by order of Napoleon and sent to Paris with all the other art treasures on which he could lay his hands. With the ruthlessness of a barbarian he destroyed everything that reminded the people of the former greatness of Prussia. He even tried to slander Queen Luise, whom he declared the real instigator of the war. He did not realize that more than all his extortions, more than all the crushing tyranny against trade, by which he enforced his continental blockade against England, it was this uncalled-for rudeness to the queen which even then stirred the hearts of Prussia's youth against him and fanned into flame the love for the Prussian fatherland which for a time seemed to have gone to sleep, but which never would die out.

On the day of the terrible battle King Frederick William had asked for an armistice, and he repeated his request frequently, after the flight with his family to East Prussia. He declared himself ready to pay a large indemnity and to surrender all the lands west of the Elbe. Suddenly, however, all negotiations came to an end because of the demand of the French emperor that Prussia at once break with Russia. Frederick William would never agree to forsake his allies, although that had become a common cus-

tom among the other nations whenever it suited their convenience. Neither would Frederick permit Prussia to be the basis from which Napoleon could attack Russia. He decided to continue the war on November 21, 1806. But it took the Russian emperor a long time to decide to give help to his Prussian ally, the decision being hastened by a revolution in Poland, which was directed against both the Russian and Prussian suzerainty. Even then the Russian assistance was of little value. All the real success against the French was achieved by the Prussians. When the French and Russian armies came to battle on the fields near Prussian Eylau, it was the Prussian corps under L'Estocq which, following the advice of Scharnhorst, succeeded in wresting the laurels of victory for the first time from the hands of the emperor. This time the chief of the Prussian general staff had been able to carry out his own orders himself, and all of them had succeeded. At last it had been brought home to Napoleon that the spirit of Frederick the Great had not been wholly extinguished in the Prussian army. He retreated from the battlefield across the Passarge. Scharnhorst, seeing his opportunity, urged an immediate pursuit of the French and the chasing of them across the Vistula. But his pleadings were unsuccessful with the Russian commander-in-

chief, von Bennigsen, who did not care to risk the safety of his army (just saved by the Prussian corps) in the pursuit of such a "general idea." What cared he for the liberation of Danzig or the danger to Pomerania! No further proof need be given that Napoleon was decidedly impressed by the Prussian victory than the fact that the emperor who formerly had rejected with sarcastic comment all requests for an armistice now offered the king a separate peace. Napoleon felt that there might still be danger in these Prussians. He was aware of the negotiations going on between Prussia and Austria and England, and he admitted, not without annoyance, that nowhere else in the world was there more virile force, faith and good-natured kindness united in a single people than in Prussia—a statement which filled with great joy the historian Barthold Niebuhr, who had just moved to Prussia. It worried Napoleon that here had been formed the *Franctireur* corps of Ferdinand von Schill, the brave major of hussars, who caused extensive damage to the French troops in Pomerania; and that the old General de l'Homme de Courbière held his own at Graudenz; and that Major von Gneisenau, supported to the best of his ability by the old Nettelbeck, saved the fortress of Colberg for his king. Indeed, Napoleon was barely able, with the exer-

tion of all his power, to take Danzig, which was defended by its small garrison with the utmost bravery. When the city finally succumbed to the besiegers, on May 26, 1807, Queen Luise wrote in sad realization of the disaster: "There are moments when courage fails and when sadness masters the soul, and this is one of them: Danzig, Danzig is lost, is since yesterday in French hands, those hated, horrible hands!"

All the hopes that Scharnhorst had held forth of the breaking out of a national war were gone. All the plans that Major von Gneisenau had built upon the landing of an army in Hanover in the rear of the French, and the marching of the Swedes to aid Blücher in Pomerania, all this had to be abandoned. In addition to these failures, Prussia's most influential minister, Freiherr von Stein, was dismissed in disgrace. Yet even then Scharnhorst's confidence and the king's perseverance were not at an end. Despite the poor campaigning of the Russian general, Bennigsen, and the fact that his idea of the superiority of Königsberg over Danzig had caused the fall of the West Prussian port, Napoleon did not succeed in loosening the friendship of Prussia and Russia. King Frederick William was still faithful to his allies. The royal family passed its days in poverty and misery at Memel, but the king was so little willing to desert his ally and

accept the proffered hand of Napoleon that he even contracted a closer alliance with Alexander, on the occasion of a personal meeting, at which the Russian emperor fairly surpassed himself in protestations of eternal friendship and fidelity.

The Russian commander-in-chief, Bennigsen, however, once more showed his incompetency at the battle of Heilsberg on June 10, when he did not dare make a final annihilating attack on the French army which had just been beaten by the Prussian corps and was in full retreat. And when Bennigsen's army suffered defeat at the hands of Napoleon in the battle of Friedland, June 14, Russian ambition failed to remain on the same high level as Prussian faith. Alexander concluded peace with Napoleon, formed an alliance with France and betrayed Prussia. Even before Napoleon had a chance to state his terms, Alexander suggested the Elbe as the frontier for Prussia, and was even ready to permit the complete annihilation of Prussia as an independent state, provided his own country would not border on any of Napoleon's vassal states.

Napoleon needed peace just then in order to permit the carrying out of his plans against Spain, and through them against England. Austria seemed to make new attempts to mo-

bilize its forces, and the all-powerful dictator was not quite ready to penetrate into the interior of the Austrian monarchy. For these reasons alone some of the possessions which had been Prussia's remained Prussian. Frederick William, called to the conference on a float in the river Niemen, met the two emperors and was treated with contempt by Napoleon, who showed his low breeding by personally insulting Queen Luise when she begged for leniency in the name of her suffering country. The peace was signed at Tilsit on July 7-9. It separated from Prussia all the lands west of the Elbe and all the Polish possessions, reduced the state from a population of about ten million inhabitants to less than four and one-half million, from 114,000 square miles to 56,000 square miles. And even these "concessions" were made by Napoleon "solely out of respect for his friend, the czar." The western districts of Prussia were incorporated with the new French kingdom of Westphalia, while the eastern parts were turned over as the grand dukedom of Warsaw to the king of Saxony, Prussia's former ally. For the purpose of providing a proper connecting link between the kingdom of Saxony and its new grand dukedom, Warsaw, Prussia was compelled to maintain a "military road" through the Prussian districts. This was immediately changed into a

“commercial road” by Marshal Berthier in a letter to the Prussian envoy-plenipotentiary, Count von Kalkreuth. Even Russia’s cupidity had to be satisfied at helpless Prussia’s cost; so Russia received the city of Bialystock, while Danzig was proclaimed a free city.

There could no longer remain the slightest doubt that the mighty state of Frederick the Great had been demolished. The loud applause of the German princes whom it had so often saved from disaster was its funeral march. And yet, even in this, the hardest time, there were signs of heroism, expressed in the valorous deeds of individual leaders and in the perseverance of the king under every distressing circumstance. These showed that nothing was too difficult to demand of Prussia’s patriotism. The answers which the lost districts sent to King Frederick William, in response to his farewell messages, began to reveal a growing realization among the people that it was impossible to demolish a state by political treaties. Injustice was calling forth the righteous wrath of the whole nation, and inciting the whole people to the deepest and most serious resistance. Whatever may have been the causes which had served to conceal from view these moral forces, they existed even then. Gneisenau recognized as early as 1807 the mighty

soul of Prussia which lived in thousands and thousands of hearts, the infinite powers in the nation which slept unused and undeveloped. It was now necessary to fan these spiritual and moral forces in the hearts of the people into flames, until they should set fire to the whole of Prussia. And the faith of the king, who did not hesitate to recall a man personally objectionable to him, Freiherr von Stein; the wisdom and clear thought of statesmen and military leaders; the general realization of the absolute necessity of establishing the state once more on a sound foundation; the all-surpassing moral courage which clung to the truth and holiness of religious beliefs and faith; the fury of the people against the tyrant to whom nothing was sacred; the love of the Fatherland created by Prussia's ruler, which found in the much abused and much revered queen its finest expression—all these were destined to aid in the dawn of a new day, before which the fires of the despot would vanish. Napoleon had succeeded in reducing Prussia to a ruin, but he could not crush the life from the state. And, truly, from these ruins there was soon to issue forth a new and glorious life.

CHAPTER III

THE REGENERATION OF PRUSSIA

EVER since those early days, in which the heroic wisdom of the Great Elector had raised his little "Mark Brandenburg" to be an oasis in the midst of the desert caused by the unhappy Thirty Years' War, ever since then this little Brandenburg-Prussia had been a thorn in the flesh of the princes of Europe, a stone in their paths. In wonderful wars the Houses of Bourbon and Hapsburg had battled for the pre-eminence in Europe, regardless of the misery which they caused to the people of that unfortunate continent. They realized fully that the subjugation of Germany was the first step to a complete suzerainty over Europe, and the crushing of the independence of the German empire was always the chief aim of the two contending dynasties. What Italy had once been to the Hohenstaufen, Germany was for the Bourbons and the Hapsburgs—the foundation of world power—and as opportunity offered they had drawn now this, now that, German prince

into their meshes and their service. Then suddenly, to the inexpressible surprise of everybody, there had arisen as the champion of the Germans that powerful, energetic Great Elector. With unbounded courage he had dared to oppose not only one but both the conflicting Houses. True, he had to jump and bend and fight and dodge, but despite every disadvantage he succeeded in maintaining his state, and in planting within it the fundamental characteristics of his own nature, the firmness to maintain the freedom of his state and of the empire, and at the same time the moral strength to do right, and the sense of satisfaction caused by duty well done. Was it any wonder then that both Austria and France hated with all their energy this young heroic state, which had dared to interfere with their schemes; that they exerted all their great forces and resources to crush and demolish it? And yet Prussia, as we have seen, had succeeded in holding its ground for a century and a half. Indeed, not only had Prussia held its own ground but also had grown to be a strong shield behind which the smaller princes of the German empire could find protection against the arms of their French neighbors and the wiles and treachery of their imperial master. It is hardly to be questioned that if only one of the two great powers had been in

the field, Prussia would have been enslaved and crushed, and it is to be considered a fortunate thing indeed for the young state that the continual bickerings and wars between the two gave it the chance to maintain its place and to prosper and increase.

There is no pretense that this young new state was actuated solely by purely ideal and unselfish motives, for no individual, much less a state, can progress without at least some selfishness; and it is in the nature of a state that it must contain a living, virile egotism. Otherwise it must sink deeper and deeper into the slime of laziness and be engulfed. Nay, not only the state alone but all humanity, without a certain degree of selfishness, would sink lower and lower into final oblivion. The true appreciation of the welfare of its subjects, the dutiful carrying out of projects in the interests of the people, and the spiritual cleansing of the human race—these are the things that ennoble the necessary selfishness of the state and give it the moral right to exist. And in this true selfishness the Prussian state surpassed all others, chiefly because of the masterful execution of work on the part of its people and the highly developed sense of duty on the part of its rulers. This sense of duty, in particular, had enabled the Hohenzollerns to accomplish deeds of greatness, to jump

between the two fighting great nations and to tear from them the prize, the freedom of the peoples.

And now, in what the Bourbons had failed to do, in what the Hapsburgs had been unable to accomplish, would the boundless insolence of the great Corsican succeed? There lay the state, upon which all human hope was built, shackled and gagged, unconscious and completely exhausted. Naked and miserable, it seemed to beg on its knees for pity from the other nations. Was it really destined to fall? Should this land of glory really bear the fetters of a foreign conqueror? And this foreign, this Gallic nation, had it not suffered a short time ago in the worst slavery? Had it not just succeeded in realizing the depth of its own degradation? With courageous words and rash deeds it had obtained its freedom; but lacking the serious schooling of duty and work it had dashed away like a runaway horse, threatening all and destroying all, until the Corsican general had grasped the reins with firm hand. And was this nation, trembling beneath the grip of its master, destined to place the yoke of servitude upon the neck of a people who had so often fought for the liberty of states? Was the despiser of all morality, the mocker at all moral laws, to reign over a royal House which had built up its crown

by hard work and the strict fulfillment of its every duty?

Such a punishment seemed too harsh as a chastisement for the short time in which the Prussian people had forgotten strict conscientiousness in the joy of glory, for the short period of folly which had followed the long years of hard labor. Some steps had already been taken toward improvement; and he who has looked into the serious face of world-history knows in his innermost heart that brutality may bend down a people, but can never subjugate them for all time. It was not conceit, but a deep feeling for that justice which holds the world together, which caused a Prussian, Count Dohna, to say: "The destruction of the Prussian state cannot be a part of Providence, for this state is necessary to the world and to the cause of true enlightenment."

Just as the loss of one member of a family leads the remaining members into closer attachment, the tearing off of the lands west of the Elbe united more firmly those provinces still remaining to the state. And as at one time the Roman slavery of the human conscience led to the greatest deed of the German spirit, the Reformation, so now the Napoleonic slavery of Prussia led to the political liberation of the whole German nation. Yea—and who would

deny it?—it was just this debasement which bore within itself the germs of the coming unity of Germany. Prussia still remained the last hope of those who still could feel for Germany, who realized the shame of being bound in the chains of the world conqueror. And what a proof of the virility of this state, that the most eminent minds of all Germany gathered within its shattered ruins, and there worked in unison for its restoration! For here and here alone were the seeds which might revive the whole Fatherland; here the people had been brought up in the idea of serving the state, of giving property and life for the welfare of the Fatherland. Here people remembered from days gone by that the state is entitled to ask the greatest sacrifice from the individual, and that the best efforts on the part of all citizens are not only their imperative duty, but the very foundations of the welfare of all. Only here might one expect to find those moral forces without which a virile state is unthinkable.

Reforms, of course, were necessary in Prussia; but the ground had been well prepared in the early days of healthier conditions, and by the more recent attempts at improvement. In many cases one had but to reach back to old-German institutions, to follow the guideposts set up by Frederick William I and Frederick II. These

men had engraved in letters of iron the weighty words "Fulfillment of Your Duty," and had explained the duty itself, as well as the demands of the times. Frederick William I, in particular, had served this principle, and Frederick II had, as he expressed it, the "presumption to think that some of his laws and regulations might even be fitted for posterity." A different spirit filled the people; they saw that other institutions were needed, and the evil days of the citizens' indifference concerning their government were gone forever. The new era set up new demands, and the best minds of the nation were filled with aims which had been hidden, by an impenetrable fog, from the eyes of duty-filled absolutism. The past was dead, but had died only to give, phoenix-like, new life to the future!

The national government had remained for a long time a dumb spectator, viewing idly the great events of national life, the mighty advance in the spirit of the people. It now became necessary to utilize the awakened forces of the people for the service of the Fatherland, and to awaken those still lying in slumber to new life, new work, for the benefit of the state. It was necessary to revive the old Prussian principle, that work for the state is the duty and obligation of *every* individual citizen. Not by using any foreign ideas and principles, but by

appealing to the innate spirit of the state and the nation, did the Prussian leaders plan to revive their land; and the new structure, the new state, must be erected, not on the sand heap of temporary expediency, but on the firm rock foundations of the old Prussian state. These thoughts had been stirring for a long time, and attempts at reform had been made at various times. But it was this deep national misfortune which brought those germinating ideas to a quick ripening, which brought back hearts and minds from the base gratification of passion to true morality and true piety. This has always been the case in the history of the world,—the old time dies in the throes of pain and fear, while the new one is born in travail. Even without being goaded by the whip of a foreign conqueror, Prussia had more than once surprised the nations by her force of moral regeneration, had taken stock of her own faults and subsequently developed an astonishing power. That the Prussian state succeeded this time in undertaking such a radical cure of itself, directly under the eyes of a man so tyrannical, selfish, calculating, clever and suspicious as Napoleon—that, indeed, was something absolutely unheard-of, something astonishing beyond all human conception.

Prussia had not been wiped off the map of

Europe entirely, and the House of Hohenzollern still wore the crown of Prussian royalty. But the "Evil One" (Napoleon) had taken good care that the very existence of the state should in itself cause its ultimate ruin. It was to be a "buffer state," a barrier, occupied always by French troops, in order to keep a close watch over Russia. It was therefore only natural that even the slightest indication of a new spirit, a new "life," was regarded with the utmost suspicion not only by Napoleon himself, but by his vassals, Jérôme, king of Westphalia, who squandered his people's money under the most shameful and immoral régime, and the self-centered and narrow "king-duke" of Saxony-Poland. Of even greater importance was the condition that, according to the terms of the peace treaty, French troops were to remain in the garrisons of Prussia until the huge indemnity had been paid. The state had been robbed of its arteries of commercial life, the Elbe and practically the whole Vistula, while the sole remaining river, the Oder, was hampered and throttled by French garrisons at Stettin, Küstrin and Glogau. All trade with England was stopped until such time as France felt inclined to make peace with Britain. Bands of French troops roamed at will over the whole country, sucking the lifeblood of the people like vampires. Often it was the

written order for supplies in the hands of a French soldier which forced the poor citizen to acknowledge bankruptcy in advance. And Napoleon took every precaution not to permit trade or commerce to be revived. In order to force England to make peace, he conducted a commercial war with unheard-of cruelty. By stopping all shipping, confiscating property, inflicting enormous impost duties and taxes, he ruined the private fortunes and business of thousands of citizens, at the same time crushing industry, agriculture and internal trade with cold-blooded calculation.

Under such conditions it was, of course, impossible for the state to pay the war indemnity of 154½ million francs. But even this huge sum did not satisfy Napoleon. Every now and then the emperor and his chief financial assistant, Daru, evolved new calculations, new demands, which the commission appointed by the king of Prussia found it impossible to satisfy. For this "peace" was not real, it was but peace in name; the demolishing of the whole state was the real aim. In facing such savage schemes it was useless to be yielding and obliging; and all projected plans of taxation remained mere paper plans, or failed to bring the expected revenues.

It was then that the king decided upon a most important step, that of selling all his private

property for the good of the state. Legal doubts concerning the transaction were swept aside by Stein, while the nobility consented to it in principle, and the domains of the royal House of Hohenzollern were offered for sale to the highest bidder. But who, in that poverty-stricken country, could even think of buying these lands? Even if some one had offered to buy, the prices obtained at this time of direst need and poverty would have been ruinously low. For the same reason it was useless to attempt to float a loan; and finally Prince William, brother of the king, offered to go as a hostage to France, pending payment of the indemnity.

Thus Prussia remained in the possession of the French troops. The presence of 160,000 French soldiers quartered there compelled Austria to be very quiet, held the czar in leash, and formed a continental counterweight against the maritime war of England. Indeed, Napoleon fully expected to humiliate England by commercial starvation, and to cause it to realize that the "sea could be conquered on the land." By the time England succeeded in occupying the Spanish, Dutch and French colonies, France (to use Napoleon's own expression) would have eaten up Prussia completely. When Napoleon went to war he had in his treasury between 24,000 and 80,000 francs; from unhappy little

Prussia he squeezed more than the entire income of thirteen years—over a billion francs. How much additional damage he caused to the national wealth is beyond all computation. The king of Saxony, for instance, confiscated the private fortune of Prussian subjects in his new possession of Warsaw, contrary to the stipulations of the peace treaty. By this single action he damaged the Prussian national wealth by at least fifteen million thalers.

In addition to all this there was the open derision, the plain malicious insult with which Napoleon treated the king and his advisers. "The Prussians are no nation, have no national pride; they are the Gascons of Germany." He knew only too well how they all hated him; and sometimes he must have felt a certain amount of uneasiness, particularly when he saw how his blows not only increased this hatred, but were actually raising the beaten people's moral seriousness and sense of duty. His spies were everywhere, among the soldiers as well as among the consuls and their employees whom he sent into the cities to control all British goods. "I know everything, I know what your statesmen are thinking. You can't deceive me;"—he shouted once at the Prussian ambassador in Paris; and added his ominous "I shall be swifter than lightning."

But behold! Under the spying eyes of this terrible man, the Prussian people succeeded in carrying out a wonderful and precious revolutionary change. Misfortune purifies and cleanses lofty and noble natures; and the truly great man places his goal higher under misfortune than during the days of luck and plenty. So was it in Prussia. Not only its own liberation, but the liberty of all Germany, the glory of the old imperial reign, was to be fought for. As yet the ways and means were dark, the goal was dim and far away; but the idea and the yearning for its realization were there and the people knew that victory against the foreign conqueror would sooner or later bring this idealistic dream within the reach of the Prussian nation.

No one among the people was more outspoken, more bitter in his denunciation of the "German princes by Napoleon's grace," than Freiherr Heinrich von Stein. He was filled with the idea of a United Germany, and he spoke courageously, as "a free knight of the empire, equal to any and all German princes." He said: "I have but one Fatherland, and that is called Germany, and as I am subject only to the empire and not to any subdivision thereof, I am devoted only to the whole empire and not to any one particular portion of the same!" His scathing criticism of the sickly and rotten condi-

tions in the state swept through the land like a hurricane, smashing and breaking everything that was decayed and dying, and unworthy to live. Every one bowed to the greatness of this powerful mind, to the Titanic character of this superman. We can easily understand how Stein's forceful, ruthless personality might be objectionable to a king to whom order and methodical progress were almost a sacrament.

But whatever may have been the private tastes of King Frederick William III, he always subordinated his desires to his sense of duty. In July, 1807, acting on the advice of Hardenberg, he recalled his former minister; and he declared that "it was a word of consolation" when he heard that Stein had accepted the offer and would return to him. It was with demonstrations of joy and gladness that Queen Luise received the confident Stein, when he paid his respects at Memel, on September 30, 1807. When shortly afterward there arose a situation which, he thought, compelled him to resign once more from his responsible position, the queen wrote a personal letter to him, urging and begging him to remain at his post in order that the good which had been accomplished might not be lost. Her troubled soul yearned for companionship with strong and proven patriots, and her woman's intuition had recognized in Stein the savior

of Prussia. When Stein actually and permanently took charge of the ship of state, Queen Luise permitted herself again the harmless little pleasures of her simple farm, near Königsberg, which was called Luisenwahl in later years. There the king and royal family spent the summers of 1809 and 1810.

In his memorial of June, 1807, called *Concerning the Proper Training of the State, Provincial, Financial and Police Authorities in the Prussian Monarchy*, Stein outlined a comprehensive programme, which culminated in the requirement "to awaken the religious and moral, mental and physical development of the people; to revive the quiescent or falsely guided forces of communal, municipal and national spirit, and to give every property holder a share in the conduct of local administration." Stein particularly emphasized this last requirement, which was calculated to do away with the peculiar feeling of being an outsider, "a hired servant," who had somehow entered the bureaucratic officials. He hoped also by this method to abolish useless forms and phraseology. Twenty years later he expressed his idea in the following words: "What the school represents to youth, the active participation in government affairs is to the mature man. He is compelled to transfer his attention and activity from purely

personal affairs to those of the community, and he acts in full view of the public. Selfish motives and empty vanity are immediately noticed by the observers and are properly punished."

Stein went even further than that. He not only demanded that the people take part in the administration of the laws, but also in the formation of these laws. The so-called political testament of Stein, in which these principles are contained, it is true was not written in its entirety by himself, but it was signed by him, and therefore represents his views. He always supported these views in debate, to the utmost of his power and ability. The exact method of creating a popular representation, the formation of provincial or imperial governmental bodies, an upper and a lower house of representatives, professional and commercial assistance, election rights and methods, and the powers of the representatives after they had been elected—all these matters were still exceedingly vague and there was much difference of opinion among the leading men, such as Vincke, Rhediger, Schön, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Grolmann, Boyen and von Wedell (former president of the chamber at Halberstadt).

Stein had in view separate provincial assemblies to take charge of the provinces, or districts, in purely local affairs; a *Reichstag* to be

chosen by the free vote of all property owners; and an "Upper House" to represent separately the rich nobility, or, as he expressed it, "the improved and ennobled nobility" as a support to the hereditary monarchy. The representation of special interests was to be restricted in such a manner that merchants could only choose a merchant and peasants could not elect either a nobleman or a lawyer. Stein considered in his plans for popular representation only property owners, and, in the first place, only owners of real estate. In this respect he was in direct opposition to Vincke, who wanted to exclude at once all property qualifications from the qualifications of a voter. It followed from Stein's plan that in order to create the best of understanding between his "property-owning representatives" and the government, he favored the exclusion from the *Reichstag* and local assemblies of all "lawyers, scriveners and trouble-makers." In this idea Stein was strongly supported by von Wedell. According to this view, lawyers and writers, being unacquainted with the conditions in the property owners' class, would be apt to sacrifice everything to their own interests, to impractical theories and to vanity. Von Wedell also expressed the opinion that the government should have the double right, first, of increasing the number of

the members of the Upper House by creating new peers, and, second, of dissolving the *Reichstag*. In the latter case the government should be compelled to hold new elections and assemble the new *Reichstag* within six months.

The king himself was, as Stein relates, even at that early date, ready to form some sort of representative government, and ordered the publication of an article by Stein, in which the latter expressed his belief that, "The new order could be built upon a representative system, which assured to the nation an active part in the making of the laws, thereby enhancing the communal spirit and the love for the Fatherland." Twice, in the period of 1808-1811, attempts were made to give the state a representative government, but they miscarried, and we know now how many more years were destined to pass before such plans were actually carried into execution.

The more practical reform, in administration as well as that in general social conditions, succeeded splendidly. Stein's character, it is true, was too large and broad to take notice of all the minor details. He overlooked difficulties, even if they were insurmountable. He demanded the execution of his orders, without bothering his head about the method of the doing. As Frederick von Raumer expresses it: "He re-

joined in the battle of wits and valorously fought for what he considered the best; but it was not given to him and to his pushing, forceful mind to remove day after day, through long years, difficulties that arose anew each day." It is undoubtedly true that Stein, in his impulsive will power, his quick and rapid execution, missed many things; he was certainly unfitted, by reason of his fiery, violent temperament, to be a diplomat or statesman.

This impulsiveness resulted in Stein's enforced second resignation as minister, after only a few months of fruitful labor. In a letter written on August 15, 1808, he had requested the prince of Wittgenstein to stir up a revolution in Westphalia. This letter fell into the hands of Napoleon, just at a time when he was preparing to heap new indignities on the head of Prussia. With the mocking phrase of regret "that the king of Prussia had ministers who were as clumsy as they were depraved," Napoleon ordered the letter printed in the Paris *Moniteur* and in the *Telegraph*, a miserable sheet of the utmost servility to the French, printed in Berlin. Naturally he demanded Stein's instant dismissal; and the latter himself begged the king to relieve him of his post, realizing that his continuance in office under the conditions could only have grave consequences for

the state. He was relieved on November 24, 1808.

Despite this dismissal, Stein remained the all-enlivening spirit. He had the innate majesty of authority, which Vincke had occasion to miss in later years; and he still carried on his shoulders the whole reform of the government. Stein laid down as his first principles that the national state must be the aim of the future, and that the participation of the people in the administration and in the making of the laws must constitute the foundation of a national existence. In the matter of pure patriotism, generosity, heroic thought, forceful activity and readiness to sacrifice all and everything, Stein has never been surpassed by any individual.

An entirely different character, and yet one completely in harmony with Stein's ideas, was his predecessor and later successor, Freiherr von Hardenberg, who, after his dismissal through the influence of Napoleon, on September 12, 1807, had gathered his suggestions as to the necessary reorganization of the Prussian people in a volume of political suggestions. Where Stein was rough, rude and often insulting, Hardenberg had the smooth, polite bearing of the born diplomat; not the courtier who flatters, but the diplomat who knows how to hide his plans and his work from the enemy. Stein was

German through and through; Hardenberg more cosmopolitan, and yet far more Prussian than German. Stein was a devout and true Christian; Hardenberg, while not exactly an infidel, was more inclined to take a somewhat liberal view of life, religion and love. Stein only considered the common weal, to which should be subordinated everything personal, and to serve which should be the highest aim and honor of the individual. Hardenberg placed the welfare of the individual ahead of that of the state as a whole. Stein demanded in the first place the reawakening of the moral forces; Hardenberg that of the economic forces. Stein, although influenced somewhat by the English system of self-government, lived as a "knight of the empire" in the dream of imperial splendor, and preferred to look back at all times to the old-time German institutions. Hardenberg admired the advantages of the French system of local prefects. Stein was the reformer of the administration and constitution of the state; and Hardenberg was the founder of the new social order. Stein defended the mercantile system and the old-time guilds, with their purifying moral influences; Hardenberg fought for the freedom of trade and commerce. Stein coupled his demand for a participation of the nation in government with a property qualification, and

stood for a separate Upper House. Hardenberg (he had occasion later to change his views repeatedly) stood at first firmly for a house composed of the nobility and high government officials, and considered an Upper House unnecessary and impracticable. Stein desired to retain the feudal tenure of property under the state, called feoffment-in-trust (*Fideikommissarischen Besitz*); Hardenberg, on the other hand, favored the mobilization of all real estate property. Stein was full of understanding of the historical development of the estates of the realm and was for that reason a friend of self-government; Hardenberg was full of enthusiasm for the paid officials, engaged and trained by the state. Stein's ideas were based chiefly on his conception of history and conservatism, and the formation of the new constitution was to him mainly the "evolution of the present from the past." Hardenberg stood with both feet firmly planted on the ground of liberal ideas of the present, and did not shrink from even the most advanced demands of enlightenment. He considered the reform not in the sense of historical evolution, but as "a sign of the highest concepts of the state."

Of such different character were these two men. And after the terrible year of the destruction they never sat simultaneously in the

advisory council of the king. Yet both had in common the hatred against the foreign oppressor, and the hope for the ultimate liberation of the Fatherland through the Prussian state. Both worked with the full devotion for the awakening of the national spirit, the regeneration of the state, a revolution to be started by the royal House itself, a constitution based on "unity, power and nationality," and the final aim of improving and ennobling all humanity—their activities being so similar that posterity has linked their names together, whenever it speaks of the new Prussian legislation. One of them wanted to retain the old-Prussian principles, the other wished to introduce democratic ideas into the monarchy; but both planned to enthuse the people by means of passing better laws, and by permitting those who were fitted therefor to participate in the work of the government.

Because of the dismembered condition of the state, and the practical control by the French army of even those parts that remained, all innovations could be nothing but temporary changes. The establishment of a cabinet council facilitated the government business, in connection with the General Conference, and Stein accepted the portfolio of chairman of this council, after the resignation of Beyme, who had been appointed president of the supreme court.

Stein retained in office all the former members of the council, and all sought to work in harmony. It was first only possible to exert proper supervision in the East Prussian section; but the number of great men assembled in this work was astonishing. Of these we shall mention here only the liberal and businesslike Freiherr von Schrötter and his counselor Friese.

It was remarkable how Prussia turned back to the old institutions of Frederick William I, in reëstablishing the new administration. In order to reconstruct the whole, it was only necessary to cleanse the various departments from the abuses which had crept in. Then each department was found ready to meet present conditions. Even President von Schön, who had enjoyed a more theoretical than historical training, could not but admit that the much abused king had really been the most capable, in internal government matters, of all of Prussia's rulers.

Of course, not everything succeeded on the first trial; we must even acknowledge that notwithstanding the collective ability of the eminent counselors, the greater number of the plans and schemes which were made, discussed, accepted, and submitted to the king had ultimately to be discarded or, at least, not put into execution. The movement for a central administra-

tion, along the lines laid down by Stein and worked out by Altenstein, came to a satisfactory conclusion through its acceptance on November 24, 1808, signed by the king. The whole national entity of the state, the coöperation of all the forces of national life toward the awakening of the national spirit, were to have their center in the *Staatsrat* (state council). This council was to include the adult princes of the royal House, five active ministers, the passive ministers, several counselors of the ministry, the privy counselors (especially those in the ministries of the interior and finance), a private secretary and a number of young assistants who were to be present for the purpose of learning the conduct of state matters, but were without the right to vote or to voice their opinions. The chairman of this state council was to be the king; and its work was to be done in committees, as well as in the council as a whole. The committees were selected in strict accord with the practical knowledge of their members, and the ministers, too, were carefully chosen from their respective fields of endeavor. The indiscriminate mixing of authority, because of local or other influences, was avoided; and henceforth there was but *one* minister for foreign affairs, *one* for the interior, *one* for finance, *one* for war and *one* for justice.

This plan had already received the confirmation of the king and was to have been put in force immediately, when Stein was compelled to resign on the demand of Napoleon. His successors, the ministers von Altenstein and von Dohna, issued the *publicandum* of December 16, 1808, which omitted the *Staatsrat* and left the entire conduct of the state to the five ministers, who represented the highest power in the state. Count Dohna, however, soon reverted to the order of November 24, 1808; and when finally the new constitution of the Prussian government was finished by Hardenberg on October 27, 1810, it contained the provisions of the *Staatsrat*, outlined above, with but minor amendments. The chief amendment was the establishing of the office of chancellor of the state, to which Hardenberg had been appointed a few months previously. The chancellor, instead of the king, was to be chairman of the *Staatsrat*; he was to maintain supervision over all the ministers, particularly over the departments of finance and the interior, which remained without responsible ministerial heads for some time. He was also to take special interest in the conduct of foreign affairs, and to supervise the royal household, the royal income and the archives of the state. In short, the chancellor of the state was placed at the head of all the nation's business, while the

actual installation of the *Staatsrat* was not accomplished until seven years later.

Of great importance in the coöperation of the central authorities and the provincial officials were the four "presidents"—the heads of the several provinces of the state, which had been mentioned in the *publicandum* of 1808, but which had been omitted from the constitution of 1810. Valuable notations concerning this work have been made by Stein, Altenstein and Schrötter. The four presidents were the permanent representatives of the ministers, and at the same time the trusted confidants of the inhabitants of their respective provinces. Without being hampered by administrative detail, they maintained supervision over the whole administration and over such business (as, for instance, military and police matters) as was really beyond the proper sphere of the local chambers.

Attempts were made, acting on the advice of von Vincke, to give the provincial administrative councils all the advantages and privileges of a ministerial college, and to arouse in their members the sense of personal responsibility. Only the most important matters, concerning at least several districts, were decided by the council as a whole, or even by the particular committee in charge of such matters. All preliminary steps in individual districts, as well as

all minor decisions, had to be made by the local councilor himself. By carefully separating the various council chambers according to their work, these chambers became the actual governing bodies of the state, and handled all the state business in five divisions: Police, education, finances, military matters, and the department for customs, taxes and internal revenue. The police department was not intended to be merely a preventer of damage and crime, but a factor in the improvement of the common weal. This improvement, it now was clear, lay in the abolishment of the old mercantile system. A policy of free trade, domestic as well as foreign, was announced, which could not have been made more comprehensive, and which lived up to the Hardenberg principle of *Laissez faire, laissez aller*.

Stein had succeeded in carrying out one reform, which he considered vitally important to prevent abuses in a government administered solely by paid officials. Each provincial government included nine representatives of the estates of the province, selected by the king from a larger number of delegates chosen at a general convention in the province. These nine delegates had full voting power in all important legislation decided by the council chamber as a whole. This idea of having representatives of



Queen Louise and Napoleon.
From the painting by O. Wiesniewski.

the estates in the administration seems all the more extraordinary when it is remembered how little uniformity there was among those estates; and, as a matter of fact, it was carried out only in East Prussia, and even there without lasting success.

No field of activity was better suited than municipal government to aid in Stein's plans of drawing the nation into administrative work. The continual cleansing and purifying of the city administrations, the untiring efforts of the citizens to extend their trade and commerce, the remarkably flourishing condition in which they had been before the war, had created a prosperity in the cities of Prussia which was the envy of their neighbors and which necessarily roused an exceedingly favorable impression when compared with the slipshod methods of other cities. The reforms of Frederick William I, and the advancement of the tradesman and artisan through Frederick II, had served to prepare a soil for the growth of civic betterment, such as did not exist elsewhere in Europe. It was Stein, too, undoubtedly, who was the real father of the Prussian municipal law of November 19, 1808, although his share in the proposals and drafts which preceded it was unusually small. It is significant, however, that the basis of this municipal law lies in two drafts, written by order

of von Stein by one of the tax commissioners, Privy Councilor Frey. This reform, like all others made at this time, was given to the cities by the king of his own free will. Some of the cities were even reluctant to accept this valuable and gracious gift. The chief aim now was to remove the city's affairs from the supervision of the state, in order to "create more interest in the community and increase the attractiveness of public office, which leads to a lifting up of the national spirit, to a studying of general educational matters, and to the desire for the possession of a good reputation, thereby curbing egotism and frivolity." That is to say: the root of all the evil suffered by the nation was to be torn out, and in order to render feasible a thorough healing of the wound, the state voluntarily surrendered a portion of its rights to the citizens. The control of the police power, of the courts and of the safety of the roads was retained by the state as representing branches of state duties; but the entire internal administration, including the municipal budget, the housing and care of the poor, schools and the supervision of buildings, was placed in the hands of the city authorities. The sole restraining clause in this liberal municipal law was that the election or choice of the highest municipal officers should be subject to confirmation by the state. By this

the state was assured that its own laws and rules would not be broken or defied by the municipalities. As a matter of fact, even the police power was turned over to the city authorities in most of the larger towns.

These reforms made, in every city, a tremendous change. Where formerly the population of a city had been divided into "classes" and "guilds," it now consisted only of "citizens," and "strangers enjoying citizens' rights." The obtaining of these rights of citizenship was greatly facilitated. The citizens transferred their civic rights to their aldermen, who were elected by universal suffrage, while the aldermen chose some of their number to form a municipal council, which carried out the resolutions of the board of aldermen. The municipal council was composed of paid and unpaid counselors—the high-sounding name "senator" had fortunately been rejected! Only those counselors who were specialists in some particular branch of municipal government (the mayor, trade supervisors and building commissioners) received salaries, and even they were elected only for a certain period. In the great desire for independence of the cities, steps were taken which later proved to have been too far-reaching. The supervision of the state over the financial affairs of the cities, the free disposition which could be made by the

board of aldermen of the money, and the fixing of the annual budget, as well as the placing of the municipal council practically under the orders of the aldermen—these innovations were neither to the best interests of the state nor to those of the cities.

This very overstepping of the bounds of prudence in granting greater independence to the cities shows the determination with which the state attacked the problem of giving to the people an active part in the administration of the community, "thereby creating and fostering the national spirit." The universal application of this new municipal law to all the cities proved, later on, a tie of the utmost importance, when Prussia was restored to power and many changes in the national administration were found necessary.

In a similarly liberal manner the artisans' guilds were freed from their shackles. As early as August, 1807, King Frederick William decided that the stringent factory law and the prohibition of imports were no longer desirable. In 1808 new regulations removed the restriction in the manufacture of millstones; the operation of mills, breweries and distilleries; the compulsory membership in the respective guilds; the monopolies of the butcher, baker and grocery trades; and finally, as the greatest single item,

the restrictions which interfered with free trade from country to city, and vice versa. The edict of October 27, 1810, also established a new taxation system which, despite the new and exhaustive demands for money, left margin enough for life and expansion.

Stein had intended to establish, besides the municipal law, a village law, with liberal self-administration, and also a county law, formulated somewhat along the lines of the British county system. Vincke, especially, had worked hard on this plan. After Stein's resignation, however, the plan fell through, not so much because of the evident hostility of the nobility and the peasants, but because of the great number of propositions and schemes which loaded down the Altenstein-Dohna ministry. It was the crowding of many affairs that made the acceptance of this plan impossible, although both ministers were liberally inclined and greatly in favor of such legislation. And yet it would have been of incalculable value to the state to have had a satisfactory village and county law; for the new legislation had removed from the old political constitution every vestige of economic foundation by which rural communities could be guided and controlled.

The freeing of the peasants from bondage had been one of the great desires of the Prussian

rulers of old, pursued at times with the greatest fervor, but always meeting with the most determined resistance. Why, indeed, should not the earnest mind of King Frederick William III occupy itself with this heritage from his ancestors, which at the same time was so clearly demanded by the spirit of the times? The freedom of the serfs was, as he declared on the occasion of his ascension to the throne, the goal at which he would aim throughout the years. He had intended to reach it gradually, but the unfortunate situation demanded and justified a quicker solution. We should, however, refrain from using the too oft abused terms of "liberty" and "slavery," and should rather express the matter more in accordance with the actual conditions. The king issued an edict, on October 9, 1807, "in order to remove everything that might prevent the individual from attaining that measure of affluence which he was able to reach by exertion of his power." This edict eliminated all distinctions of class in the purchase of real estate and property, and permitted the nobleman, if he so desired, to engage in trade or commerce, without "losing caste." The bourgeois and peasant were also permitted to exchange their positions and to pass from one class into the other. The edict furthermore forbade any and all conditions of

hereditary bondage between landowner and landtiller. This important section of the law went into effect on St. Martin's Day, 1810, on which date the last vestige of "slavery," as Stein called it, was removed from Prussian soil. On the royal lands, bondage was lifted by the edict of October 28, 1808, while two further edicts in 1811 settled the relations between landowner and peasant, and changed all remaining bondage farms into free land, requiring the owner to release the bonded peasant from all further claims of servitude.

By means of these edicts the king actually created entirely new social conditions, backed solely by his own personal force. As his hand thus struck hard and deep into the existing order of things, it was but natural that he should meet with considerable resistance. Unconcernedly, however; as only a king of Prussia could, Frederick William insisted on the revolutionary change. This recognition of the demands of the times, and this demonstration of the power of royalty to master even the most perplexing social problems, was well worthy of admiration, particularly in those trying times of political misery.

Our explanations have sought to show that the men whom the king called to the head of the government deserve a full share of the credit

for this big reformatory work on the whole structure of the state. But to Frederick William himself belongs the chief credit. He not only chose his advisers and assistants with an open mind and a clear understanding, but he supported them and helped them carry their efforts to completion in spite of opposition and in spite of his own occasional doubts. In order to gain the support of Stein, Hardenberg once wrote to the latter: "The king has gained much through misfortune, and his persistency is worthy of great honor. Find the right way or manner to discuss your business with him, and you will find him ready to help you in anything that is good and useful, as I have had occasion to discover." And Stein on his part reminded his successors, when they hesitated before the difficulties of their work, that the decisive will power and the proven good common sense of the king would give them courage and assure the success of their task. Frederick William himself, as Clausewitz and Boyen report, used to call the innovators in his councils the "good party."

In what other source could one expect to find in this misery of political slavery the strength for social liberation, except in the hope to pass through this misery to political and national freedom? One step which was undoubtedly the

first and most pressing was the reform of the army. It was fortunate indeed that for this reform, too, there were a number of distinguished minds gathered around the king. The king himself had been convinced of the necessity for a complete reorganization, even before the great calamity itself. It was only his fear of hurting the feelings of the "feather dusters" (a jocular name for the commanding officers of the Prussian army, given them because of their hat ornaments) that had prevented him from carrying through his reforms with energy. It seemed nothing short of heinous even to suggest a complete revision or reorganization of the great Frederick's victorious war structure. But during the war with Napoleon, Frederick William made a number of important changes in military tactics and in generalship, based on his own personal ideas. He now gave his assent to the most important propositions of Scharnhorst, who afterward declared that the king made many of the changes himself. In December, 1806, a royal edict was issued, calling for severe punishment for the cowardly commanders of the various fortresses which had surrendered. Then, shortly after the conclusion of peace, the king nominated a commission for the complete reorganization of the army, at the head of which he placed Scharnhorst. Unfortunately, however, there

were included in the commission a number of opponents of the contemplated reorganization, and these caused so much trouble and bickering that Stein wrote in December, 1807: "The spirit of intrigue is again rampant in the army, and I fear very much that it may obtain the upper hand and restore all the old abuses, which wrecked the monarchy!" After Stein had been removed, General von York hoped that "this one crazy head having been crushed, the rest of the poisonous brood would dissolve in its own poison."

But opposed to such vigorous representatives of the reactionary party were Gneisenau and Grolmann, to whom later were added Count Götzen, the energetic governor general of Silesia, and Boyen, the heir and successor of Scharnhorst. Stein, too, had a voice in the deliberations; and Scharnhorst was appointed adjutant general (chief *aide de camp*) of the king on May 31, 1808. This meant the removal of the opposition party from personal contact with the sovereign. After this, the thought of reform made rapid progress. Blücher demanded a national army; Prince Augustus urged universal military duty; while Clausewitz, the best and most talented pupil of Scharnhorst, explained the points of reform scientifically. Scharnhorst had to fight against the extremists

on the reform side as well as on the other, especially when the suggestion was made that officers ought to be chosen by the soldiers themselves, thereby removing all real authority from the ruler. But more detrimental than all the other opposition to the planned reorganization was the terrible financial condition of the state. And the most dangerous phase of the reform was the chance of arousing the suspicious resentment of Napoleon's emissaries, who followed each move with the utmost care. In the summer of 1808 Napoleon demanded the dismissal of Scharnhorst, which was seemingly carried out. Secretly, however, the great general remained at the head of the army and worked harder than ever.

One high idea was clearly recognized as the main duty. The new army must be based on moral foundations, welded together by high ideals and true education, a *national* army—"representing the union of all the moral and physical powers of the citizens of the state;" because a fight for the Fatherland, for the independence and honor of the nation, by a universal rising of a people, this is the triumph of morality. This central idea naturally developed four further demands. In the first place, the army henceforth must consist of native-born citizens only; second (and this demand was a literal rep-

etition of the principle of Frederick William I), every subject of the state, regardless of birth or caste, should be obliged to serve in war; all the inhabitants of a state should be its natural defenders. The third demand was a change in the method of promoting officers. The king promised to any soldier who had never committed a felony an officer's commission, provided he showed knowledge and ability, without the slightest regard to his patrician or plebeian birth. Promotion even to the rank of commanding general was to be made without regard to the length of service in the army. Nobody could become an officer without having gone successively through the ranks of private, sergeant and ensign, while the promotion to the rank of ensign depended upon successful passing of a technical and scientific examination. Promotion from ensign to lieutenant was made only after another examination, and in addition the consent of the officers' corps. The choosing of officers solely from the nobility, in the years past, had not only served to deprive the army of the talents and abilities of the bourgeois part of the nation, but it had created in the officers' corps the wrong idea that it was no longer necessary for a nobleman to possess military ability in order to become an officer. As a result, the general intelligence and education of officers had

deteriorated and was far behind that of other professions; and the army itself had become a subject of hatred and derision. In the fourth place, it was decided to abolish once for all the custom of corporal punishment from that "caste" to which the entire nation henceforth belonged. For "any punishment which would be considered dishonorable in any other profession or trade must be doubly dishonoring in the army." Finally, this definite reintroduction of the ancient German principle of universal conscription, of the formation of an army composed of all the inhabitants of the state excepting only the crippled, insane and criminal, this made necessary the fixing of the term of military service for a definite period of years. Stein proposed ten years, Scharnhorst six years.

Neither Scharnhorst nor Gneisenau made the mistake of considering an armed mob an *army*. They knew that the continual training and drilling on the barrack grounds, maneuvering in the field, sharpshooting and skirmishing remained absolutely necessary, after eliminating the seemingly useless minor matters. Military administration, education, the general staff, the system of fortifications and particularly the artillery, were subjected to sweeping reforms. It was seen that only by continued general maneuvers, by continued common training, could the able

bodied men of the state acquire the knowledge that they constituted a "military body." Training requires teachers; warlike thought demands warriors; and in order to change a whole nation into a body of soldiers, "it was necessary first of all to instill in them, even in peace, a military spirit." Herein lay the greatest difficulty. Would Napoleon for one moment permit such an assembling of the able-bodied youths of the nation? At first, while part of the state was occupied by the French troops, and while financial conditions were at the lowest ebb, it had been decided to limit the size of the standing army to 40,000 men. But in the Treaty of Paris Napoleon forbade the state of Prussia, on September 8, 1808, to maintain an army of more than 42,000 men at any one time. This order was a new chain around those who had never given up the hope that the Fatherland would rise again in all its former splendor.

Those heroes who were still resolved on liberation from the French yoke had to find some means of building an army in secrecy. Who can appreciate what it must have cost those open-hearted, frank and courageous men to simulate and to use trickery? How could any one realize a universal military service, when the low figure of 42,000 soldiers in arms was fixed? In this dire necessity Scharnhorst had the novel idea

of giving "training in installments," an idea which solved the whole problem and made the army a truly national one. Each company had at that time only twenty-five men; instead of keeping these until the expiration of their full service term, Scharnhorst decided to discharge five and more of them, on leave of absence, and to call in an equal number of new, green recruits to be trained. After a month, another five were discharged, and five new recruits added to each company; within five months the whole company had nothing but "new recruits." The newly trained were sent back to their civil duties, trades and professions, at the end of their fifth month, to continue quietly in military exercises under the instruction of older officers, who had been given "leave of absence to go to their homes." This quiet military instruction in the small towns and villages, which usually took place in the school yards and gymnasiums, served to stir up the fiery spirit of the growing boys and students. In this manner Scharnhorst succeeded in training more than 100,000 *Krümpers*, as they were called, in maneuvers and general military drill. They were destined a few years later to become the terror of Napoleon's armies. And yet, the scheme was handled so carefully that Napoleon had no chance to protest against it as a violation of the Paris treaty.

To crush the French conqueror was the sole idea and aim of the patriots, and the hatred in Prussia grew more and more against him as he continued to abuse the country and heap upon its people shame and derision. As Stein expressed it: "To have faith in a man of whom it is said 'he has hell in his heart and chaos in his head' is worse than infatuation; there is no salvation for the honorable man except to take for granted that the scoundrel is capable of all evil." And Heinrich von Kleist, in his *Catechism of the Germans*, defines Napoleon as "the beginning of all evil, the end of all that is good—the *Sinner*." And again he says: "Mankind would be short of expressions sufficiently to denounce Napoleon, and angels would lack sufficient breath on the day of judgment," thereby speaking from the bottom of the heart of all true Prussians and of all contemporary humanity.

Scharnhorst now considered the time ripe for the plans for arming the whole people, which he had formulated in 1803, 1806 and 1807. Civilians and soldiers were to work hand in hand, and only consider themselves servants of the state. But as there has been and always will be a certain antipathy among refined and educated people against tramps and vagabonds, who at that time composed most of the standing armies, and as there was a strong supposition that the

warlike spirit might not be so strongly developed among tradesmen and the learned professions, Scharnhorst proposed at first the formation of a militia in addition to the standing army. "Under the general conditions," says the report of the reorganization commission, characterizing the spirit of the times, "it appears necessary that the nation and the government be united as closely as possible, that the government, so to say, form an alliance with the nation, which should bring forth faith in the constitution and render its independence worth while. This spirit cannot exist without some latitude in the choice and use of the means to attain independence. He who has no such feelings cannot appreciate them and cannot be expected to sacrifice himself for them. A national militia, which maintains, arms, clothes and drills itself, can have such a spirit. It may never feel thus, if it has to pass first through the standing army, where its independence is hampered through an imagined pressure of regulations."

Scharnhorst therefore believed it necessary to separate militia and standing army as completely as possible. In each community those liable to military service were to be divided into two classes. The volunteers and those who were not able to clothe, arm and feed themselves were to

be incorporated in the standing army; all others in the militia. The choice of officers was to be left to the militiamen, the only requisite being their necessary ability and education. The training period of this militia was fixed at eight weeks, later at only four weeks. It is true, the idea was to teach the manual of arms in all the municipal schools and to explain in a general way the maneuvering of large bodies of men. Scharnhorst also demanded the *Landsturm*. All male inhabitants, able to handle a weapon, were to be included in it, and he had no doubt but that Prussia could carry out successfully a defensive plan that had succeeded in Spain.

It was not long before these plans became a reality. King and government surrendered freely the old-time honored institutions and privileges of the state, in order to raise the national spirit of the people and the realization of the community between state, government, army and citizens. The people, on their part, met the wishes of the government with an ever-increasing enthusiasm for the Fatherland, and an ever-growing fury against the foreign oppressors. The reformers had sometimes to meet serious resistance from the opponents of any reform, the "moles," as they were called. Here and there appeared pamphlets attacking and deriding the government; miserable characters dared occa-

sionally to voice their own dishonorable sentiments concerning both the just and the unjust, but the people as a whole adhered more firmly than ever to their king. The nation's yearning for freedom, for the downfall of the tyrant, became ever more powerful. How could it have been otherwise in the state of the Great Elector, the great Frederick? Men knew the sins of the past, the mistakes made by even the great Frederick; but it was the glory which he had gained for the Prussian nation, the solemn sense of duty with which he had served the state, that formed the anchors to which the people now clung with determination. True, non-Prussian people also chafed under the reins of the conqueror, and yearned for liberty; but while in the rest of Germany the people were satisfied to dream idly of a vague, half-true conception of the former splendors of imperial Germany, Prussia turned back its eyes only a few short years, and realized that a true national existence, a national independence, could only be founded upon decisive action and upon the strict fulfillment of duty. One had only to look at the king and his advisers to see in their conscientious work and true morality the promise of national freedom. Where else could the people have found the idea that the state is a moral personality, and its nature a mirror of the sentiments

of its citizens? And thus, though Germany's political unity had been torn completely asunder, the peoples themselves turned back in thought to the common treasures of the inner national life. With joy and the sincerest fervor they revived the German Middle Ages, the arts and sages of ancient Germany. Poetry and science reached back into the treasures of their forebears and redisplayed their wealth of idealistic possessions.

With justifiable pride and enthusiasm the German people accepted the writings given to it by Achim von Arnim and Brentano, in *Des Knaben Wunderhorn* (The Boy's Magic Horn); the Brothers Grimm in the old German fairy tales; Eichhorn's research in *German Justice*; and Savigny's story of the creative force of a national spirit. Lüden, who dared, despite the hirelings of Napoleon, to attack the un-German attitude of the Rhenish Federation, wrote the first history of the German people; and it was with enthusiasm and pride that the people read of the accomplishments of their forefathers. They knew, they felt, that in order to maintain possession of this splendid inheritance of their ancestors, they must conquer it anew. It was now that the nation began to understand for the first time what Schiller had preached concerning the duty toward one's country; even the ruling

prince of German thought, the aged Goethe, worked, unconsciously perhaps, for the national awakening. And although one must deplore his reluctance, yet ever since the days of Queen Luise the enthusiasm for both Goethe and Schiller has formed a mighty bond to bring into closer union the scattered ideas of German unity.

Just as the "categorical imperative" could have been discovered only by Kant in Prussia, the state which represented its corporeal existence, so it was that a Roman history (that of Niebuhr) came to be written in that state which in its cradle had seen nothing of esthetic beauty, but had been born amid conditions demanding the cleanest and purest development of stern realities. Only here and here alone was it possible for Arndt, in his writings and poetry, Schleiermacher in his sermons, and Fichte in his lectures and in his proclamation to duty and to sacrifice, to have such a tremendous influence upon the minds of the people. What though, on the streets, commands were given to the soldiers in French! In the Cathedral of the Trinity and in the assembly halls of the academy in Berlin, Unter den Linden, German words sounded sonorously, and a German assembly filled with sacred enthusiasm formed a quiet but determined resolution to cast loose from the enemy

and to risk life, limb and property for king and country.

The best minds of the nation formed secret societies, the most famous of which was the *Tugendbund*, and these showed the pulse beat of the nation. Officers of the army formed secret understandings and connections, and secreted arms, making comprehensive preparations for the hour of liberation. Yet nothing serves to show to better advantage the true monarchical idea of the German people than the fact that no one dreamed of starting the contest without a formal call to arms by the king. The heroic patriotism was there, just as strong as today; and in the flaming enthusiasm and the desire for fight and liberty one was apt to overlook such infractions of military discipline as the independent warfare of Major Ferdinand von Schill. With deep sympathy and with threatening anger the people followed the tragic career and end of the brave major and his heroes. It was the general voice of the people, not only that of the poet, which said that "No emperor, no king, but freedom and the Fatherland, had sent him on his road to glory." But neither Schill nor the few other officers who attempted similar independent attacks were able to swerve the great mass of the people into the wrong path.

The Prussian nation, which people had con-

sidered as capable of producing nothing but soldiers and statesmen, now brought forth logical thinkers and critics, poets who were destined to become great luminaries in the starry sky of poetry. The solidity and heaviness of the German character needed such a far-reaching interruption of its social life, to become aware of its poetical capabilities. Heinrich von Kleist, Achim von Arnim, Schenkendorf and De la Motte Fouqué were Prussians; and their flaming words acted as lightning upon the minds. What an uplifting, beneficent thought it must have been for those who saw that in all the misery and servitude arts and sciences had found a haven! It was truly written in those days that "what had been lost in physical power, still existed spiritually."

This was the thought of the king, and it was Wilhelm von Humboldt who translated the idea into reality. The new high school in Berlin was opened in 1810, and among the teachers were men who, like Schleiermacher, Savigny, Eichhorn, Niebuhr, Boeckh, Hufeland and Thaer, are still considered as eminent authorities, who emphasized the value of science in the conduct of human life and the administration of the state, and who worked successfully to achieve the ideals they had taught.

The belief gained ground that all success was

based on the harmonious union of spiritual and mental training, with state control; of warlike spirit, with moral sense of duty; of unconditional execution of the public duties of the individual, with a devotion to the Fatherland. With these would come the harmonious development of the mind and all the powers of the heart and soul. The great idea had to be carried out on the real ground of actually existing conditions, with all the forces available, even those inherent in the idea itself. The ideal belief in the Fatherland had to take the place of, or to enlarge, what was lacking in physical force. The certainty that the Fatherland could not sink had to fill all hearts. And this certainty, in order to reign supreme in all hearts, must be founded on the belief in an eternal Deity. As a matter of fact, however different were the religious opinions of the leaders, every reform in state and nation was carried through by a deep religious feeling. From the throne down to the lowest cottage, everywhere the belief in the old God again appeared, for this belief in God was inseparable from a belief in the Fatherland. The belief in God again became the true inner source of life, and once more it became the solemn duty of the state to watch that "it never dried up"—as Stein expressed it—and that the solemnity of divine service, as well as the moral purity of the ministry, be main-

tained. For the ministry were, by teaching and precept, the instructors of the grown-up people.

In this manner, state and society were rebuilt in Prussia, until, as old Blücher said, no one wanted to carry the fetters any longer. The king succeeded in calming the reckless and the boisterous; yet ever more and more frequently there was voiced the question: "Will there ever be a foreign situation which will indicate the proper moment in which to try and shake off the unbearable foreign yoke?"

CHAPTER IV

UNDER THE HEEL OF NAPOLEON

(1807-1812)

WITH the Peace of Tilsit (1807), Napoleon had crushed completely the strongest military power of Europe; and all his thoughts were now directed toward destroying the equally hated naval power of England. Unable to attack the Britons by sea, he thought of striking them through Spain; and in the Spanish War French arms did not succeed there in the old accustomed manner. Hence Napoleon found himself compelled to withdraw the *grande armée* which lay quartered in Prussia, and to send it into Spain. Such a removal of the hated French soldiers out of Germany would have given a free hand to both Russia and Austria, and in order to prevent a Prussian, or even German, insurrection Napoleon had to win the friendship of the Russian czar. This he could accomplish only by permitting the czar to carry out his eastern plans, in particular those directed toward the

acquisition of Moldavia and Wallachia. Czar Alexander allowed himself to be placated by this seeming understanding and approval of Russian aims and purposes, and concluded a still closer alliance with France. Hence it came to pass that Austria had to postpone its warlike preparations, while Prussia was forced to sign a treaty promising aid to the emperor of France in any war against Austria. The same treaty, September 8, 1808, put all the fortresses on the Oder in the hands of French garrisons, thereby pronouncing the seemingly final "sentence of death" over Prussia. It was only by the exertion of all his ability that Prince William succeeded in eliminating from the treaty the dismissal of Stein.

There followed, in September and October, 1808, the famous meeting between the czar of Russia and the emperor of France, which degenerated into a general rendering of obsequious homage to Napoleon by all the assembled German princes. It would still have been possible for Alexander to save Europe, or at least to obtain better terms for Prussia, as he had promised to do on his journey to Erfurt; for Napoleon very sorely needed Russia's good will. But once again Alexander forsook his friend; he declared with cold disdain (and to "his royal brother's" face) that he had no interest in the

execution of the former treaty stipulations, and held that the Oriental expansion plans of Russia were more important to him than the liberty of the European states.

Napoleon therefore could go to Spain without the fear of a Prussian insurrection; and when his plans went further wrong in Spain, he could prepare for a thorough chastisement of Austria for its temerity of warlike preparations. The Frenchman had held out a sure bait with which to catch Russia's friendship. No matter how sweetly spoken were the czar's words of friendship, when the royal Prussian couple visited him in St. Petersburg in January, 1809, he held fast to his alliance with Napoleon. He was even ready to fight side by side with Napoleon in the threatened assault on Austria. Prussia, with French armies in the country, French armies to the West, Russian legions to the East, Saxon-Polish friends of France in South and East, gagged and watched suspiciously by Napoleon, Prussia could not even think of coming to Austria's assistance! England was averse to sending help or reënforcements; and the Vienna Hofburg declined even to make a Prussian treaty. Despite all these obstacles, there was hope among the members of the war party that the insurrection would now take place. Even King Frederick William himself believed occa-

sionally that the czar would, when it came to action, rush with him to the help of Austria; yet in his innermost heart he despaired of any real success against Napoleon. Moreover, Alexander soon showed his Napoleonic friendship by more than words, and sent his troops against the archduke Ferdinand; while Austria, even in this precarious situation, committed black treason by sending Colonel Steigentesch to Königsberg, for a confidential talk with the king and queen of Prussia, and later ordering the colonel to repeat the "confidential talk" to the ambassador of Jérôme Napoleon. Nevertheless the Prussian ministry boldly ordered payments to France stopped, though they sought to reassure Napoleon with the idea that the large bodies of troops collected at various points were intended for his assistance, as stipulated in the Treaty of Paris. Even after the French had gained the victory of Wagram, and humbled Austria had agreed to an armistice, even then Frederick William still had hopes of a successful revolt and sent Knesebeck with new propositions to Emperor Francis and to the czar of Russia.

Was it any wonder, after Austria's big victory at Aspern and the Peace of Vienna (October 14, 1809), that Napoleon turned with the whole of his fury to vent it upon weak Prussia? To sat-

isfy and calm Napoleon, the Prussian royal family agreed to leave its country security and return to the royal palace in Berlin, December, 1809. They were received by the people with a tremendous demonstration of joy and enthusiasm. Yet the procession was in truth a humiliating spectacle at which many gnashed their teeth; for the king lost all his freedom and all remaining independence amid the bayonets of the French soldiers around him. The words which Colonel von Krusemarck, when sent by the king to congratulate Napoleon on his peace with Austria, had to hear were scathing. Napoleon told the envoy bluntly that Prussia had planned war on him, had broken its treaty, and was going to be punished. New indemnities were only the least of these punishments, for soon it became evident that the haughty conqueror planned not only the seizure of Silesia, but the complete demolishment and disarming of Prussia—"the military party is out of season in Prussia!"

The situation in the state was so discouraging, bankruptcy seemed so near, that the ministers with the recklessness of despair urged upon the king the refusal of Napoleon's infamous demands. But the king did not follow their advice. On the contrary, in June, 1810, he called Hardenberg to the head of the government with

the most far-reaching powers, and Napoleon, believing that Hardenberg would find some way in which to pay France the necessary funds, was gracious enough to leave him unhampered, although at one time he had hated Hardenberg from the bottom of his heart. Hardenberg's call to office was the last piece of good news destined for Queen Luise. A few weeks later, the gracious queen went on a short journey to her home, from which she never returned. She died on July 19, 1810, of a broken heart, and the weeping people standing around her bier vowed that, despite Napoleon, her ashes at least should rest in a free Germany.

Hardenberg had really the intention of collecting the means to pay the French indemnities and requisitions; but he had little success, because of the complete exhaustion of the state. He promised to meet the French demands in full, no matter how unjust they were. More and more unbearable grew the detestable conditions caused by the continental blockade, which was completed by the various orders of 1810, especially the tariff of Trianon, which was intended to destroy British commerce and to favor that of France. But without a protest Prussia submitted to each imperious command from the Seine. This seeming submission at least served to hide from the mas-

ter of trickery and lies the continual internal development of Prussia, which was growing stronger and stronger all the time.

The Peace of Vienna now caused a shifting of France's most important continental policy, that of friendship for Russia. The cordial relations between France and Austria which this peace treaty made possible were further strengthened by the marriage of Napoleon to the daughter of the emperor of Austria, the one-time "German emperor." The understanding with the czar had now lost much of its former value for Napoleon, and, with Austria's cession of parts of Galicia and on the shores of the Adriatic, France became such a close neighbor of Russia that a war between them seemed merely a question of time. And now, in his cruelty to Germany, Napoleon piled, as the ancient phrase was, "Ossa on Pelion": in the midst of a year of peace, 1810, on July 9, he suddenly annexed Holland, and on December 10 he declared the mouths of the Ems, Weser, Elbe and Trave, with the cities of Bremen, Hamburg and Lübeck, French territory. This was an infamous mockery of the German Fatherland, and a tightening of the chain around Prussia; but it was also a threat against Russia by advancing French territory to the Baltic—a purely Russian sphere of interest. It was furthermore a violation of treaties and a

personal insult to the czar. By this annexation, the duke of Oldenburg, a relative of Czar Alexander, was excluded from the Oldenburg throne, which had been given to him a short time before. Alexander felt as if Napoleon had boxed his ears in full view of all Europe; and, beginning with the summer of 1810, both he and Napoleon armed for the final fight which would decide the supremacy in Europe.

It was clear now that Prussia had to arm as much as it could; for no matter how the war might end, Prussia was certain to be the battlefield, or at least the direct road of attack. It had to choose between France and Russia; the idea of neutrality in this situation was unthinkable. For a neutral Prussia would most assuredly have been scooped up and tied into a laurel wreath for the victorious Napoleon. Forged letters, which nevertheless clearly mirrored the views of Napoleon, had disclosed the intention of France to demolish the state completely, as had been repeatedly stated in the French official paper, *Le Moniteur*. Such a demolition might well be considered by France a good beginning for a war against Russia. Even Champagny, the French minister of foreign affairs, voted for the dismemberment of Prussia.

The Prussians realized also that even if the

Russians won the war, Prussia would not gain anything; and a complete Russian victory was impossible so long as Russia kept up its fighting with Turkey. Neither the king nor Hardenberg shared the optimistic opinion of Scharnhorst, who saw in the preparation of the Prussian people a powerful factor for liberation. Both deplored the lack of competent leaders in the Russian and Prussian armies; and in view of the proverbial luck of Napoleon in battle, Frederick William no longer believed in the possibility of victory over him. The king and Hardenberg also considered it necessary to continue the reforms in operation for a few years at least, in order to strengthen the state by a little longer time of rest and peace. Hence, during the whole fearful year of 1811, the maintenance of peace was the chief task of the Prussian ambassadors at Paris and St. Petersburg, General von Krusemarck and Colonel von Schöler, respectively. One shrewd step toward peace was the sending of Prince von Hatzfeldt to Paris, with a message of congratulation to Napoleon, on the occasion of the birth of the latter's son. Hardenberg gained the consent of the king to this embassy only after much effort and argument.

The soothing words which came from Paris at that time, referring to all the differences as "merely passing clouds," could not deceive the

people for any length of time; the more so as France refused to evacuate Glogau, as agreed, upon the payment of the installment due on the indemnity, and instead demanded Prussia's disarmament. In April, King Frederick William carefully explained to the czar the difficult position in which Prussia would be in case of open hostilities between Russia and France, and how cautious he himself had to be not to subject Prussia to swift and complete annihilation. Under the impression of the new demands of Napoleon, he wrote to the czar, on April 12: "In my absolute uncertainty concerning the designs of Napoleon regarding Prussia, I am afraid that he will only declare himself at the moment of actually attacking Russia, and that in the meantime he will take all steps to paralyze the small forces remaining to me, and to rob Prussia of all its auxiliary resources. These matters appear to me as equally important to Your Majesty. May I count with confidence upon your assistance? Will your armies come to my support, if I am attacked and my provinces are invaded by Napoleon or his allies in violation of the treaties? I must know your decision, Sire, in order to be able to make my own in the difficult situation which may present itself."

The intention of the king, undoubtedly, was to come to an understanding with Russia. Aus-

tria, however, because of the Russian war against Turkey and the cession of Galicia, had become a bitter enemy to the czar and was sure to refuse him any assistance against Napoleon. Hardenberg again feared the Polish desires of Russia, and, finally, there was as yet no real necessity that the war should actually break out. It was most certain, however, that if Prussia made a treaty with Russia and France did not open war on the czar, Prussia would be exposed in the most dangerous manner. For this reason Hardenberg started a new series of negotiations with St. Marsan, the French ambassador at Berlin, and through Krusemarck at Paris. At the same time Frederick William sent another urgent appeal to Alexander. Not a single instant, he wrote, would he hesitate to fight on the side of Russia, if the czar would ally himself with Austria, would guarantee the independence of Poland, and would keep his armies in readiness near the Prussian frontier, where they could support him. But as long as none of these conditions was fulfilled, how could he maintain the safety of his country, without allying himself with France? He could only pray that the war might be avoided.

With angry displeasure the army leaders followed the new negotiations in Paris. Scharnhorst, in particular, was openly for an alliance

with Russia, and tried hard to minimize the fears of the king and Hardenberg with the certainty of his faith in final victory. "We should fight," he exclaimed confidently, "and God will give us victory!" "He reads his Adam Smith," said Gneisenau, referring to Hardenberg's political and economical reforms, "and forgets the history of the world. Get iron! An iron will, an iron breast, and iron arms! And when you have them you will not lack the money either."

At this point it was Napoleon himself who brought king and chancellor to a decision in favor of Russia. The derision with which he declined Hardenberg's proposal of an alliance, the vigor with which he continued his military preparations, and his retention of the fortress Glogau, decided the king to send another letter to the czar, and also to intrust Scharnhorst with a personal message and with authority to discuss with the czar the necessary military preparations. The king openly declared in his letter that while he had to preserve the semblance of an alliance with France, in case of actual fighting he would take no other side than that of Russia. But he only made this declaration under the condition that Russia give active assistance; he "trusted that Alexander would endeavor to the best of his ability to win Austria

to his side"—the peace with Turkey had been concluded in the meantime; he "counted upon" the czar not to conclude any peace which did not provide for the existence and interests of Prussia; and finally "reminded" the emperor that he expected Prussia to regain at least those territories which it had lost in the last war.

Gneisenau was now called to work, and threw himself heart and soul into the military preparations which Scharnhorst had developed so splendidly. As early as February, Scharnhorst had collected and trained an additional 11,000 *Krumpers* and had succeeded in winning the king's consent to this method of procedure. Under the pretense of expecting daily a landing of English troops, yes, even with the express consent of Napoleon, an order was issued in April to all troops, recalling the reserves then on leave of absence. New detachments of *Krumpers* were being trained every month, and, under the excuse of raising some necessary laboring forces, regular workmen's brigades were formed. Near Schwedt a new bridge was thrown over the Oder, and the fortresses of Graudenz, Spandau, Pillau and Colberg, the "vital spots of Prussian power," were given larger garrisons well supplied with powder and provisions. Prussia now had 124,000 men, of

whom 74,537 were actually under arms and in readiness. Gneisenau now took up the old suggestion of Scharnhorst, "to develop and prepare a plan for a popular insurrection," by means of which the defense of the country was to receive its real force and importance. This idea, which was later regarded with so much distrust, gained the consent of the king; and messengers were sent into all the districts of Prussia, with instructions to prepare the popular mind for the coming storm against the tyrannic dictator.

But the days of rejoicing in the final insurrection of the nation were short-lived. Napoleon addressed the Russian ambassador in Paris with the most brutal frankness, and, while demanding peace, threatened war in the most terrible form. King Frederick William still did not give up all hope, even the small semblance which was contained in Napoleon's demand for peace with Russia sufficing him. "Let those exalted heads," he declared, "which only see salvation in war, go their own way"; he believed that a war under present conditions could only be waged under the worst auspices. Hardenberg immediately leaned to the alliance with France, and convinced the king that it would be good policy to submit to Napoleon, when the latter demanded disarmament in a definite and firm manner. The king thereupon sent a letter to Napoleon; but

this step gained nothing, for Napoleon sent back an ultimatum, threatening an invasion of the country within three days, if actual disarmament had not been carried out by that time. The king even had to permit a French official to travel throughout the country and to view with his own eyes the steps taken for disarmament. And added to all these humiliations was the uncertainty of what Russia was going to do. The czar had not yet considered it necessary to answer the letter of King Frederick William, written on July 16, and the Prussian envoy plenipotentiary, General Scharnhorst had to wait ten days in St. Petersburg before he was even granted an audience. As late as October messages of peace still came from St. Petersburg to Berlin, voicing Alexander's peaceful intentions and urging the king to try and remain on friendly terms with both the emperors. What could one expect? What could one hope? And just at that time Napoleon declined in the most peremptory manner the Prussian proposals. Again Hardenberg changed his course and urged the king, in a splendid memorial, dated November 2, to leave Berlin, ally himself with Russia and negotiate with both Austria and England.

On the same day Scharnhorst returned from St. Petersburg, bringing with him the signed

convention of the czar, dated October 17. The document was not exactly unfavorable, but it made the advance of Russian armies dependent upon an actual attack by France, or the collection of large bodies of French troops on the Vistula—not the Elbe. Although the Prussian ambassador in St. Petersburg, Colonel von Schöler, considered the terms highly satisfactory, Scharnhorst himself was not very pleased, and was undecided as to how the king and Hardenberg would accept them. He intimated at the very outset that nothing better could have been obtained. The Austrian minister, Metternich, too, told Scharnhorst coldly that he did not consider them satisfactory, and this happened at a moment when the general had the right to expect from Metternich a more favorable reception. However one may view this military convention, the king received the impression that not much military help was to be expected from Russia, at least no such help as was necessary in any fight with Napoleon. The Russian army would probably retreat at the first opportunity, and would resume its usual defensive tactics, which it had agreed to forsake only in order to gain the assistance of Prussia.

The king therefore despaired not only of the friendship of Alexander, but also of his ability. He was likewise certain that Austria would not

lift a finger in the defense of either Russia or Prussia. As a result, he again took up the negotiations with France, despite the latter's refusal of his former proposals. Simultaneously he decided to make a last attempt to bring Austria into a war with Napoleon, by communicating his negotiations with Alexander to Vienna. He even consented to send Scharnhorst with this message, although he knew that the general, because of his marked personality, would probably create an ill feeling at the Hofburg. Scharnhorst undertook this mission simply in order to be able to say he had left nothing untried, for he had no longer any doubt about Frederick William's decision. And as the king had expected, so it happened. Austria had no intention of discarding its new alliance with France, and it required all the intrigue and trickery of Metternich to hide from Scharnhorst Austria's plan to use the Prussian difficulties in such a way as to regain Silesia. Scharnhorst himself was now convinced that all the hopes which he had fostered were lost. The journey to Vienna had failed completely, and that to St. Petersburg had not brought the results considered necessary by the king. There remained no other course for Prussia but to take France's part. It was no longer a question for the king, *how* Napoleon could be vanquished. Under the circum-

stances no one could even dream of a victory over the French usurper.

The negotiations with Napoleon had shown the certainty that nothing could be expected from him but the *Væ victis* of Brennus; yet another attempt was made to conserve peace between Russia and France by sending Adjutant General von dem Knesebeck to St. Petersburg. Even this remained without result. Napoleon's preparations indicated that the advance of the French armies might begin any day, and it actually commenced on February 26, 1812, when French troops invaded Prussian Pomerania. A few days later they entered the territory of Magdeburg and were on the way to Brandenburg. Their march was the open declaration of war. All troubles were forgotten for the moment. Feverish preparations followed, and the French ambassador was even told that war had begun. The final orders for an advance against the French were to have been issued, the hour of six o'clock in the afternoon of March 2 was chosen for the beginning of the march, and Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Boyen had asked for their dismissal from office (to deceive the suspicions of Napoleon) and been given important orders for the carrying out of further military preparations. At the height of the excitement a courier arrived from Paris with the treaty

which Prussia had before asked in vain. It had been signed by Napoleon on February 24. Moreover, not 200,000 men, as Gneisenau had estimated, but 550,000 were advancing in the vast French army to war upon Russia, and to enforce the terms of the convention with Prussia. The warlike movement of the Prussian troops was promptly checked and the treaty with Napoleon was ratified by King Frederick William on March 5.

Thus Prussia was again beaten without a fight. For all the wars of Napoleon, excepting in Spain, Italy and Turkey, Prussia was compelled to give assistance. In the coming war with Russia it was called on to supply a corps of 20,000 men with 60 cannon. In fact, as Napoleon himself admitted, the alliance of Prussia was worth to him as much as an army of 120,000 men. Every kind of recruiting was subject to Napoleon's consent; the commanders of the fortresses of Colberg and Graudenz were under the orders of the French; the neutrality of defenseless Silesia was restricted to Breslau, Oels and Brieg; and the entire remainder of Prussia, with the exception of Potsdam, and all its resources were open to Napoleon the Terrible. Prussia also had to support the French armies, payment for this to be deducted from the indemnities still due; to supply them with

wagons, horses and munitions, and to carry out without argument every requisition of the French generals.

Again the hope of the patriots had been smashed, again their burning desire for a battle for freedom, honor and independence had been crushed. It now seemed as if all salvation and liberation from the foreign yoke must be gone forever. Tortured hearts cried to heaven, and a sacred determination filled the men who had prepared so carefully for the fight for freedom, who had drilled the nation in arms, who had inflamed the minds and had done everything to create an insurrection of the whole nation, who had given it that leadership which must result in ultimate victory. In fact, there is no doubt but that Prussia could have sent 300,000 soldiers into a fight against Napoleon; that Hardenberg's negotiations with England for munitions and arms might have been brought to a successful conclusion; that it was for Napoleon an immeasurable advantage to open the war on the Vistula and the Niemen, his armies firmly planted in the military power of Prussia; and that the shedding of blood and loss of life and property through this alliance with him deducted just that much from the forces which later fought against him.

Even to this day Prussia can understand the

deep pain which was felt by those patriotic Prussians, but it can also understand why the king despaired of undertaking a war of such terrible consequences. The advice of diplomats and generals, and the readiness of the individual to sacrifice everything for the Fatherland, are a different matter from the responsibility of a monarch who with one stroke of his pen must risk the existence of the state, the welfare and the life of all his subjects. Difficult and full of dangers indeed was the position of the king. Perhaps no other man had ever been so unhappily placed. Incessantly he was torn between the duties of a sovereign and the inclinations of his own heart, and one can understand how he must have suffered through his inability to follow the dictates of the latter. He was as in a fever; on each side of his path was an abyss awaiting him. Finally, after struggling for a full year, and under the immediate pressure of the powerful enemy, he had decided for the cause which personally he hated. Forced by dire necessity he walked the path opposed to his desires and inclinations. The favorable changes which he had hoped for had, in his opinion, not materialized. Only if Austria, Russia and Prussia together had exerted all their powers could he have expected a favorable ending of a war against the genius and preponder-

ance of Napoleon; Prussia, standing alone by the side of Russia, would have been annihilated—if not with mathematical certainty, at least with the utmost probability.

Frederick William had not yet learned to believe in the terrible, irresistible force of the national spirit, the angered soul of the people, on which Scharnhorst and Gneisenau calculated. The king, on the contrary, rather feared that maddened spirit. This is to be regretted, but sufferings such as Frederick William had experienced can stifle the most venturesome soul. One cannot consider as a fault that caution which has distinguished the prophetic souls of the greatest heroic natures; and the king in his responsible position could not risk the ordeal, the mighty and swiftly approaching divine judgment. Even Scharnhorst had declared that Providence would have to work a miracle in order to save Prussia from destruction in this war. Austria had emphatically refused her aid, and Frederick William expected nothing from the Russian military convention. And how could the king overlook the unreliability proven by Russia four times, in 1805, 1807, 1808 and 1809? How could he believe in Alexander now, when the czar said nothing about the war question and declined to express himself on the matter of military assistance with that precision which the

king demanded and which was absolutely necessary for the terrible war drama to be staged against Napoleon? One single successful blow of Napoleon against Russia—and who could guarantee that Alexander would not again make peace, a peace which would wipe allied Prussia off the map of Europe? How Napoleon would treat this “miserable nation, which he could not like because there was always such a strong resistance among its thinkers,” even if it had acted in unison with him, that indeed was a doubtful matter. According to all human possibilities it seemed clear that Napoleon could not treat Prussia quite so shamefully if it helped as if it opposed him. The decision made by the king gave at least the hope that “an existence might be maintained, which later might regain, in the course of future events, its former splendor.”

Men like Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had a more reckless patriotism; but the king was a better diplomat. Many an officer believed that the fight for the Fatherland should be above obedience to the sovereign, and resigned from the army. But he who had been hit the hardest, who had done by far the greatest work in preparation for an insurrection, Scharnhorst, remained true to his king. Despite tempting offers from other countries, his great soul never doubted his king. And in view

of the faithfulness and confidence shown by this best of all subjects, this creator of the new army, this soul best prepared for the great fight, the sting is taken out of the reproaches which have been hurled at the king for his vacillating, hesitating, trembling and faint-hearted policy of those years. The delight with which E. M. Arndt exclaimed, "There is no freer life possible than with good soldiers," referred to his companionship with Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Boyen and Prince August, and characterized those officers who remained faithful to their king, even though devoured by a desire to fight against the tyrant. Such loyalty as theirs distinctly disproved the commonly expressed idea of the day, that things were so bad in Prussia, anyway, that they could not become worse.

CHAPTER V

THE WAR OF LIBERATION (1813-1814)

THE events which followed belong to the history of the world, and are well known everywhere. With an army of 450,000 soldiers, among whom was the Prussian corps under the command of General York, Napoleon crossed the Russian frontier. While York fought smaller battles in the Baltic provinces in company with Macdonald, the mighty Napoleon beat the Russian army at Smolensk and hurried in forced marches to Moscow. There, before the sacred citadel of the Russian empire, he administered a second defeat to the czar.

As early as August, Scharnhorst had prophesied the defeat of the Russians, because, he said, they did not utilize their peculiar advantages—the enormous distances of the empire—in their defense. At first all happened as he had foretold. But at Moscow, rather than yield the capital to the French, the heroic General Rostopshin chose the deliberate destruction of the sa-

cred city that to Russians stood as the symbol of their religion and their nation. And what man had failed to do, the conflagration accomplished. Hesitating for a few days, Napoleon was forced to commence his retreat from the heap of ruins. He recognized his danger, and asked the czar for an armistice. This the latter refused upon the urgent advice of Stein, the exiled Prussian leader who now had full revenge upon Napoleon.

In this disastrous retreat of the French army there was shown the enormous latent strength of Russia, of those forces which Scharnhorst had called Russia's best defense—the seemingly infinite distances. A battle in which the Russians were the victors compelled Napoleon to make his retreat over the same road by which he had advanced, and the elements themselves seemed to come to the assistance of the czar. Winter arrived with a piercing cold that was absolutely unprecedented, and tortured the French armies in a frightful manner. But more terrible, more ghastly than the headlong flight over the snow-fields of western Russia, was the disastrous crossing of the Beresina. Attacked in flank and rear by the skirmishing Russian cavalry, the French attempted to cross the icy waters. The entire *grande armée*, starved and emaciated because of Napoleon's errors in arranging for pro-

visions and supplies, was practically annihilated in this battle at the Beresina. Only straggling, crippled individuals, or small detachments of half-frozen figures, reached the frontier.

Yet even these poor, decrepit creatures, once across the German frontier, became so overbearing and so insolent that no one could have pity on them. "Never before," said E. M. Arndt, "did the Angel of Death hold such a harvest; never was there seen such disguising and hiding, such traveling in secret, as during these weeks between Königsberg, Danzig and Berlin, and further toward the west. Never in the world's history did the greatest misfortune of a nation more resemble a masked carnival than this French retreat—and yet, its misery was almost beyond the limit of mere tears." But he who bore the French imperial purple robes was least affected by the divine judgment. He had the news of the disaster published in France with the brazen postscript: "My health has never been better."

From all sides there now came petitions and requests to the king, urging him to break the unnatural alliance. Even the old opponents of the new order of things, as, for instance, Fr. August Ludwig von der Marwitz, pointed to the deeds of the great Frederick and demanded an immediate rising. Now truly the moment had

arrived, to risk all and everything for liberty, honor and independence. But even now the king did not think the time fulfilled, and hesitated to fight for life or death against him who had "trampled upon us, tricked us, cheated us, and committed crimes of all kinds in our land," as General Bülow fiercely declared. In company with Austria, the king hoped to enforce peace by an armed neutrality. The Prussian work of preparation and mobilization progressed but slowly, and nobody thought for a moment that Napoleon would admit defeat and lay down his arms. Even now he was giving orders to concentrate large armies at Magdeburg, raising new levies by conscription.

Not even the news of the bold deed of General York led to an open breach with Napoleon. In a mill near Tauroggen, York had signed on his own responsibility an alliance with the Russian general von Diebitsch, fully aware of the terrible consequences of his step, but firm in the conviction that the czar would unite his forces with the king and would not again lay down his arms before Prussia had regained its old frontiers. The convention might, York wrote to the king, lead to his own death on the sand heap (public execution), but it gave the Russian armies the freedom of activity, saved East Prussia from destruction, and gave the king an oppor-

tunity to start the war which would decide the freedom of Prussia, the liberty of Europe. "This is the moment," wrote the intrepid soldier, "to place ourselves alongside our ancestors, or else—may God prevent it!—be despised and disowned by them forever. Let us fight, let us earn our national freedom and independence! To accept this freedom and independence as a present from any one would place the nation on the public pillory of wretchedness, and would abandon it to the contempt of the living and of posterity."

New letters now came from the czar which assured the king of his real friendship and his faithfulness, while Napoleon, in his hurried mobilization of fresh troops, showed little inclination to keep the terms of even his last treaty with Prussia. He answered in an offhand manner the Prussian requests for payment of the sums agreed upon for the maintenance of the French army in the country, and even ordered his commanders in the Prussian fortresses to make out requisitions in violation of the treaty. Napoleon thus placed himself in the wrong, even formally; and the most tender conscience need not shrink from breaking away from him who "in fortune and misfortune treated Prussia with nothing but suspicion and disdain." At last the struggle in King Frederick William's heart was

ended, and the better part of his nature, his desire for the right of the oppressed against the oppressor, gained the upper hand. He resolved to let the war commence, even without Austria's assistance. What must have been his feelings, humbled by the blows of fate in the death of his queen and his own fall from power, when he listened to the confirmation of his plans by his successor, the crown prince. The latter repeated the words: "I believe in Him who sayeth to arrogance: 'Thy proud breakers shall stop here! The dawn of a new day is nigh!'"

On January 23, 1813, the king proceeded to Breslau where, freed from the oppression of the French soldiers, he could announce his decision. On the 28th he assembled a commission, consisting of Hardenberg and the generals von Hake and Scharnhorst, to discuss the immediate and most rapid increase of the Prussian military forces. On February 3, the young men aged between seventeen and twenty-four years, who had been examined and trained, were called to the colors, to form the volunteer riflemen. On the 9th, all exemptions from military duty, granted heretofore, were suspended by law, and on the 12th the entire field army was ordered mobilized.

Yet even now all bridges had not been destroyed, all ships had not been burned. Once

more the king offered new conditions to Napoleon, on February 13, although the French emperor had forbidden on the 10th the continuance of all negotiations with Russia. The new conditions demanded only the payment of the sums agreed upon by Napoleon for the support of his army, and the withdrawal of French troops from the district west of the Elbe, and were therefore so easy that Napoleon could have accepted them at once. Hardenberg, it is true, believed that even if this should happen there would still be enough causes for war, while no one could doubt, as Alexander wrote, that Napoleon had broken every one of the articles of the Tilsit treaty in the most unheard-of manner. Who would deny to the Prussian nation the moral and formal right, when necessity required it, to withdraw from the shameful alliance, and to fight for the freedom and honor of the Fatherland?

How deep was the joy among the people as finally it became evident that the great sacred war for country and liberty, for honor and existence, had at last drawn near! In Berlin and in the provinces, every man was aflame with the desire to take up arms. The East Prussians, saved by York from Russian attack, called together the *Landtag*; and when Stein appeared before it, the estates rendered homage to their



**King Frederick William IV. assumes the lead of the uprising against
Napoleon at Breslau, March 17, 1848.**

king for his faithfulness; they gave "faith for faith." Of their own free will they passed a *Landwehr* law, strengthened in their work by the courageous behavior of Freiherr von Stein. It was Stein, too, who advised the czar to complete the negotiations with Prussia, which were dragging along in Kalisch, by sending a personal representative to the king. The treaty was signed at both Breslau and Kalisch on February 27 and 28. However far the Polish expansion plans of the czar might lead, and however they might endanger the Prussian frontier in the future, this treaty remained silent regarding them, and Hardenberg's suspicious fear had to bow to the demands of the present. For the power of the elements had already given the Russians something that the Prussians still had to fight for—the right to exist. What though Poland was lost! If the old connection between Prussia and Silesia could be reestablished, and if in the West or center of Germany districts were turned over to Prussia in return for the lost Polish lands, as the treaty with Russia provided, the advantage was sufficient. It now became necessary for Prussia to arouse the rest of Germany. A proclamation appeared on March 25, issued from Kalisch, which invited all the German princes to join the rising, and which guaranteed to the people a regeneration "out of

their own spirit." The vague expression of this guarantee made little impression on the people who, as far as political ideas were concerned, lived more in a world of idealistic dreams than of definite promises. More important was the installation of a central administrative council, which was to administer the districts occupied by the enemy according to principles which would make them subservient to the general cause.

On March 11, Russian troops entered Berlin, and a few days later York was again in the capital of his king. What must have been the impressions of the strong and serious man, as he read in the uncontrollable enthusiasm of the people their accord with his firm deed in throwing down the gauntlet to Napoleon! On the birthday of Queen Luise there followed the establishment of the Order of the Iron Cross, and also a command to incorporate in the church records of each community the names of those who gave their lives on the battlefield for the liberation of the Fatherland. On March 15, Czar Alexander entered Breslau; on the 16th, war was declared on Napoleon; on the 17th, the new *Landwehr* law went into effect, calling every able-bodied man between the ages of seventeen and forty to military service; and on the same day Frederick William issued that famous docu-

ment, *An Mein Volk* (To My People), which had been composed by Hippel according to instructions from General Gneisenau.

On April 21, the king signed the *Landsturm* law, which compelled every citizen of the state to take part in the war against the oppressor "with pitchfork and hatchet, with cheating and trickery, with destruction of all provisions and houses, with heroic courage, in every village, every town of the country." For it was the aim now to gain for the nation the most sacred things of life, the freedom from foreign yoke and the liberation of a nation. And—as Fichte had taught the believers—as life is nothing but a desire to attain a closer resemblance to God, it follows that freedom and independence are the greatest possessions of life. When national and individual freedom is threatened, it becomes therefore the duty of every individual to participate personally, and without substitution. The exertion of all the forces, no peace without complete victory, no consideration for life or property—that was the true war. This view was expressed in the *Landsturm* law. Fichte, the strong preacher, did not himself hesitate an instant to take the consequences of his teachings on his own head. He at once joined the *Landsturm*, and in the company of Schleiermacher, Savigny, Niebuhr, Schadow and Iffland,

he exercised and trained in the use of military arms.

Like an earthquake the enthusiasm went through the masses of the people. Old and young, veterans and boys, high and low, educated and ignorant, rich and poor, from the pulpit and the university, the office and storeroom, the factory and the plow, from everywhere the people rushed to arms. TO ARMS! There was no longer any talk about surrender or defeat, yea, not even about victory or death. The thought of *victory* alone burned in Prussian hearts. One duty, and one alone, filled the entire nation. Freedom from the conqueror! Down with the enemy! This was the outburst of the nation of the Hohenzollerns. The memory of Frederick, the knowledge of men that their state had been created through such hard work, showed its all-inspiring power. The other German countries—which, it is true, had not been treated by Napoleon with the same derision and cruelty—did not yet experience the sensation that here really was the birth and beginning of the most wonderful accomplishment of the German people. To those who were resolved to fight for the common cause of Germany, opportunity was given through the formation of the volunteer corps under Major von Lützow. There is no need of speaking of the sacrifices made by those who

remained behind, the wives and children, the aged and crippled. One need but remember that even in the well-to-do circles of Prussia and Brandenburg it was considered a disgrace to possess, after the war, even a single piece of silverware. All and everything that could be considered a luxury, even necessities, were given freely by the people. Wedding rings and even hair was surrendered by the women of Prussia, to obtain funds for the fight against Napoleon. It is almost beyond belief that this people, with resources drained dry by the years of French oppression, could gather by voluntary contributions the sum of 10,000,000 thalers; that this harried and poor country could place in the field 271,000 armed men, or one for every 17 of the population; that this crushed nation should dare start a fight for the freedom and liberation of Europe. No more splendid achievement has been recorded in the annals of history. And no better proof of the force exerted by the moral powers of Freedom, Morality, Independence, Idealism, Patriotism and Faith in God can be cited.

And this people, often called non-German by the rest of the empire—this state, which so often since the days of the Great Elector had saved the other German countries—Prussia considered that its duty was to fight in the midst of its own

misery for the greater purpose of liberating the German empire, of regaining the splendor of the old German Fatherland! The reconstruction of the old empire, of which the poets sang, actually provided the certainty of victory, a certainty which rendered easy all sacrifices, and which was not lessened by the knowledge that the hardest part of the whole fight against Napoleon must be borne by Prussia, and that the fight had to be against some German brethren who still followed the eagles of Napoleon. Alone of all the German countries, Prussia had become a united nation, while the other countries were scattered and divided. In Prussia it was the colonization of the Ascanians and the Teutonic Knights, the colonizing activity of the Hohenzollerns, which proved its value and reacted upon the empire. The Prussians, being a mixture of all the German tribes, were unable to think of a liberation which did not include the freedom of the whole German Fatherland. The true German character of the Prussian state could not be shown more clearly than in this matter. At first, each *Landwehrmann* felt every inch a Prussian; but soon every spark of his enthusiasm belonged to Germany and German freedom. The statesmen exerted all their influences to draw the other German states to the side of Prussia. Nor were their efforts selfish.

Hardenberg declared that Austria rather than Prussia was to receive the most important rôle in the future empire; Stein also declared that Austria was to get back the imperial crown and dignity. Yet even Austria now gave evasive answers to the Prussian appeal and remained in utmost fear of the Prussian revolutionists, regarding men like Stein and Scharnhorst as though they were French "Jacobins." Bavaria, too, although already half on the side of Prussia and urged on by an influential court party, now drew back, frightened by the tremendous preparations of Napoleon. Hanover thought the time suitable for a demand for old Prussian districts; and even England postponed the alliance with Prussia because of this Hanoverian scheme, and started to bargain over the size of the monetary subvention which it might be induced to give to poverty-stricken Prussia. The king of Saxony decided to stick to Napoleon, anyway, and he also concluded that the best thing for him was to preserve his personal safety. He fled to Regensburg and there awaited the decisive battles.

The armies now began to advance. True, the main Russian army, whose commanding generals—first Kutusow, later Wittgenstein—had by Prussian modesty been allowed to rank as commanders-in-chief, did not reach Dresden

until April 24. But in the meantime the generals York and von Bülow had driven the French troops out of Mecklenburg, Lauenburg, Lübeck and Hamburg, although the fortresses on the Vistula and Oder still remained in French hands. Prussian troops pursued the French into Magdeburg, and fought their first victorious battle at Möckern against the French viceroy Beauharnais. The southern wing of the army had been intrusted, to the delight of all the patriots, to the old hussar-general Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher, whom the voice of the people as well as the army had hailed as the leader of the Prussian armies.

Scharnhorst earnestly supported this selection, for during the retreat from Auerstädt each had recognized the abilities and worth of the other, and in their sacrificing friendship they formed, as Scharnhorst himself put it, "One mind, one thought and one decision." And while Blücher realized that he could do nothing without Scharnhorst, the latter exclaimed: "You are our leader and our hero, and if you had to be carried in a sedan chair before or after us. Only with you can we find resolution and good fortune."

In Silesia there were gathered the Brandenburgers, Pomeranians and Silesians, who formed Blücher's army, and the place of this gathering

is known to this very day as the Silesian meeting point. For a few weeks the Prussians were detained because of the hesitating tactics of the Russians, but on March 27 Blücher entered Dresden. Blücher seemed still a fiery youth, though with the silvery hair of a seventy-year-old veteran. Nothing that had happened in the terrible six years had taken from him the conviction that this Napoleon would be overthrown some day, and that the awakening of Prussian courage would accomplish it. Around him were now gathered all the fighting spirits of the nation, and the most able officers of the army, such as Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Grolmann, Clausewitz and many others. In his headquarters one felt the premonition of coming victory. True, some of the plans of Scharnhorst for a new offensive had miscarried because of timidity in Russian headquarters, and the chief command was unfortunately in the hands of the Russians. But the confidence with which Scharnhorst now expressed the conviction that this time Prussia's liberty and independence would gain the victory lived in every breast among Blücher's followers. Though the enemy were ever so numerous, and though they might gain ever so many victories, yet the Prussians felt assured this present war could never end to the advantage of the French; for it was a war

such as Germans had not seen since the days when the hero Arminius led them against the Romans.

In the meantime Napoleon, at the head of an enormous army, entered the city of Erfurt. From the north Eugene Beauharnais advanced upon Merseburg; and both these armies formed a junction at Naumburg, on April 29, with a combined strength of 180,000 men. On May 2 a battle was fought on the fields between Lützen, Weissenfels, Leipzig and Grossgörschen. The choice of the battlefield was not at all the idea of the Prussian leaders, and it was not given to them to have a deciding influence on the conduct of the battle. The Russians were in chief command, and all the Prussian forces could do was to draw the sabers and strike. And all the fury against the tyrant, all the yearning for freedom and liberty, was behind the terrible assaults made by the Prussians time after time against the fortified positions of Marshal Ney, in Grossgörschen, Kleingörschen, Kaja and Rhena. For a long time the battle swayed this way and that, and fully one-third of the troops of Ney covered the battlefield. The Prussians were right in considering themselves victors in the fight, although Napoleon finally won the upper hand by bringing up large reënforcements. During the night Blücher made

one final desperate attack, but in the morning the czar ordered the retreat. Even this retreat, however, earned the Prussians a military reputation which placed in shadow the great Frederick's military glory. Ernst Moritz Arndt composed at that time his famous *Lieder für Deutsche* (Songs for the Germans), the songs of the great minds who by their desperate efforts in these fierce battles had lifted tons from the weight of shame resting on Prussia's neck.

But what a calamity darkened the joy of successful resistance. He who had fashioned the files which were to cut Prussia's fetters—Germany's best and greatest man, Scharnhorst—had been wounded severely. And when he, faithful unto death, attempted to travel to Vienna to conclude an alliance with Austria, although desperately ill, he succumbed on the return voyage at Prague, on June 28. He was not destined to see the fruits of his labor, the free country of his birth; but he could carry up to heaven, to his ancestors, the joyful tidings that Prussia's sons had risen and were risking all to gain their liberty.

Napoleon, following up his victory with his usual energy, sent Marshal Ney against Berlin, and himself advanced into the Ober-Lausitz, close upon the heels of the Allies. By order of the czar, the latter accepted battle in a most

unfortunate position near Bautzen, on May 20-21. York, on the previous day, had attempted to intercept Marshal Ney, who came in forced marches to the assistance of Napoleon with a powerful army, and had fought a bloody battle near Königswartha. The Bautzen battle against Napoleon's huge force was lost at the very outset, but the exceptional bravery of the troops under Blücher, defending the heights of Kreckwitz, caused such great losses among the French—the killed alone numbering more than 25,000—that the best Napoleon could do was to remain in possession of the battlefield, not having enough strength left to start a pursuit. He had not gained a single Prussian trophy, but the Prussians had taken from him fifty cannon and a large number of prisoners. Under these conditions is it any wonder that the enthusiasm of the Prussians continued. They had proved the French were not unbeatable. It was the cause of the Fatherland, yea the cause of GOD, as Arndt said, for which the Prussians fought.

True, Davout, because of treachery on the part of Bernadotte, recaptured Hamburg, and the punishment of the unhappy city for its attempt to free itself from its French "fatherland" was the severest which Napoleon could conceive. Berlin was saved by a successful battle under Bülow against Marshal Oudinot

near Luckau; but Napoleon was undisputed master in all Germany west of the Elbe, and he still possessed the fortresses in the other parts. Immediately after the battle of Grossgörschen the king of Saxony had followed the orders of Napoleon and had hastened to his assistance at Dresden. Emperor Francis now took the field, too, but his military preparations were not completed and he considered the plans of the Prussian patriots chimerical, their enthusiasm sinister. Because of this no negotiations had yet been concluded with him. To influence the Austrian policy, Hardenberg urged the king not to withdraw too far from the Austrian frontier.

Napoleon now attempted, as on former occasions, to bring the czar over to his side, by offering him valuable territorial concessions, to lead him to new treachery against Prussia. He therefore offered an armistice, to which the Allies agreed; the treaty was signed on June 4, to be effective until July 20. When this news was received in Berlin, "all faces blanched, all hearts seemed struck as if by lightning; the stillness of death came over the glad multitudes; the sun of the beautiful spring day shone only upon people despairing of everything. At the thought of a possibility of peace under such conditions all were as if thunderstruck." Uncontrollable fury gripped the people when it became

known that Napoleon had treacherously used the time of the armistice in annihilating the entire volunteer corps of Lützow, near Kitzen, on June 17. Only a hundred men escaped from the slaughter.

Nevertheless, the armistice was of greater advantage to the Allies than to Napoleon, for it gave them a chance to rush their preparations; and on June 14 there came the long-expected alliance with England. On the 27th of the same month came the alliance with Austria. At last Austria had realized that her plans for any peaceful expansion were destined to come to naught; for Napoleon had sent a mocking answer (which was intentionally dispatched too late) to her grasping proffer of a selfish peace. So Austria declared war on Napoleon during the night of August 10-11. The arms were taken up once more! A rousing "Hurrah!" went through the armies of Prussia, as it became known that on the 17th of the month a new advance would start against the French. The three allied sovereigns met in solemn conclave at Prague, accompanied by their leading generals. When Napoleon, who now grew actually worried over the situation, sent an impudent proposal to renew the old Vienna congress, he received a blunt refusal.

The plan of the Allies was now to advance

against Napoleon with three great armies of, together, 480,000 men. The main army was under the command of the prince of Schwarzenberg, who, unfortunately, was also intrusted with the chief command over all the allied armies. The northern army was under the newly chosen crown prince of Sweden, the former French marshal Bernadotte; and the Silesian army was under the command of Blücher, who had Gneisenau as his chief-of-staff. But Napoleon, too, succeeded in raising an almost equal number of men, only about 40,000 less than the Allies, in addition to the troops which he maintained in the fortresses of the East, Stettin, Küstrin and Danzig.

The Silesian army was the smallest and had therefore instructions to watch Napoleon. But here, under the command of Blücher and the urgency of Gneisenau, the Prussian fury and hatred of Napoleon came to the fullest expression. When therefore Macdonald, who had remained in Silesia, sent his troops across the Katzbach and Neisse, on August 26, Blücher ordered General York to attack the much larger French army. The clash was terrific, and the French were thrown headlong from the hilly banks of the rivers into the water. Those who escaped the furious blows with the butt end of the rifles—the pouring rain prevented firing—

found their death by drowning in the raging torrents of the Katzbach and Neisse, or were finally wiped out in a second battle, two days later, on the banks of the Bober. At one stroke Napoleon had lost an entire army, and the Prussian province of Silesia had been freed of French troops. All the world now saw, what Scharnhorst had seen long ago, that Blücher and Gneisenau were to be the heroes of the great war of liberation.

In the meantime, the Prussian generals who had joined the army of the Swedish crown prince had had a chance to add new laurels to the Prussian wreath of glory. Oudinot had been ordered to attack Berlin from the South with a big army; Davout was to support him in the flank, from the direction of Hamburg; and General Girard was to advance from Magdeburg. The capital of Frederick William, which just then made up for all its former sins by extraordinary sacrifices, which "deserved to be the seat of its rulers"—Berlin was destined by French fury to be burned to the ground. The flames of the burning Prussian capital were expected to start a fire of dissension among the Allies. Undecided, in fear of the future, and hampered by his own treachery, Bernadotte hesitated. He thought he saw the inexorable coming of Fate. But Bülow attacked in a pouring rain the

French corps under the command of General Reynier, on August 23; and again the Prussian raging impetuosity did the work, after the cannon had ceased to roar. Bülow's and Borstell's battalions drove the French from the village of Grossbeeren, near Berlin, and the capital was saved. Before this terrific onrush of the outraged Prussians Oudinot immediately turned about face. Davout did the same; the French retreated. The small fights which their troops had were of no importance, excepting that at Gadebusch, on August 26, in which Theodor Körner, the great Prussian patriotic poet, met his death. And finally, the corps which had left Magdeburg to attack Berlin was ambushed on the return and cut to pieces by General Hirschfeld, who commanded the *Landwehr* of that section. Only 1,700 Frenchmen escaped to Magdeburg.

While the Prussian armies in Silesia and the North gained these splendid successes, the main army, under the incapable leadership of the Austrian commander, suffered a terrific defeat by Napoleon at Dresden, on August 26, and the retreat almost became a headlong flight when it was learned that the French general Vandamme had succeeded in gaining the road over which the retreat had to pass. Luckily, Prince Eugene of Württemberg, in command of the

Russians, was able to disperse the army of Vandamme by a sudden attack from the rear, in which the entire corps was annihilated, and Vandamme himself, with 10,000 of his men, was taken prisoner. In addition, the booty comprised 80 cannon.

Worse still was the fate of Marshal Ney, whom Napoleon sent for the second time to wipe Prussia's capital off the earth. His advance guard was detained for hours by Tauentzien, on September 6, in a series of vicious attacks from the front, until Bülow could reach the flank of the French army; the Saxons were thrown out of Göhlisdorf, and by advancing up to Dennewitz Bülow was able to force the French into a retreat, which soon changed to full flight. Toward the very end of the battle, the commander-in-chief, Bernadotte, appeared on the field, and seeing nothing else of importance to do, promptly claimed the honor of the victory.

How disheartening it was that in the face of these military successes Prussian diplomacy could win nothing but defeats and disillusionments! Stein submitted once more his plans for the formation of a new and closer union of Germany; but even Hardenberg's exceedingly favorable propositions for Austria's leading rôle in the new empire were declined by Prince Metternich. On the contrary, the incredible sim-

plicity and straightforwardness of the Prussian statesman was taken advantage of by the cunning Austrian minister. Metternich planned to tie the smaller German princes to the throne of Austria without the pomp of an imperial German crown, and to exert over the lesser states an influence which would give Austria a greater power than it had possessed in the time of its imperial glory. For, as he himself expressed it later in life, "in this manner Germany belongs to us far more securely than before." The Treaty of Teplitz, signed by Russia, Austria and Prussia, September 9, 1813, defined as the aim of the war the restoration of the conditions of 1805; but it left to each little German state its full sovereignty. Hardenberg, unsuspectingly, left the negotiations with the South German states to Austria, and thus it came to pass that the treaty with Bavaria, which Metternich had signed at Ried on October 8, did not include the submission to a central authority, and even left to Bavaria the ancestral property of the Hohenzollerns, Ansbach-Baireuth, of which Napoleon had robbed the royal Prussian House. The anger of Frederick William over this high-handed disposition of his ancestral property, and the exasperation of the Franks, who demanded to be placed again under the protection of the Prussian eagle, had no deciding influence on

either Metternich or Montgelas, the Bavarian minister. Metternich had succeeded in winning for Austria the Tyrol, Salzburg and the Inn districts, therefore it seemed but fair to expect Prussia to pay to Bavaria the price which Frederick the Great once had set on Bavaria's liberty. For Metternich had found the magnet to draw the smaller German states in the wake of Austria, as the example of Bavaria clearly showed; Prussia might try and see how it could manage to bring about a union of the old empire.

Even as the Austrian diplomat was working to stifle all Prussia's political gains from the war, so the Austrian military commander appeared to have abandoned all military moves against Napoleon. But against the Austrian's will and orders Blücher forced a continuance of the war. On October 3 he crossed the Elbe near Wartenburg, between Torgau and Wittenberg, and after York's soldiers had thrown the enemy from the high banks of the Elbe the way was opened for the crossing of the northern army. This seemed to stir the Austrians, for their Bohemian army advanced at last. Napoleon attempted to force Blücher to accept battle, while at the same time making a feint toward Berlin with some of his forces, in order to draw the northern army in that direction. To his extreme surprise Blücher refused a fight, crossed

the Saale, and marched in a westerly direction. The threatened attack on Dresden now forced Napoleon to turn his attention to the Bohemian forces, and this still fitted in very well with his original plans of crushing one of the armies of the Allies, and weakening the other two. At the gates of Leipzig he expected to beat them completely—for he thought Blücher somewhere near Merseburg and he had no great fear of Bernadotte.

Near Wachau, on October 16, 1813, began the mighty "battle of the nations." Napoleon launched the first attack with his army of 121,000 men against the 113,000 men of the Allies. His terrible artillery of 300 cannon caused terrific losses among the corps of Kleist and Prince Eugene. The moment of victory seemed at hand, and Napoleon had already ordered the church bells at Leipzig to ring in celebration of his success—when suddenly the Austrian reserves, led astray by Schwarzenberg, arrived on the field of battle and postponed the decision for a little while. The untimely arrival of those reinforcements upset Napoleon's plan to plunge Marshal Marmont into the fray, from the direction of Möckern; and Marmont himself was thrown into consternation by the unexpected appearance of Blücher and his fiery and tempestuous warriors.

Blücher not only held Marmont fast in his position, but ordered the tried and tested regiments of York to storm the strongly fortified position of Möckern. Despite the bravery with which Marmont defended himself, and though he was protected by more than fifty heavy cannon, he could not resist the fury of the Prussian attacks. Battery after battery was stormed, Möckern taken, Marmont thrown back to almost the gates of Leipzig, 53 cannon captured and 2,000 men made prisoners. Death's grim specter could not check the Prussians, who saw thousands of their comrades stretched upon the field. With a prayer York had attempted the seemingly impossible, and with thanksgiving he concluded it. The army, as once at Leuthen, gave thanks to the Lord of all armies, who had given it the victory.

The fighting had been so terrible that on the following day no one except Blücher was able to make a move. His indefatigable heroes drove the French from Gohlis and Eutritzsch in the north of the city. Napoleon himself attempted to start negotiations now, but late in the evening he began preparations for retreat. It was Sunday, and the rest enabled the Allies to draw together a large number of reserves, bringing their forces to more than 225,000, while Napoleon could only muster 160,000. In the after-

noon of the 18th there appeared the crown prince of Sweden, with his army, after Blücher had given him 30,000 men from his own forces as assistance, and completed the connection between the other two armies. And this was of the utmost importance. Six times already had the Prussians under Kleist and the Russians under Prince Eugene stormed against the main position of Napoleon, the extraordinarily fortified Probstheida, with its high stone walls, but in vain. But Bülow's forces, which formed the advance guard of Bernadotte, drove the French from Paunsdorf, Sellerhausen, Molkau and Stuntz, and chased them to the very gates of Leipzig; the Russians under Langeron drove the French out of Schönefeld, with the result that Napoleon's left wing had been broken and his center had become untenable.

While the Allies' songs of thanksgiving rose to heaven, Napoleon, late in the evening, gave the order for full retreat. Because of the policy of Schwarzenberg, who "built him golden bridges," Napoleon was able to lead to safety 90,000 men of his own France—leaving his German, Polish and Italian auxiliaries to defend the city. Bülow and Blücher took Leipzig by storm on the 19th. The East Prussian regiment of the *Landwehr*, led by a Major Friccus, who had been a public official, broke the Grimma gate

and entered as the first Prussian soldiers into the capital of Saxony. On the same afternoon, the allied monarchs entered the city through the same gate, received with uncovered head by the unhappy king Frederick Augustus, who unto the last had held to the oppressor of German freedom, and who now was led away a prisoner of war.

This gigantic battle had cost heavily on both sides; about 80,000 men were killed, or—what in those days was almost worse—lay severely wounded on the battlefield. All medical science, all charitable impulses, were limited by human endurance. And when, in the midst of the excitement, some one (it is said that it was a Frenchman) blew up the great bridge over the Elster, thousands of men who had fled from the sword were drowned in the river, among them being Prince Poniatowski. But in the blood of the thousands which saturated the fields around Leipzig there germinated the freedom of the whole German nation, and the heroes whose bones bleached there in the sun had made the first attempt to open the doors of German unity and power.

* A wonderful two months had passed. Not even the Prussian history could show such heroism and such struggling, such battling and such a victory. All of Germany had been freed as

far West as the Rhine. Napoleon succeeded in escaping to France, after removing the slight obstacle of the Bavarian army under General Wrede, near Hanau. The allied headquarters permitted the French escape, although they might have prevented it.

Many now believed that the purpose of the war had been attained, although as a matter of fact all that had been gained was still very insecure. In the fortress of Glogau, where the French commandant still held sway, the disaster to Napoleon was kept from the French troops, the commander inventing a tremendous victory, as he had done after the battle of Grossgörschen. The Rhenish states now joined the Allies. And even if most of them took this step merely under the influence of the Prussian victories, they seemed to expect rewards, for they returned from visiting the allied monarchs at Frankfort in a highly insulted frame of mind—because no one had given them slices of territory for their valuable assistance. Furthermore, the rising of the various peoples took place only in a limited manner, and Metternich offered Napoleon a peace which would give him not only the Alps and Pyrenees as frontiers, but also the Rhine as the eastern boundary. But among the Prussian patriots there was a less mercantile spirit. They would have no bargaining. They were

determined that the struggle should continue until the old frontiers of the Germans, the Scheldt and the Ardennes, from Dunkirk south to Basel, had been regained.

One of their hopes at least was fulfilled. The war was continued, and the fortresses in the East, Danzig, Thorn, Torgau, Dresden and Wittenberg, fell into the hands of the Allies. Still there was little thought of marching straight for Paris; on the contrary, the disunion caused by the clashing interests of the various allied nations became more clearly evident. They decided finally to cross the Rhine; but because of Austria's intentions regarding her Italian possessions and Switzerland, it was decided to cross the frontier by way of Swiss territory. This route was planned for the main army. It was only after great difficulties that Blücher obtained the consent of the general headquarters to his crossing of the middle Rhine, while Bülow, who since the march of Bernadotte against Denmark amid the acclamations of the people of western Germany had been given a free hand, crossed the lower Rhine into Holland. With astonishing speed Bülow stormed the Dutch fortresses, excepting Antwerp, held by Carnot; and so for the second time Prussia liberated the Netherlands from French oppression. And for the second time this was done only to

find that thereby English influence had been firmly planted around the mouths of the lower Rhine.

In December the Allies announced to the French people their invasion of France. Yet in their incredible infatuation of winning by tender means, they promised not only the most careful and gentle treatment, but also the maintenance of the old French territorial frontiers. In the night of New Year's, 1814, Blücher crossed the Rhine at Kaub, and the thundering "Hurrah!" of his troops carried to the Germans on the left bank of the river the glad tidings that, in the words of Arndt, "the Rhine is Germany's river, not Germany's boundary!" Without meeting resistance, Blücher marched through Lorraine, crossing the Saar, Meuse, Moselle and Marne, until he reached Brienne on the Aube. There was no possible chance for Napoleon to stop the victorious march with his hastily collected, green recruits, for Schwarzenberg, too, had reached the plateau of Langres. But at this time the hostile currents in the headquarters of the Allies became still more painfully visible. Metternich, at the time of the battle of Leipzig, had announced openly that he had no intention of permitting Prussia to get Saxony, or to possess the left bank of the Rhine. If, however, the Prussians continued in their wild victorious

march, it would be impossible to withhold from them these rewards.

Up to the present time Metternich had succeeded in hiding his true purposes from the unsuspecting Hardenberg, so that the latter had no doubts whatever regarding the honest intention of Austria. Still less did the crafty Metternich intend to permit the czar to carry out his plans for absorbing Poland, which, despite the Russians' silence, were generally known to be in preparation. Nor less still would Metternich allow the czar to gain the ascendancy in French affairs. This seemed likely to be the consequence if the war was continued to the abdication of Napoleon, and the establishment of a new French government, of whatever form and constitution. It was for these reasons that Austria vigorously opposed the heated demand of Prussia to march to Paris. True, Austria could not very well refrain from continuing the war, but it did manage to have Russia and Prussia send representatives to the congress at Chatillon, where the conditions and terms of peace were to be discussed with Napoleon, on the basis of the French possessions in 1792.

Blücher, however, took this opportunity to administer to Napoleon a severe defeat at Brienne on February 1, and again on the following day on French territory near La

Rothière. Despite the fact that Schwarzenberg had allowed Blücher only a very small army with which to operate, Emperor Francis began to think that the Prussians were winning far too often and too consistently for the good of Austria. He therefore deliberately ordered the commission of a piece of petty treachery, by removing protection from Blücher's left wing and ordering the main army to advance directly west. As a result Napoleon was able to harass Blücher in a series of small battles, which in their aggregate effect were worse than a single big defeat. Near Etoges, the Prussian generals escaped capture or death only by what seemed a miracle. Thus Emperor Francis and Napoleon gained their desire: Napoleon's throne was as firm as ever, and the Prussians had to be a little less self-confident at the peace meeting. Schwarzenberg himself was defeated by Napoleon at Montereau, and called vigorously for the assistance of the Prussians; and by February 21 Blücher's army was in a condition to join hands with the main army. Then the peace congress broke up, because of the growing impudence of Napoleon; but still Schwarzenberg, although having an enormous preponderance of forces, hesitated to give battle.

Thereupon Blücher, advised by Grolmann, asked permission to separate from the main

army and to march on Paris, together with Bülow, who was marching onward from Belgium. Bülow, on his invasion of French territory, issued a proclamation to the people, promising the most friendly treatment and the inviolability of all frontiers; the war was directed solely against the tyrant emperor. Blücher, not even awaiting formal permission, started his advance, and thus drew Napoleon after him. King Frederick William forced the Austrian commander-in-chief to attack a small French force left behind under the command of Oudinot, and to demolish it. At this fight near Bar-sur-Aube, Prince William of Prussia (the future German Emperor William I) gained a reputation for courage and fearlessness, during a wild ride as an *aide de camp*.

Meanwhile Blücher, instead of battling with Napoleon, followed the advice of Gneisenau and Boyen and carefully retreated, until he could form a junction with Bülow's army from the northeast. This accomplished, he gave battle at Laon, March 9, and during a terrific night struggle, near Athis, beat Napoleon so decisively that only the sudden illness of the German leader (Field marshal "*Vorwärtz*," as Blücher now was generally called) and the reluctance of the other generals to accept the orders and authority of the younger Gneisenau saved Napoleon from

complete destruction. The fight at Athis was under the direction of York and Kleist.

By this time, the obstinacy and insolence of Napoleon had changed the ideas of his imperial Austrian father-in-law; and on March 2 the convention of the Allies was renewed for a period of twenty years. In this renewal there was provision for the independence of Spain, the Netherlands and Italy, as well as a tentative plan for a "Federated Union of German States." And when Napoleon submitted a demand for the Italian royal throne for his stepson, thereby figuratively slapping the Austrian emperor's face, Austria forsook the diplomatic field and again took part in actual fighting. The Allies finally, with a treble superiority in numbers, succeeded in winning a victory over Napoleon at Arcis-sur-Aube, March 20; and the march to Paris was ordered at last.

Strange to say, this resolution was actually carried out, although Napoleon endeavored to detract the Allies' attention by suddenly making a feint in the direction of the Rhine. The Allies only detached a small force to watch developments in that field and pressed on to Paris, leaving Napoleon himself in the belief that they had abandoned for the time being the idea of taking his capital. Without meeting any great resistance, the allied armies arrived before the

gates of Paris, March 25, 1814. The attempt of a French division to stop the advance near La Fère Champenoise ended in complete defeat for the French. Two French marshals endeavored to defend the capital and fought a series of small but desperate bloody battles, at Pantin, Père la Chaise and on the hill of Montmartre, but without result. In the afternoon of the same day, March 30, the city of Paris capitulated. On the following day the allied sovereigns, Frederick William and the czar, accompanied by Schwarzenberg, made their solemn entrance into the French capital, in which for many centuries the plans had been formulated for the subjugation and misery of the German Fatherland, causing its people untold death and agony, shame and accursed degradation.

It now became evident how sensible the Prussian generals had been in their demand for an immediate attack on Paris. For now indeed the war was over. The French nation rejected Napoleon, and turned to the allied sovereigns as the harbingers of peace. The French senate, at the suggestion of Talleyrand, decreed the dethronement of Napoleon; and even the French marshals refused to obey his orders, when he attempted to march to the relief of his capital. On April 10 Napoleon resigned for all time, for himself and his descendants, all claims on the

French throne, and was sent to the island of Elba. Against the protest of Prussia, he was allowed in this little island an annual income and the rights of a sovereign ruler. Although the Allies had looked around for weeks to find a successor to him, they came to the conclusion that there was nobody in view except the Bourbons. And, although only England expressed a preference for the Bourbon dynasty, Louis XVIII, the "Pretender," was finally accepted as the king of France. It was with him that the Allies concluded peace, on May 30, at Paris, in which France was established in the frontiers which it had in 1792. The gracious kindness with which Louis was treated by Russia, Austria and England,—the idea being that the poor Bourbon king was not responsible for the misdeeds of Napoleon,—left to France not only Alsace and Lorraine, including those sections which had been conquered by France in 1793, but also remitted the payment of the costs of the war. This even excused France from the debt of 169 million thalers, which she unquestionably owed to Prussia for services in the war of 1812, according to the treaty with Napoleon.

Thus there was peace in Europe, but a peace which did not at all satisfy the expectations of the Prussian people. On the contrary, France was more powerful than even during the reign

of Louis XIV. In the first joy over the liberation of the nation, however, few noticed the unsatisfactory conditions of the peace. All were rejoicing that the great work had been accomplished, that the sacred war had been carried to victory. "What patriots dreamed and egotists ridiculed has come to pass!" exclaimed Gneisenau. Even a Frenchman, Benjamin Constant, in full realization of the curse which Napoleon had brought upon all the world, admitted that: "The Prussians have brought the face of humanity once more to honor." Tumultuous joy reigned in Berlin as the victors brought back with them the sword of the great Frederick, and the Quadriga of Victory was once more placed upon the summit of the Brandenburger Thor.

A gigantic task still awaited the Allies, the reorganization of Europe. The congress of Vienna was called for July of the same year, but its opening had to be postponed until November. It was, however, already decided by the diplomats that the state which had carried the greatest burden, which had gained the most decisive and important victories, was not to receive its reward. Once again the old jealousy was brought into play against this state of work, power and high ideals—Prussia. Hardenberg refused to enter into closer alliance with the czar, who needed Prussia's good will for his

Polish expansion plans, and remained the true friend of Metternich and the English minister Castlereagh, both of whom did all in their power to wreck the plans of the Prussian patriots and damage the interests of Prussia. Already there were signs that the western frontier of Prussia would be greatly changed to the advantage of the new Holland; that the districts of Limburg, Luxemburg and Liège, with the Meuse, would be surrendered; and that Mainz would be lost to the state, thereby rendering impossible a proper defense of the western frontier. Gneisenau even advised the king to start another war rather than surrender Jülich and Mainz. In addition, Prussia's claims upon Saxony were vigorously opposed by all the Allies, and were impossible of attainment without the assistance of Prussia.

CHAPTER VI

THE VIENNA CONGRESS AND WATERLOO (1814-1815)

FOR some time the foreign policies of Prussia remained in a state of indecision. King Frederick William had no wish to fight his recent allies, yet was unwilling to be robbed by them. Meanwhile, Prussia's broad internal policy of reorganization progressed rapidly. Bülow took charge of the finances, von Schuckmann the home affairs, Prince von Wittgenstein the department of public safety, von Boyen military matters, and Hardenberg the general supervision. After the signing of the peace treaty, King Frederick William III and the czar of Russia followed the invitation of the prince regent of England, and paid a visit to London, where it is said that the enthusiasm of John Bull for Gneisenau and Blücher, "Marshal Forward," reached almost the point of veneration—just as in the days of Frederick William I and Frederick the Great an alliance with Prussia

had been a sort of gospel, and the great Frederick had been hailed as the liberator of states and consciences.

On August 6, 1814, Frederick William returned to Berlin, and soon afterward he took the step which was to be the most important innovation in Prussian affairs. Because of economical pressure, the many exemptions from universal military duty which had been suspended in February, 1813, for the duration of the war, had been again put in force on May 27, 1814. The king now called Gneisenau and the new minister of war, von Boyen, as also the reorganizer of the general staff, von Grolmann, assisted by Hardenberg, to form a commission which would work out a new law, regulating military compulsory service. This law went into effect on September 3, 1814. In this law one may see mirrored not only the events of the two years that had just passed, but the basic foundations of the Prussian state, in the very first sentences, which read: "The general exertion of our faithful people, without exception and distinction, has effected the liberation of our Fatherland in a successfully concluded war. Only in such a manner is it possible to secure the maintenance of this freedom. The institutions which caused this great success must be the foundations of new laws for the military constitution of the

state, and the basis of all future military institutions. For only in a lawful and orderly arming of the whole nation can we find the best security for a lasting peace." The work of Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Boyen and Grolmann was thereby secured forever to the nation, and the universal compulsory service, without favor or exception, was established as the *rocher de bronze* of the Prussian state for the future.

Comparisons were made, and have since been made, between this great accomplishment of Scharnhorst and the attempts of the sixteenth century to regulate the relationship between man and heaven, but there can be no doubt that the establishment of this compulsory service law, with its attendant abolishment of a "professional" standing army, composed to a large degree of tramps and vagabonds and all-round "good-for-nothings," was the most important step in the development of Prussia and all the countries of Europe. In more recent times, no single reform movement has caused such a deep impression on the fate of all the nations of the world as the idea, morally and ethically pure, of universal service for the good of the country. And this idea was born in the oppressed and enslaved Prussian state.

In the middle of September the first preparatory steps toward a readjustment of the

boundaries of Europe were taken by the ministers of the four great powers, in Vienna; but it was November 2 before the Vienna congress was formally opened. Its purpose was not only to reorganize the territories and frontiers of the European countries, but also to reconstruct in some fashion that mighty central territory which was still called by its old general name, "Germany." It is a story often told how a veritable mob of persons, both authorized and unauthorized, flocked to the congress; how the business of argument and discussion was more often adjourned to the banquet tables in the houses of the society leaders, instead of conducted at the green baize tables of the diplomatic offices; how intrigues supplanted real work. Weeks and weeks passed, without any result being achieved.

The modesty of Frederick William prevented his forcing upon the world the sun of Prussian deeds; their glory did not penetrate through the clouds of incense which enveloped the czar in Paris, Vienna and everywhere, praising him as the liberator of Europe. On the contrary, one can follow through all the negotiations the red thread of jealousy against Prussia, which acted as a sure guide through the labyrinth of twisted paths of allied diplomacy. As ever, with the exceptions of the time of Fred-

erick the Great, the Prussian cabinet refused to believe that Austria, for which Prussia had done so much, and for which it was willing to do still more in the future, could forsake the Prussian state. Hardenberg always believed—as his diary shows—in the goodness and honesty of the seemingly so gracious emperor and his clever and shrewd diplomatic adviser, Metternich, even after both had treacherously befooled and deserted him.

The most important problems for Prussia were those of the Saxon-Polish and German constitutions. In the former, Prussia was to achieve a half success, but in the latter it was completely defeated. Alexander still planned the restoration of the ancient glories of the kingdom of Poland—but under Russian suzerainty. In other words, he intended engulfing all Poland in Russia. Yet he had previously signed the Treaty of Kalisch, in which he guaranteed to Prussia “the restoration of Prussia’s frontiers” and promised to his “most faithful ally” such a “unification and rounding off in the East as may be necessary to form a compact and independent state.” Vienna also had its eyes on the Polish lands belonging to the Saxon crown; while Hanover, out of consideration for England’s feelings, would probably be enlarged rather than cut down. The sword of the Allies

had conquered Saxony; it was therefore without a lawful owner. Its former ruler had clung to the oppressor of Germany even after the battle of Leipzig, at which he had been made a prisoner. He had followed the Frenchman, from whom he expected rewards, and who certainly had caused nothing but trouble and misery for the empire. It was therefore no more than right that he should share Napoleon's fate. Had the result of the war been different, he would doubtless have been rewarded at the cost of his neighbors. The wars of Frederick the Great had clearly shown the value to Prussia of this little country which was so well protected by mountains against Austria; the great king had urgently advised its acquisition, and all the quibbling and scrapping between the courts of Dresden and Berlin, which had continued from the time of the Reformation, would have been settled once for all by a union of Saxony with Prussia. And finally, Prussia urged that once, at least, the proper punishment should be meted out to a ruler who had forsaken the Rhenish federation and the interests of the empire and allied himself with the oppressor of Germany.

All these considerations were to Austria strong reasons for opposing the Prussian views. Prussia already, by its possession of Silesia, seemed to endanger the eastern wing of the Aus-

trian monarchy. With the possession of the *Erzgebirge* (Ore Mountains) Prussia had, in the eyes of the Austrian statesmen, a postern gate into their country. If Saxony also was handed over to Prussia, did not that mean giving her the means to realize her German plans? The possession of Saxony assured to the North German state just that influence over the central states which it was Austria's hope to prevent. And was it not true that by punishing one of the German vassals of Napoleon Austria would be threatening the others, to win whom was the chief aim of the Hapsburg policies? And finally, if Russia assisted vigorously in the pressing of Prussia's demands for Saxony, was it not chiefly because Russia considered Saxony a recompense for the old Prussian possessions in Poland which the czar so much desired? The presence of the czar on the Vistula frightened Austria just as much as the Russian eagles on the lower course of the Danube; and for the same reasons that Metternich extended favors to Constantinople, he opposed the Prussian demands for Saxony. He thereby weakened the power of Russia and this aim he followed with the utmost persistency. He also dared to hope that if he withdrew from Frederick William the indemnity for Poland, the latter would drop his exertions in favor of the czar. In this manner

he hoped to sever the friendship of Russia and Prussia, insomuch as this rested mainly on the cordial personal relations of their rulers, while both the Prussian and Russian statesmen opposed the Polish plans of Alexander—although for somewhat different reasons. What a gain it would be to be able to chain Prussia to the Austrian ship of state! Russia would be completely isolated, and Germany lost.

To attain all this Metternich fought shoulder to shoulder with the English ministers, particularly Lord Castlereagh, who would not assent to a Russian enlargement, but who greatly desired to weaken Prussia in the interests of the Guelphs. Castlereagh succeeded in forcing Prussia, under the most peculiar circumstances, to cede East Friesland, and the expected "isthmus" leading to the western districts of Hildesheim, Minden and Lingen, to Hanover. But it was necessary, under any circumstances, now to rectify one of the mistakes of the Peace of Westphalia (1648), the incorporation of the irregular coast line of Pomerania and Rügen in the Danish monarchy. To regain this district from the hands of non-Germans, to get control over the mouths of the Oder, and to end the 200-year fight for possession of Pomerania, this was more necessary for Prussia than even the possession of East Friesland with the mouth of the

Ems. This Frisian territory would at least fall into the hands of Germans, and the Guelphs refused to surrender Lauenburg for anything less than the Frisian compensation. And the possession of Lauenburg was necessary to Prussia, because Denmark would not consider any other payment for its ceding of North Pommerania. It was with a heavy heart that Frederick William consented to the surrender of his Frisians, and these refused to believe for a long time that they had been "tied to the tails of the white horse"—referring to the coat of arms of the Guelphs. And hard was the fight before the Guelphs agreed to hand over Lauenburg.

On top of all this, it was a severe loss to Prussia to see the formation of close relations between England and Holland, and to realize that the Guelphs now ruled from The Hague to Limburg, from the Channel to the Elbe; for the Hanoverian Guelphs had never been favorably inclined to the Hohenzollerns. The Guelphs showed their true nature immediately. As soon as they had increased their own territory at the expense of Prussia and had pushed the black eagle from the shores of the North Sea, they intrigued against the proposed enlargement of their uncomfortable neighbor by the incorporation of Saxony. For Saxony under a Prussian régime promised much less of a profitable trade

with England than had been found in Leipzig (the main distributing point of English commerce in Germany) through a convenient system of bribery and commissions.

The Anglo-Austrian combination, if opposed to a close Russian-Prussian alliance, would have been in a condition of stalemate. At this point there came to the assistance of Metternich the smooth ability and unshakable certainty of the master of all diplomatic intrigue, the French ambassador Talleyrand. True, the Paris treaty had excluded France from all participation in the congress covering the reorganization of the territories. But Louis XVIII had known how to keep the friendship of the English ministers who had lifted him to the throne of France; and Talleyrand, by utilizing the different currents and interests, not only obtained admission to the discussions, but actually gained a leading influence in the congress. The Bourbons had always bragged of their great love for Poland; Russian aggrandizement was not at all in their mind; the possible weakening of Prussia, on the other hand, would be to France a delicious revenge, to make her people forget that Prussia's armies had dared not to punish them for their misdeeds, but to gain victories over them.

Everything therefore united to rob Prussia of

the fruits of its victory. Not one of the states took an interest in the enlarging of the monarchy, and the czar only supported the Prussian plans feebly, in order to realize his own in Poland. These Polish plans, on the other hand, were so threatening in their possible effect on Prussia that neither Hardenberg nor Humboldt, Prussia's second representative at the congress, sought an understanding with him. They believed that the fear of Alexander's intentions would be strong enough in the Vienna Hofburg to render the Austrians more agreeable to their Prussian neighbor. Supported by Austria and England, the Prussian envoys hoped to save Saxony for Prussia, and they were supported in this hope by the expressions of Metternich. Alexander, however, notified the king of Prussia that Metternich had offered him an alliance, over the head of Hardenberg, and had promised to yield in the Polish matter. Thereupon King Frederick William ordered a close understanding with Russia. Whether or not Alexander told the truth is not known, but Hardenberg wrote sadly in his diary: "Metternich has not kept his word."

Russia now surrendered to Prussia the Saxon administration, which until then had remained in the hands of the czar. This brought matters to such a crisis that Berlin about the end of the

year was fully prepared for another war. Gentz, representing the voice of the Austrian ministers, explained in a memorial that Austria, in order to maintain a European balance, would be compelled to conclude an alliance with southern Germany and France against Russia and Prussia. This incredible result was actually reached. On January 3, 1815, probably urged on by Talleyrand, the three powers, Austria, England and France, formed an alliance, defensive and offensive, against Russia and Prussia. This remarkable league of recent enemies also included Sardinia, Hanover, Darmstadt and Bavaria, which demanded the city of Mainz. Such was the answer of Europe to the work of liberation accomplished by Prussia and Russia.

Luckily, conditions were such that the realization of this peculiar gratitude could not be immediately carried out. Exhausted, as the states all were, it was impossible for them to start a new great war over the question of Saxony. And fortunately the Prussian statesmen gave in and declared themselves satisfied with one-half of Saxony. The czar supported this generous Prussian offer vigorously and was so pleased with the turn of events that he himself decided to sacrifice something "for the good friend." He renounced his claims on Thorn and Danzig and permitted a connection between the prov-

inces of Silesia and Prussia. He also declared his readiness to establish a Polish republic of Cracow, and offered to cede Wieliczka with its great salt mines, and the Tarnopol district, to Austria. Prussia, it is true, lost some German territory, and was again compelled to take in payment therefor a piece of Polish land, which Frederick William at one time had refused, and France had again been admitted to the concert of the powers as an equal. But the congress was thus brought to a peaceful end, with some English intercession. Austria thereafter was a little more reasonable in yielding a strong western frontier for Prussia, though this was chiefly because Austria wanted Prussia to have all the trouble of keeping guard against France.

Yet this too was a distinct gain for the German empire. "The Margrave of the Rhine," demanded by Ernst Moritz Arndt, must indeed be a better guardian and protector of Germany against France than the small conglomeration of states which Metternich had proposed to range along the border line. The final settlement gave Prussia for all its sacrifices, in addition to a part of Poland, Danzig and Thorn, Westphalia and the Rhineland, half of Saxony and Pomerania, but not that "rounding off" which had been promised to it. The added territory was less, by 14,000 square miles, than it had

possessed in 1806, and the geographical situation of the state was again so torn and scattered that a strengthening seemed to have been successfully prevented—unless, contrary to all expectations, this unfortunate scattering of its forces should become a new cause for further advancement.

It was still less possible to solve the German constitutional problem during the Vienna congress. There was not only the opposition of Austria and the stronger central states of Germany to be considered, but the whole problem itself was in such a vague, crude condition that there was no general idea as to the proper manner of its solution. No one seemed to realize that a common discussion of this question by Austria and Prussia was in itself impossible of success; that Prussia, German through and through, must work along its own lines to carry out the thought of German unity; that Austria, which had a wide influence in Italy through the rulership of members of its royal House, must view any strengthening of the German nation as an obstacle to its own suzerainty. It was clear that Austria did not intend to overload its many other crowns by reassuming the imperial crown of Germany, and that it had rendered impossible a strengthening of the empire by its policy of petting the small states of Central

Europe, shown particularly in its treatment of Bavaria and Württemberg. This treatment was responsible for the refusal of the small states to give up the smallest item of their sovereignty, and Bavaria and Württemberg lodged a vigorous protest against the idea of a federated constitution. In the course of the discussions it was found that no agreement of importance could have been reached even by the five chief states alone: Prussia, Austria, Bavaria, Württemberg and Hanover. How impossible then to form a union in which all the small principalities of the empire would have to be consulted! This was brought out by Württemberg in its refusal of the conditions suggested.

Freiherr von Stein, who was at that time in Vienna without holding any official capacity, but who nevertheless exerted a considerable influence, through the mixture of fear and respect given to his superior personality, did not plan to put Germany under the leadership of Prussia, as General von Steinmetz suggested, or, worse still, to exclude Austria from the empire altogether and to remove from their thrones all those small princelings; but he demanded some form of a United Germany, a powerful state which should possess in itself all those elements of force, education and a true and lawful freedom of thought: "a constitution based on unity,

force and nationality," "a state which contained all the moral and physical requirements of force, freedom and enlightenment." In urging this idea he, however, committed the historical error of thinking that it had been accomplished in the period between the tenth and thirteenth centuries. Stein would have wiped out all but fifteen or sixteen ruling Houses in Germany; while Hardenberg and Humboldt decried all proposals to exert force against the small states. They insisted that Prussia should be a "protection to the lesser states rather than a danger." Both statesmen, of course, desired that Germany should again become a nation, and that a union of the most important interests of the people, based on the national requirements and patriotic demands of the times, should be formed. The first Prussian draft for a general German national constitution therefore included the creation of a high court of justice, the *Bundesgericht*, or federal court; identical constitutions in the various states of the Union, with equal rights in each for the citizens of the others; a German civil code, equal coinage, and common administration of revenue and mail services. Unity in the military service was to be accomplished by common agreement.

But neither this reasonable proposal nor others worked out by Humboldt, with never-

ceasing enthusiasm and diligence, met the approval of Metternich or the favor of the ministers of the princelings. The whole work on the constitution was hopelessly delayed, and even the urgent advice of the emperor of Russia did not serve to bring forth that feeling of repentance which is said to precede the better deed. Finally there was nothing left for Prussia, after war agreements, *Bundesgericht* and landed estates rights had been discarded, but to sign the convention, no matter what the conditions. It had to be satisfied with "generalities," and to hope that in the future something worth while might be accomplished along the lines of a federal constitution. It was enough to have been able to prevent or render difficult the formation of a Rhenish federation, for in the meantime there had appeared a very practical reason for the formation of a federation which would maintain the external security and independence of Germany. On June 8 the articles of such a German federation were signed, and on the 9th of the month incorporated in the general report of the Vienna congress.

In the German federation thus loosely formed, the powers of Europe were again placed as guardians over the constitution of Germany—as if they had not caused enough trouble during the past two centuries, since the

Westphalian peace! Metternich gloried for many years afterward in having thus accomplished his object. The basis of the federation was the complete equality of the thirty-nine German states and free cities, which agreed to support the federation as a whole and each state individually against any and all attacks. They were not to make war upon each other; not to conclude any alliances with any foreign power against the security and interests of the federation or its individual members; and, in case of a war on the part of the federation, not to make peace separately and without the consent of the federation. That was all. There was not even the institution of a high federal court of justice. Only a congress made up of representatives from the states formed the visible evidence of the union. The old Regensburg *Reichstag* was dug up again, and experienced in the Frankfort *Bundestag* a poor resurrection. In the inner council of this federation only the twelve larger "powers" of the federation were to have a vote; the others received one vote for every five and six of the members. But in the general council, out of a total of sixty-nine votes, the seven large powers, with five-sixths of the total territory and population, had barely one-half of the votes. And as if this did not sufficiently prevent any real reformatory work, Saxony's proposal to limit all

the important decisions, such as new fundamental laws, organic changes, individual rights and religious matters, to a unanimous vote, in order to become laws, dug the grave for the half-dead corpse of the federation. Upon the suggestion of the South German states a further resolution was passed, practically excluding the people from participation in the deliberations of the federation, and providing instead that "in each of the federal states there was to be a constitutional assembly"—a mere formula of no value whatever. The weakness of this final promise was not realized so much by the enraged people, as several of the states had actually made nominal steps in the direction of freedom, and had appointed commissions to work out constitutional programmes. King Frederick William gave his solemn promise on May 22 to form *Reichstände* and to reestablish the *Landstände*, or provincial estates, which were to elect a general assembly. He had also promised a new constitution to Prussia.

But before the new German constitution had come to be really discussed in all seriousness, the hammer which was to demolish this artificial structure had already been lifted for the blow. On March 7 the report came to Vienna that "the sovereign of Elba" had landed on March 1 in the neighborhood of Cannes, France. It

was clear that this time the rulers of Europe had no hesitation about hurling themselves at the Corsican conqueror. On March 13 the great powers pronounced Napoleon an outlaw, and on the 25th they signed a new treaty, according to which each of the four nations agreed to furnish 150,000 men, to prevent Bonaparte—they called him now by that name—from again interfering with the peace of Europe. Napoleon had in the meantime gathered around him the troops which still lived in the dreams of his glory, and had entered Paris, while the Bourbon king fled with all haste during the night. The usurper immediately promised to the French nation new laws and liberty, and tried to appear before the other nations as the repentant sinner and angel of peace, who was only too happy to accept the Peace of Paris. But even the most peaceful citizen of France knew that the name of Napoleon alone meant war, and two of his most famous marshals, Oudinot and Macdonald, refused him obedience. The French nation, as a whole, however, voted for Napoleon's ascendancy of the throne and thereby accepted its responsibility for the actions of its ruler and was compelled to suffer the consequences of another war. The sentiments of the great powers are best shown in the fact that Talleyrand, the French ambassador, could dare to suggest that

the war be declared only against Napoleon personally; while the English commander-in-chief openly declared: "France has no enemies; this is a war of Europe, including France, against Bonaparte and his army." The confused negotiations in Vienna, the hesitations of the various cabinets and their real or pretended military unpreparedness, gave the emperor the necessary time to collect a new army and complete his armaments. In June he had 200,000 men, nearly all of them veterans, for the best of them had come from all the Prussian fortresses where they had been kept prisoners of war until the Peace of 1814.

In Germany the war was accepted as inevitable; and the youth of the nation again was fired by the sacred flame of patriotism. The Prussian *Landwehr* rushed to the colors and all declared enthusiastically that they would not suffer a man on the throne of France who, as the king expressed it in his proclamation, "announced the domination of the world as the reason for his many wars." The demands now made by the Prussian people were definite and sharp. "We must have better frontiers for Germany," was the statement of Frederick William, short and to the point. Everywhere Prussians demanded that France should this time restore to Germany the robbed districts of Alsace-Lorraine. The

aroused people, especially Blücher, Gneisenau and their friends, were glad to see the unhappy Peace of Paris displaced by a new one, which would construct a firm dike against the attacks from the West.

The Allies planned to collect an enormous army in Belgium, the middle Rhine, the upper Rhine, and in Switzerland; 800,000 men were to guarantee them the victory in advance. But the armies under Blücher, Gneisenau and Wellington, composed of Prussian and English troops, to which were added a few regiments of other Germans, fought the fight alone, although under great stress and with terrible losses. In the first place, these two armies were not completely ready, being distributed over too large an area. The English army, especially, was scattered from Ghent to Quatrebras. The English commander-in-chief also believed that Napoleon would try to spread out and attack him in the right flank or would seek to envelop him, while Napoleon had decided to dash between the two armies and beat each one separately. Too late this intention of Napoleon was realized by the Allies and orders were sent hastily to Gneisenau at Sombrefte, where he collected three Prussian army corps on June 15-16. The junction with the corps of Bülow, which stood at Liège, did not succeed, and the question was seriously debated whether

it would not be better to evade a battle under these unsatisfactory conditions. The most definite assurances given both orally and in writing by Wellington, on June 15 and 16, that he would appear with his troops in the afternoon without fail, finally decided Blücher and Gneisenau to accept battle, despite their unfavorable positions. The English did not arrive; they had to fight a small battle near Quatrebras, which because of the miscalculated time of reënforcements they were barely able to maintain.

But it was not Wellington himself who had to suffer the consequences of his hasty promise. It was the devoted Prussians under Blücher and Gneisenau. Although at Ligny there were fighting soldiers surcharged with patriotic enthusiasm, with bravery and valor, their efforts were in vain. Without expecting or giving quarter, 25,000 men were hurling themselves at one another time after time in deadliest conflict. The battle continued until late at night; for even at eight o'clock in the evening Wellington's arrival was still expected. But he did not come. Napoleon remained in possession of the battlefield, while only a desperate cavalry charge saved Blücher from falling into the hands of the French. The horse of the old field marshal had been shot under him, and both friend and enemy whirled past the prostrate figure. His adjutant,

Count Nostiz, stood near him, with pistol drawn and cocked, until help arrived. Napoleon was wild with joy over the day's success. He thought he had driven the Prussians eastward to the Rhine, and sent an army corps to pursue them. But the army corps sought the expected fugitives in vain; for, against all calculations and expectations, Gneisenau had decided to march northward, toward the English army, despite the breach of promise committed by Wellington. Gneisenau was urged to superhuman endeavor by his burning desire to avenge his defeat by the "Monster," and by the fear that a retreat of the Prussian corps would have the most disastrous consequences on the general political situation.

Even the most obstinate mind must admit the power of "moral forces." For in spite of the terrible day of fighting, in spite of the exertions of the forced marches in pouring rain, the Prussian army reached Wavre in the evening of the 17th, only a few miles south of Mont St. Jean, near Brussels, where the English army was stationed, ready for a new battle. Wellington now sent word that he was willing to accept battle, provided Blücher would come to him with 25,000 men. "With all I have, with my whole army, I hope," answered Blücher, and he kept his word.

Napoleon, secure in his belief that the Prussians were in full flight toward the Rhine, pre-

pared to attack the English. So confident was he that no help could reach his foes that he delayed for a great parade of his whole forces. The defeated Gneisenau grimly conceived the plan of enveloping Napoleon's army and attacking him in both flank and rear simultaneously. Assailed from the north by the English, from the east and south by the Prussians, the French army, standing on the heights of La Belle Alliance, was to be annihilated. Wellington, because of his unfortunate idea that the emperor might outflank him, had weakened his forces by 17,000 men; but he held favorable positions with his center at La Haye, his left wing at Frischermont, and his right wing at Hougomont. The battle began at noon, June 18, 1815.

News now reached the emperor that the Prussians, whom he had defeated and who were supposed to be fleeing eastward, were coming toward him from the rear. At first he tried to believe and make those around him believe that the approaching army was his own corps sent to pursue the Prussians but now returned. Finally he was compelled to realize how much he had underrated Prussian firmness. It was then that the full fury of the attack of the French guards developed. Napoleon knew that he must destroy Wellington before Blücher's men could arrive on the field. For hours the English withstood all

attacks, and Wellington's soldiers fought with the courage of despair, knowing that the fate of the world hung in the balance. Everything depended on their holding out just a little longer. But even they could not stand such furious assaults; their line was broken and Wellington could fill the breach only by taking the most desperate chances. It was late in the afternoon, and Wellington lost hope. "I wish it were night, or the Prussians would come!" And then, at half past five in the afternoon, the first battalions of Bülow's corps emerged from the woods at Frischermont, opened fire on La Belle Alliance and attacked the village of Plancenois. In the meantime Ziethen's corps stormed against the positions of La Haye and Papelotte, in order to relieve the hard-pressed English forces. The battle was over at eight o'clock. It surged most furiously around the village of Plancenois, where 6,000 of Bülow's men covered the ground. Once more Napoleon sent his guards against Plancenois, and against the English center. In vain; Bülow maintained his position and Ziethen drove the enemy from La Haye. The left and right wings of Napoleon's position were crushed and Napoleon realized that all was lost: "*Sauve qui peut!*"

Even escape, however, was granted to only a few; for Gneisenau took no chances and would

give the defeated enemy no moment to recover his strength. The English troops rested during the night; but the Prussians, who before the hot battle had marched over heavy muddy roads for eight hours and more, took up the pursuit and exerted all their forces to annihilate their foe. Napoleon himself was barely able to escape on a fast horse; his carriage, filled with jewels and treasure, he had to leave behind as a booty for the victors. Only 10,000 men succeeded in reaching Paris, although the army corps which before had been searching for the Prussians managed to evade capture. "A better name than 'La Belle Alliance' could not be found for the battle," reported Blücher in his official description of the conflict; but Wellington thought it more conducive to his own glory to give the battle the name of Waterloo, the place of his last headquarters.

By means of forced marches Blücher and Gneisenau led their armies to Paris, while Prince August through his conquest of the fortresses gained a high military reputation. On July 3 these two commanders forced the city of Paris to capitulate for the second time. The French nation now, as once before, cast aside the man who had become the curse of Europe, but who had carried the French to the pinnacle of glory. He was sent on board of the British

warship *Bellerophon*, lying at Rochefort, and was later transported to St. Helena, by order of the allied powers.

These terrific blows did not create particular rejoicings in Vienna and in St. Petersburg. For if Prussia's sons could carry out deeds on the battlefield which, as Blücher said, "would ever be remembered in history," and which gave the reasonable presumption that they might be repeated by their descendants, how in such case was it possible to realize the hopes of the statesmen on the Danube? How could Prussia remain so small that it had to take its orders from the banks of the Neva? Blücher, the faithful "comrade-in-arms" of Wellington, had marched to Paris only to put back the Bourbon on the throne which he had left so hastily and unceremoniously. By thus accomplishing ably and quickly what was really the great desire of the English cabinet, Blücher compelled the czar to acknowledge Louis XVIII as king of France; although the czar had long recognized the incapacity of the Bourbons for government, and had planned to put the royal crown on the head of the duke of Orleans. Had Russia not promptly acknowledged the Bourbon king, it would have lost all influence on the Seine, and all chances of French support for its eastern policies.

But with the reëstablishment of the Bourbon dynasty Prussia had to drop its demands for a regulation of the western frontier and the return of Alsace-Lorraine. Stein, it is true, urged the chancellor Hardenberg, and Gneisenau wrote a heartrending appeal to him, to demand the French line of fortresses against Belgium, Luxemburg and Alsace-Lorraine, for "Prussia never stood so high as now." Blücher begged his king not to let the diplomats throw away with the pen what the soldiers had twice conquered with their blood. The moment had arrived to safeguard Germany against France. As founder of the German safety the king would be honored and revered for all time, and Prussia would be able to enjoy the fruits of its efforts, when it no longer was forced to stand with a drawn sword over its possessions. But how could the allied monarchs, when they entered Paris on July 10, demand from their host an indemnity from him who "was absolutely innocent of wrongdoing and who had suffered personally through this 'incident' of Napoleonic dictatorship and war"? The matter was clearly impossible, although the Prussian ministers and ambassadors did all in their power to obtain better conditions of peace. It was useless for them to point out that as Louis XVIII had not taken part in the fight against Napoleon, as

everybody had a right to expect, and as the French nation had made war for the emperor with all its resources, the conditions of the first Peace of Paris were an impossibility. The responsibility of the French nation for all the great sacrifices which the war had cost, the ease with which a new French invasion into Germany might be staged, and the strained and insecure situation in the South German states, all these matters were pushed aside when opposed to the powerful interests of England and Russia.

The history of the past two centuries had taught that the unprotected frontier not only placed the German nation at the mercy of its western neighbor, but was also the main reason why the South German states were unable to carry out a truly national German policy. Their defenseless condition had created the possibility of the intriguing "French party" within the empire. Gneisenau had warned the emperor Alexander truthfully when he said that he believed more was lost even to Russia, for the common cause of Europe, by submitting to the expansion plans of France, than by strengthening the German defense. It even remained in vain that the crown prince of Württemberg exclaimed prophetically: "There is always the possibility of a new Franco-Rhenish federation, as

long as the South German states, lying without protection from the cannon at Strasburg, are continually threatened by France as to their very existence!" For Metternich, swayed by no regard for the security of Germany, solemnly declared that no war of conquest had been undertaken, and that France therefore should receive its frontiers as they were in 1790.

The second Peace of Paris was concluded tentatively on October 2, 1815, and definitely signed on November 20. It left to France those frontiers so dangerous to Germany's safety, with the exception of a few fortresses which were given to Holland, the surrender of Savoy to the kingdom of Sardinia, and the districts of Landau and Saarlouis to Germany. France also was compelled to pay the incredibly small sum of 700 million francs indemnity, and to bear the establishment of foreign military posts for five years, in which to strengthen the Bourbon rule. One of the main reasons of this peace agreement, so unfavorable for Prussia, was the fact that Czar Alexander was completely intoxicated by the clouds of incense which were burned before him. Europe hailed him as the savior of its states, and he liked the rôle immensely. He consented to follow the suggestion of the enraptured Frau von Krüdener and other women: "to show Christian forgiveness to all, even to

faithless France." This Christian forgiveness, he may have thought, ought surely to have a fruitful aftermath, in the matter of his Polish plans.

It was this hypocritical morality, so clearly evidenced in the spirit of those times, which knew so well how to hide the Russian interests with the mantle of Christian love and charity, that led to the formation of the "Holy Alliance." By this, Austria, Russia and Prussia were declared the three branches of a family whose highest sovereign was "God our Divine Savior Jesus Christ, the Word of the Highest, the Word of Life." This indistinct idea of a theocratic community of the European states never led and never could have led to any political results; for the relations of the states had other causes, other means and other aims. Indeed, these other aims found expression even when Alexander placed the wordy document before his brother sovereigns. Frederick William signed it only in order not to hurt the czar's feelings; Emperor Francis only after Metternich had assured him that the document contained nothing but empty words; while the English prince regent refused to sign it at all.

For a time the four ambassadors of the great powers who were assembled at Paris, so to say, for the purpose of watching the restless French

and supporting the Bourbon government, managed to preserve a semblance of harmony among themselves. The "Federated Union" of the German princes, on the other hand, suffered all the agonies of birth while leading to no real union of Germany. The jealousy of the sovereign princes of Germany among themselves; the force of external circumstances; the policy of France, which continued as antagonistic as it had been for centuries; and the ponderous influence of Russia; all these had hastened the formation of the Federated Union. According to the opinion of von Motz, the most capable minister of Prussia in the subsequent period, the federation was not really the establishment of a united Germany and the collection of the scattered forces of the empire into a single great whole, a policy which could alone free Germany from foreign influence and establish Europe's balance of power. The federation, on the contrary, was only a means of keeping the separate pieces of Germany in their scattered condition. This concentration of powers and unification of members was still lacking also in the Prussian state; and once more it had to face the task of gathering the most obstinate German tribes under the suzerainty of the state as a whole. The solution of this problem was the first condition of the larger one. The unity of the

German empire depended, though only a few thinkers seemed yet to suspect it dimly, upon the unity of the Prussian state. It remained to be seen whether that unity could be attained.

CHAPTER VII

THE RECONSTRUCTION PERIOD (1815-1830)

THE titan who had turned the world topsy-turvy had fallen, and the states of Europe had, with some changes, been reëstablished in the old spirit. Naturally friction soon arose between the varying, contradictory interests of the individual states. Especially were the others jealous of their Prussian neighbor, whom they had thought dead and done with, but who had so startlingly revived. This jealousy increased in secret, for it was in Prussia that the new spirit of the aroused people had its home, the spirit of liberty which had fought for the people's rights and which still voiced a triumphant challenge to the world. The universal desire for rest was, however, so great as to insure the peaceful settlement of all differences under the protection of the Quadruple Alliance. Moreover, despite the diplomats' fear of Prussia, they knew that Frederick Will-

iam III placed the maintenance of peace ahead of everything.

More pressing was the regulation of German affairs, and the Prussian government was honestly ready to organize a united German federal army and to frame a federal constitution somewhat along the lines suggested by the Vienna congress. Metternich, however, had decided not to change anything in the vague relations of the federation, not even in name. He declared the loose form of the federation not only the best, but the only possible one for the holding together of the German people. This view expressed the opinion of a statesman to whom, unhappily, the several German people had a value only in so far as they furnished armies for the protection of the Austrian states; and to whom German thought—especially in that form created in the northern sections of Germany since the catastrophies which had overtaken Prussia—had only the value of a myth. Moreover, the sense of “sovereignty” of the small states, which had been greatly developed during the time of the Rhenish federation, would not now allow them to yield even a tithe of their sovereign independence. The vituperous language of Bavaria and Württemberg during the congress at Vienna was continued at Frankfort. “Lion and eagle,” wrote the periodical *Alle-*

mannia, edited by the Bavarian Aretin, "shall wed, before southerners and northerners can be united."

As a unanimous vote of the federation was necessary for every important measure, one can easily understand why Humboldt, during the preparatory discussions for the opening of the assembly on November 5, 1816, declared: "In Frankfort nothing except the phraseology of German politics can grow and prosper." For this reason Prussia could only discuss matters generally in the assembly, but was forced to carry out all matters of state by independent negotiations with the individual states. With the clear comprehension of a born statesman, Humboldt had indicated the road to ultimate union, which Prussia had to follow. The history of the federation was to show the truth of his views. For what else could this federation be considered than a nightmare, a rope around the neck, with the ends held by hostile hands, awaiting only the opportunity to pull the noose tight. Because Prussia, time after time, sought the salvation of Germany according to the treaty conditions in the federal assembly, Austria showed little activity in the interstate negotiations. Thus Prussia was held responsible for every mistake and every sin of the assembly.

These mistakes increased from day to day;

and the expectations of the German people for a closer, stronger association of its members were soon found to be bitterly hopeless. It is true that the tremendous rising of the people, the enormous sacrifices, had not been made to obtain some sort of constitution, but to win the liberation of the Fatherland from a foreign yoke, to gain the honor and independence of the state. Yet every fighting hero had considered it self-evident that the restoration of the empire and "Germanity" would follow. And this federated union was really too miserable a result of all the desires and dreams, all the struggles and sacrifices. Busily as legend always works among people, it now proceeded to turn things upside down, and soon the Prussians were actually believing that they had taken up arms solely because the king had promised them a constitution. As a matter of fact this promise had not been made until May 22, 1815. People living beyond the confines of Prussia's black-white frontier posts felt, but would not admit, that the Prussian state had accomplished such great things for the liberation of the German people. Yet it had not accomplished the greater work of consolidating the empire, and giving it, as well as the individual states, a liberal constitution. Because of this the government began to be heaped with insult. The insurmountable ob-

stacles which the Prussian endeavors had found in Paris and in Vienna remained the secret of the statesmen, and people were inclined to ascribe the failure of the Teutonic hopes mainly to the malicious or incapable work of the Prussian statesmen and diplomats. The liberals were noisiest in the middle states, where people were not used to the hard labor of government, were not trained to recognition of the limits which are set to all ideals by material conditions. The theoretical wisdom of Professor Rotteck in Freiburg, the provocations of the Bavarian von Aretin and their followers, soon caused the empire to look upon Prussia as the personification of the guard room, the home of the corporal's stick, the seat of all trickery and maliciousness. Metternich and his friends, on the other hand, looked askance at Prussia because of its Jacobinian sentiments and ideas.

So great was the general misunderstanding that for several decades the true Suabian continued to consider the Prussians as "Wenden" and Slavs. Little it signified to the dreamers and politicians in the empire that Prussia had gained their independence, had abolished personal bondage and had founded the economical independence of its subjects. What cared they for the fact that Freiherr von Stein had stood at the head of this state until his removal had

been demanded by Napoleon, and that he had been succeeded by Hardenberg, the zealot for absolute freedom of commerce and trade, the perhaps credulous, but scrupulously honest fighter for German unity? The difficulties which were insurmountable for an able, honest statesman were hardly noticed by these German dreamers who had never tasted the hard labor of the government of a state. Constitutions were demanded, and no one cared how and by what means they were obtained, or what their real conditions were. The German spirit had gone forward with courage and force, had passed other nations, but its political education was still wholly undeveloped. The including of Austria in the Federated Union seemed a matter of course to everybody, and the preëminence of the Vienna court seemed a necessity to most. What a shock it was when Justus von Grüner, whom Metternich at one time had sent to a fortress, thereby protecting him from the fury of Napoleon, and who, in words of deepest patriotism, had called upon the Austrians and Rhinelanders to fight for the Fatherland, now demanded "German unity under Prussian leadership." His voice remained the voice of the preacher in the desert, finding but rarely such an echo as the words of his friend, General von Steinmetz: "Austria is no longer a German

House, the leadership of Germany belongs to Prussia!"

As far as the sun is from the earth, just as far were the people at that time from a realization of this fact. On the contrary, despite the urgings and orders of the king, it was decided that Prussia should not vote in the assembly with the united votes of its various districts, lest it should thereby hold too great a power. The most important of all things was declared to be that Prussia should not gain control in the federation. Thus to the geographically torn conditions of the Prussian possessions was added an artificial national cleavance. Vienna prevented the king from incorporating in the empire the colonization districts of the Teutonic Knights, exactly as it had prevented this at the time of their first conquest by the Great Elector. Just as Prussia's foes had succeeded in separating her into two geographical parts and thereby hindered the strengthening of the state, so now they hoped to place new obstacles in the way of her further development by making one part subject to the laws of the federation, and declaring the other part unworthy of bearing the name *German*.

Prussian patriots still hoped to change this geographical dismemberment, and the president of the Erfurt government, von Motz, placed be-

fore Hardenberg a carefully worked-out plan which, through an exchange of territories, would establish a connection between the eastern and western halves of the monarchy. The change was to be made with the two Hessian countries and Saxe-Weimar, and would give a strip reaching from Wittenberg to Lasphe, having its main radiating point at Wetzlar. It would remove the North German states from the influence of Austria and Bavaria, as well as from French pressure, and would build up the liberty and freedom of commerce within the Prussian states. Hardenberg was compelled to decline the suggestion with thanks, pointing out the impossibility of carrying it out, and the difficulties of uniting the sharp economical differences among districts, which were cultivated differently and which obtained their living by wholly different means, simply by establishing a geographical bond. Separated from each other, the inhabitants of the two halves of the state could not, at that time, consider an economic union. So different were the Prussian peoples along the Rhine and the Vistula, the Baltic shores and the Thuringian mountains; so different were the demands of the agrarian interests in the thinly populated eastern districts and of the commercial requirements of the trading West; such were the relations between the lake

and river shipping and the ocean sailors; that the problems involved in unifying Prussia were immeasurably difficult. They were made the more so because in the newly acquired territories, in Saxony, Rhineland and in Poland, the position was not so much complicated by materialistic objections as by racial hatred and obstinacy, fostered by national and religious principles.

Aside from this geographic and economic separation of the people, there were other centrifugal forces which rendered a closer union of the Prussian people almost impossible. There grew at this time an extraordinarily sharp distinction between the classes, which gradually changed the devotion of the Prussian people and their trusting confidence into mistrust, which developed into that unripe idea according to which the governing power must be under all circumstances the deadly enemy of the governed. This sincere monarchical people could not bring itself to mistrust personally its noble king, but it began to throw all its fury and hatred upon the high officials. The belief in the faithfulness and honesty of the leaders vanished. They were mainly from the nobility, anyway, and the latter were hated by the bourgeoisie with particular intensity. Too soon, alas! there was thus opened again that gulf between the classes, which had been bridged by

the war. The nobility, so Niebuhr declares, had never in the past forty years been so supercilious as now toward the common people; and the hatred of the latter against the former soon came to be recognized as the badge of an honorable and good citizen. While the nobility often misunderstood the driving forces in the life of the state and the requirements of the people, opposing the desire for a popular representation with the demand for a return to the old constitution of estates and classes, the citizens failed to see the moral and state-supporting value of a patriotic and virile nobility. Confidence grew less and less, particularly because property and education did not go hand in hand at that time; and the president of Auerswald openly declared that the great landed proprietors did not possess any longer the confidence of the nation, because they had less of an education than the middle classes. The latter realized with pride that the former educational conditions had been reversed; and while the nobility looked down with cold derision upon the stirring pamphlets of the political leaders, which were often exceedingly crude and "unripe," it failed to understand that these views penetrated the bourgeois classes more and more. Thus the new thought became a power which stole away from the nobles the confidence of

the masses. The bourgeois, on the other hand, forgot completely that the nobility had shown at least the same degree of sacrifice and enthusiasm for the Fatherland as the other classes of the people; that the leaders who had gained the great victories, the statesmen who had obtained political and economic freedom, had come from the nobility. The truth seems evident, that political and financial rights are never surrendered without creating resistance and dissension; but the people seemed wholly to forget that, although bourgeois and peasant had gained new privileges and new rights, similar important privileges had been taken away from the nobility. It was but natural that now, as the state had to be rebuilt, the resistance broke out anew which had been only pushed into the background by the energy of a Stein, and that a deep aversion was felt in the nobility against these bourgeoisie who had been so greatly favored and who still made further demands. It was also natural that the citizens felt a similar resentment against the nobility, whose members more often emphasized their social privileges than worked for the advancement of the nation, and some of whom, as, for instance, Alexander von der Marwitz, worked earnestly for the restitution of the old conditions.

This contempt on the one side, this hatred and

bitterness on the other, again erected a wall of separation. The so-called "liberal sentiment" just then attacked the religious teachings of the past and developed a sterile rationalism, which professed to understand the daily recurring wonders of nature and even accepted the uncomprehended arts of the magicians, yet denied the occurrence of the biblical miracles. In prompt opposition to this, it became the fashion among the nobility to express piety as a sign of true aristocracy; nothing was considered so unaristocratic as the "liberal" unbelief, the agnosticism. For this reason, the clerical class formed closer relations with the nobility, being in some cases dependent on them, and thereby again lost its influence upon the people, whose teachers and educators the ministry were to be. Moreover, the personal behavior of the clergy was not always conducive to the maintenance of dignity. This led to an equalization of religious and political sentiments, and he who associated himself with the political liberals derided the religious confession; he who opposed the political demands of the present was considered as satisfying the requirements of the Church. The belief in a living God, which should and does bring together all the classes and all the masses in the whole world, became at that time a sort of political party programme. The inner con-

sciousness of pious sentiments, which had been saved from the ruins of the war, was greatly attracted by the riot of colors in the Catholic religious service, and a large number of Protestants entered the Catholic faith. When one remembers the boundless attack of Johann Heinrich Voss, in the periodical *Sophronizon*, against Count Frederick Leopold of Stolberg, in 1819, one realizes how all these errors fed the hatred of the people against the nobility.

Still another error in religious sentiment led to numerous dissensions within the Protestant Church, which did their share in aggravating political differences. The separate and often antagonistic teachings of the Catholic and Protestant religions had been softened by remembrance of the struggle for the Fatherland; and a resolution was introduced during the Vienna congress and in the succeeding year, according to which clear-visioned prelates of both Churches emphasized the similarities of the two teachings and minimized their differences, and urged a peaceful relationship between the two "sister religions." This feeling changed greatly in the following years, and soon the old abyss threatened to come between the two teachings, rending the German nation apart. The good will of the Prussian government did what it could to soften sect antagonisms, even introducing in the

Rhineland the church processional, which had previously been forbidden there.

Thus it came to pass that the population of the new Prussia, soon after a war in which it had fought unanimously under the banners of its king, in which it had fought for the freedom of the Fatherland, was torn asunder geographically, economically, politically, religiously and even nationally. The state had become nothing but a chimera, and the person of the ruler himself represented practically the whole bond. It was the duty of the state to bring together the separated subjects for the purpose of united labor toward the common good, for the development of the great aims of culture, and for the ennobling of the human race. The people must be made to feel again that they were all members of one living community. The task was the more difficult as the new subjects and territories had been sections of a hundred independent districts, governed by a variety of laws and administrations. Even in the old Prussian possessions Napoleon had upset all the old laws. The differences among the various German tribes, which formerly had been easily overcome by the state through properly guided colonization, now showed their extreme importance; and the hostile sentiments of the various districts became more hostile when it was

suggested that all the people should not only live together, but under a common administration.

If in face of all these difficulties the Prussian state could succeed in uniting all its subjects in a homogeneous whole, then the unity of the largest section of the empire would have been attained, and the possibility of a complete unification of the whole empire, hitherto denied, was proven. The gigantic problem was happily well suited to the nature of the Prussian state; and it sought to show, in the amalgamation of these widely different elements, the conciliating power of its true fulfillment of duty.

But this confusion in the interior affairs of the state, the rectification of which was so important for the development of the future, remained unrecognized until the end of the century. Only those matters relating directly to the constitution of Prussia and of Germany had as yet awakened the interest of the nation itself. As the fulfillment of the promise of the constitution depended more and more upon careful consideration, and was therefore postponed again and again, while constitutions actually appeared in other states, the criticism of this period in the following decades was too much swayed by the anger which gradually took possession of the minds of the people. And yet neither the king

nor Hardenberg was of opinion that the promise should not be fulfilled. On the contrary, everything that could be done was done, and Hardenberg saw in the establishment of a Prussian constitution his ideal, the crowning effort of his life. But in the dismembered condition of the state and its severed interests lay the necessity of first inculcating in the breasts of the new subjects the conception of a Prussian Fatherland, and of wiping out by a truly uniform administration all the separating differences. The reorganization of the finances and the general conditions, both in Germany and Europe, however, created difficulties in their effect upon the life of the people and the organism of the state which neither Hardenberg nor the king could have expected.

We have seen in former chapters how the Great Elector and Frederick William I built up their state through a series of fights against the various assemblies of their subjects. Frederick the Great paid little attention to these diverse political organizations, and with the exception of a few privileges which differed in the various provinces and districts, they lay practically dormant. The assemblies in the new provinces had led a richer life, but the power of Napoleon and his vassals, or that of the Swedes, had crushed them. In Saxony they had developed in a dif-

ferent direction and had become exclusively a representation of the nobility. Now these political organisms lifted their heads everywhere. Resting their demands on the promise of the king, given on May 22, 1815, that the provincial estates were to be restored, they asked for full restoration of their privileges and demanded other rights. The petitions showed most clearly the territorial distinction, the emphasizing of the special interests of the individual estates, the individual small territories, the "special Fatherland." The idea of separate interests had long been put away by the older state, and was indeed directly opposed to the monarchical idea, to the public conception of the unity and dignity of the whole state.

How was it possible to grant these many demands, which differed in their particular form and desire each from the others? The state would have had to surrender itself. To negotiate separately with the twenty or more political bodies which existed, or the creation of which was demanded, would have been utterly impracticable; for the firm unity and power of the state could never be the most important question to these lesser bodies. It had always been the government's intention to construct a constitution in harmony with this old division into estates, for that would be building on the historical

foundation of the country; but simultaneously with the formation of these provincial estates there was to be created a *Reichstag*, and this latter was to represent the interests of the whole, to discuss the welfare of the whole state and not the diverging individual wishes. The *Reichstag* was to develop the unifying power of the whole state.

It was clear that in the tumult and pellmell of ideas and opinions such a great and comprehensive work could only be undertaken by the crown, and that for this reason the crown had to establish first its own influence and power, and to bring administrative work into well-ordered channels. Only when this was accomplished could the king surrender rights the discussion of which in a parliament might dissolve the state into its separate parts, or at least make it powerless and impotent. The king appointed a constitutional commission on July 7, 1817, which was opened by Hardenberg in Berlin. He declared that the old landed estates had been veritable brakes on the machine of the state, and that the state owed its greatness solely to the genius of its rulers. But as the nation now seemed politically ripe and worthy of a lasting constitution, and had just given a splendid example of civic virtue and fidelity, the king had decided voluntarily to establish a representative

assembly with the right of discussion, but without the deciding vote in administrative affairs. The king, however, thought that in the carrying out of such an important work he should have the benefit of the advice and judgment of the most eminent men of the nation, and the commission therefore adjourned, while the king sent the ministers von Altenstein, von Boyen and von Klewiz into the provinces, there to learn the wishes of his subjects more clearly and in detail. These journeys did not have any other result than to show the extraordinary complicity of the ideas which prevailed, and the strange fact that in the great mass of the people there was no demand at all for a representative assembly. The majority of the people declared that the present administration was perfectly satisfactory. They were all too busy with the reorganization of their economic conditions to take any deep interest in politics. Only the return to the old system of administration by landed estates was suggested with any frequency; and this old system was thoroughly hated by Hardenberg. Only the high officials of the crown, such as the presidents Schön, Motz and others, really demanded the *Reichstag*, because of state unity. President Zerbini wished to give it the right to make final decisions; and Judge Sethe, of the Rhineland,

wished to elect its members by universal suffrage.

Events now occurred which added external difficulties to the troubles over this matter; and, by fanning the suspicion against the king into open flame, postponed for a long time the work of creating a constitution. We know how little peace had satisfied the yearning of the German people, and how every attempt to unite the greater Fatherland had been defeated in the Vienna congress. The federal *Bundestag* had now assembled; but despite its slow and cumbersome method of working, the fact was already clearly evident that it had no intention of strengthening the bond between the different German states. The Prussian government was already being insulted and ridiculed, although representing the unity which all the patriots demanded so vigorously. Arndt's demand, "The Whole Germany It Shall Be!" had captured and electrified all, especially the youth of Germany. These youths now felt called upon to found the new splendor of the Fatherland in their own way, and in the vigor of their enthusiasm were carried away to extravagant deeds. These became of importance politically, only because the government took serious notice of them, an importance which they otherwise would hardly have deserved.

Even before the wars of liberation, Jahn, father of gymnastics and physical culture, had thundered in Berlin against all *Welsch* (French) influences, and had professed to recognize in the *Turnen* (gymnastics) invented by him the real expression of Teutonic spirit. Faithful and honest in his heart, and convinced that salvation for the empire could emerge only from Prussia, but uncouth and boorish in his manners, Jahn had incited by speeches and pamphlets the rising against the "murderous Lion" (Napoleon); but now he trained his pupils to a degree of self-conceit and a positiveness of judgment that criticized with sovereign scorn the existing conditions. The insolent and impudent bearing of the *Turner* began to worry the government, although Hardenberg, Schuckmann and Altenstein preserved their good will toward the teacher and master, Jahn, and were inclined to consider his and his pupils' grotesque manners merely a passing rudeness, and not an incurable, dangerous defect. The sound and good kernel of the whole, the system of gymnastics, might easily be incorporated in the regular educational curriculum. Even the king began to believe in a real danger from the unthinking anger of these youths, though only after he had received warnings from Vienna and other German cabinets, and after the *Turner*

had joined hands with the student *Burschenschaften*.

Disgusted with the *Pennalismus* (fagging system) which was rampant in all the universities, and filled with pure patriotism and belief in God, the student body of Jena, returning from the war, had formed a so-called *Burschenschaft*, which soon was imitated in the other universities. Without having a uniform political programme, these student societies raved about the unity of Germany and thought that by removing the small societies existing within the student body, and segregated according to their origin from this and that small state, the whole united student body presented an example for the non-existing united country. Patriotic and religious enthusiasm, and the desire of a combination of all the *Burschenschaften* in the various universities, gave birth to the idea of celebrating the three hundredth anniversary of the Reformation and the second anniversary of the battle of Leipzig together, by a great celebration in the Wartburg, where Luther had once translated the Bible into German.

Grand Duke Karl August of Weimar freely opened the halls of his burg, famous in ancient sagas, to the assemblage of nearly five hundred students. The citizens of Eisenach received them with open arms, and amid patriotic

speeches and religious festivities it seemed as if the celebration was to pass without disaster or folly. But suddenly the Berlin *Turner* and student Massmann felt called upon, as a second Luther, to take all the titles of books which because of their antagonism to the constitution, to Jahn or to German thought had earned the hostility of Jahn, and to burn them on the mountain in a public *auto-de-fé*. Without knowing in many cases the contents of these books, the students thus sat in judgment according to the advice of their "Father Jahn." Then Professor Oken of Jena, who edited and issued a periodical called *The Isis*, which distinguished itself by gross insolence and shameful attacks on Prussia, celebrated the students' action in a literary article and advised the various governments to follow the example of the meeting on the Wartburg.

It was clear that such insolent behavior must be curbed. Moreover, the occurrence created in many courts of Germany a keen fear of revolutionary tendencies. Particularly in Vienna did the rulers imagine that they could see in these foolish students the most terrible fanatics of a revolution. Even in Berlin the spirit of suspicion toward the student demand for "United Germany" gained in strength. This suspicion had been created in the first instance by a pam-

phlet of Professor Schmalz, who attacked the patriots in the most bitter manner, notably Ernst Moritz Arndt, calling them anarchists, and attributing to them the preaching of "murder, pillage and rape," as well as the intention of dethroning the Prussian rulers in order to "realize the crazy idea of a German government." Among the titles of the books burned at the Wartburg, there was a very valuable and useful collection of laws, made by Privy Councillor von Kamptz for practical use, and called *Gendarmerie-Kodex*. Deeply insulted by this treatment of his book, Kamptz now took up a vigorous fight against the "vandalism of demagogic intolerance." The European powers forced the grand duke of Weimar to take exemplary measures against the Jena University, while an order was issued in Prussia forbidding the formation of such societies in the Prussian universities. Gymnastics were placed under strict supervision, and the king even planned to dissolve one of the universities in which the spirit of licentiousness had outgrown control.

A congress of the rulers took place in Aix-la-Chapelle in October, 1818. It was intended to strengthen the Bourbon rule in France, and it remitted part of the French indemnity and withdrew the remaining troops from French territory. More important, however, was the fact

that the old alliance was not only renewed in case of a new disturbance of the peace, but a reactionary memorial written by Ancillon found great favor, particularly with the czar. This memorial represented the great alliance of the sovereigns no longer as the preserver of the nations' peace, but as the protector of the rulers against their own peoples. Confidential discussions regarding the licentiousness of the press, the insubordination of officials, and the excesses of the *Turners* and students took place. It went so far that a French minister declared that he was sorry for the Germans if they had to make war against students.

The change of sentiment experienced by the czar and his subsequent leaning toward the Metternich system naturally brought it about that the leading rôle among the five great powers was taken by Vienna. In German affairs, Metternich seized all the reins in his own hands; and, as Austria must not have a constitution and Germany and Prussia must not be strengthened, the Austrian statesman henceforth worked for the prevention of any kind of constitution. With an unholy joy he fought for the defeat of all the hopes and desires for constitutional forms. His faithful Gentz assisted him in a literary manner, in the *Wiener Jahrbücher*, and even in Berlin the voices of caution grew louder

and louder, protesting against the introduction of a constitution as the forerunner of a revolution. A memorial by Metternich worked strongly upon the mind of King Frederick William, whose real sentiment in the matter was still uncertain. This memorial was replete with ignorance of Prussian conditions; but it cleverly emphasized the hatred of the liberals against the standing army, and it painted any and all constitutions as revolutions in the blackest colors.

Nevertheless both king and chancellor decided to hold fast to their intention of putting a new arrangement of the estates in place of the old provincial *Landtag*. For, as Hardenberg remarked, "Today cannot become Yesterday." Yet he felt that such occurrences and insinuations must cause apprehension in the mind of the king. Partly in order to remain in office and partly in order not to turn the king's suspicion against his own constitutional ideas, he made no defense of the foolish extravagance of the students, but urged their energetic prosecution. An appeal for a constitution prepared by the Rhenish nobility, and even a personal deputation of the Berlin magistrates, elicited from the king merely the answer that he must choose his own time for the fulfillment of his promise, that the intention of introducing a constitution

did not suffer by delay. Vincke pointed out what the people must feel when they saw that "other rulers who had not promised anything" had gone ahead.

Facing all this confusion, Hardenberg decided to work out his own ideas of a constitution, instead of continuing to ask the advice of other people. For this purpose he surrendered, in May, 1818, the general control to Count Lottum, on the advice of Prince Wittgenstein, and the management of foreign affairs to Count Bernstorff. But administration worries still kept him from giving much time to the constitution. The countercurrents which interfered with his work at the Berlin court are shown in the letter of the minister of war, von Boyen, who wrote: "This love of a people for its king rests on facts which venerable thinkers have studied for centuries. On this should be founded the aim of humanity; but a weakly generation, a bunch of old women who unfortunately wear trousers, would cast aside the monarchical idea as untrue, in order to fashion for themselves a mystic equal government from old forgotten forms, which they misunderstand. They think only of what would be so very convenient for their own dear person and their beloved families."

No matter how worried the king became, the fulfillment of his promise was to him self-

understood. In a detailed cabinet order, dated January 11, 1819, he declared it necessary to take strict measures for the control and supervision of the universities and against the spirit of unrest; he deplored that what heretofore had generally been considered mere pranks on the part of the young people now bore the stamp of a desire to interfere in international affairs; he emphasized the necessity of a law controlling the Prussian press; but he considered it highly disadvantageous to call the zeal for improvement of internal affairs a "mania for innovations" and to attribute to it revolutionary tendencies; and once more he announced his intention to give to the country "an adequate representative constitution."

For this purpose the ministry of the interior was now divided into two parts, and Wilhelm von Humboldt was invited to handle the communal and representative matters, because he was known to be very favorably inclined toward the constitutional project, and because the newspapers praised him already as "the Father of the Prussian Constitution." But Humboldt did not obtain any results. The ministers declared in a long-postponed memorial, which the king had demanded in his order, that the establishment of a constitution itself was neither hazardous nor dangerous, but they were unable to

present a uniform plan to the crown because of their own difference of opinion. In general the ideas of Hardenberg and Humboldt were the same, with the exception that the latter, less radical than the former, would treat the rights and privileges of the old landed estates more kindly, and would reconcile the liberal theories with the conservative-historical wishes. Humboldt, while strictly maintaining the basic idea of the unity of the state, wanted *Reichsstände* with the right of law-making and *Provincialstände* for local administration; and for both he demanded universal and direct suffrage.

The personal animosity between these two men killed the last bit of harmony in the cabinet, and extra-Prussian happenings made matters more and more critical for the king. It happened just then that the provincial assemblies of Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden showed themselves as anything but calm and careful representatives; they started bitter disputes with their respective governments which caused in Bavaria and Baden serious thoughts of executing a *coup d'état*. These happenings, such as must be expected in the days of parliamentary childhood, could not fail to impress the king with particular anxiety.

About this time, the poet Kotzebue, who by

his reports to St. Petersburg had drawn the enmity of the whole *Burschenschaft*, was murdered by the unhappy Sand, a student of theology. The deed was rightly considered not so much the crime of a single individual as the product of the students at Giessen, especially the brothers Follen, who preached murder as a means of attaining political results. We know now that the number of these *Unbedingten* (those students who urged the destruction of all moral and political institutions) was a very small one. But when a professor of theology at the University of Halle, by the name of de Wette, called the crime an "error, which was excused and practically nullified by the firmness and purity of the idea behind it"; when a professor of jurisprudence referred to the deed of Sand as the exaggeration of a truly moral and religious mind, then it becomes clear why the king ordered strict punishment of the crime, and appointed a commission which was to investigate the university conditions. This commission, by reason of its espionage and the persecution of the best and most innocent in the highest circles of the officials, even the famous Ernst Moritz Arndt, earned the worst sort of reputation. Its persecution of the "demagogues" opened another gulf between the Prussian government and the German people.

"What a life!" exclaimed Niebuhr, "without affection, patriotism and joy, with hatred and discontent, must exist under such conditions between government and subjects!" Yet men like Arndt suffered these trials without being unfaithful to their king or their belief, even for a moment. In the great mass of the people, too, the faith in the king remained unshaken. They understood the mind of the king, although they did not know that the king once answered his garrison preacher, who delivered a very frank sermon on the text, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do!" by asking: "Can I always do what I want?"

The king as well as Hardenberg was thoroughly convinced of the danger of the situation, and such crimes were certainly preparing in Berlin the groundwork that Metternich needed in order to work for the stifling of all constitutional ideas in the German states. He feared that, through new-fangled institutions elsewhere in the empire, the Austrian lands might be awakened from the slumber which he had succeeded in establishing. He therefore considered some common action with Prussia as very necessary. He visited the king at Teplitz, where the latter took the baths, on July 29, 1819, and on August 1 he and Hardenberg signed a so-called *Punctation* (main points of a contract). This moment,

in which the systematic action of a revolutionary party, so this contract read, was threatening the existence of all the German governments, must be utilized for a closer union between the two states; and the principles which had been agreed upon regarding the necessity of a federal press law, and of proper discipline and control of the students and teachers in the universities and schools, these principles should be extended to the other German states as much as possible. No notorious editors should be permitted to continue his journalistic activity; the newspapers should be reduced in number; no teacher who was dismissed by one of the states or who had made himself notoriously objectionable was to be employed by any other state. And finally Prussia declared, if not in direct opposition to its former ideas, yet in a form which abandoned the idea of state independence, that "in the representative assembly of the nation the government would not introduce a general popular representation, which was not in accord with the geographical and inner formation of the empire, but that it would give its provinces local representatives, by whom a central assembly was to be chosen." Metternich had selected cleverly the proper moment. He had emphasized the seriousness of the situation, and had no doubt that he was fully protected by

this contract against the establishment of a modern representative system, and that the strict police regulations would hush any desire of the Germans to "unite themselves into a Germany."

Following this *Punctuation* the ministers of Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Württemberg, Hanover, Baden and other states in the federation assembled in Carlsbad during August, ostensibly to enjoy the famous baths of that place. In the conference of these ministers the meaning of one of the clauses of the vague federal agreement had to be slightly amended because of the fear of the king of Württemberg before his obstinate old landed estates. The question whether article 13 of the federal constitution really had promised a representative assembly based upon numbers, or similar to the old landed estates, was dismissed with the formula that "every government would define this matter according to its own conception of the maintenance of the monarchical principle and the federated Union." In addition to this a general provisional "federal execution" was accepted which transferred to the *Bundestag* the supervision of the federal laws, even by the use of force, as, for instance, the establishment of a central commission for the control of the universities, the press and the demagogues. The *Bundestag* was forced to

accept this resolution, on September 20, by the use of diplomatic cleverness and inordinate speed, and Metternich could consider his work as finished. He had reason to hope that all national and liberal ideas had been suppressed forever, and that in the easiest manner possible—by strict police regulations.

The Prussian statesmen did not yet suspect how fixedly they had been chained to the Austrian yoke, and did not think of the dangers which every strengthening of the federal power must hold for Prussia, so long as Austria had the deciding influence in the federal council. Metternich could exclaim joyfully: "Prussia has surrendered to us the foremost place, which some of the Germans had given to Prussia." And the emperor Francis, who once "told himself twenty times each day, 'Good Lord, how right I am and how wrong the others are!'" had now proven in fact that his refusal of the imperial German crown had been right. Metternich could now say: "If the kaiser (of Austria) doubts that he is the emperor of Germany, he is greatly mistaken."

On October 18 Frederick William announced the Carlsbad resolutions, and published simultaneously an edict of censorship, which placed for the next five years all printed matter, without exception and without regard to its contents,

under the control of the censor. And yet, incredible as it may sound, even during the days of the Carlsbad conference the work did not stop on the constitution, and in the "central committee of the provincial representatives" Hardenberg thought he had saved the desired *Reichsstände*, the unity of the state. On August 11 the king appointed a special commission for the continuance of the constitutional work, composed of Hardenberg, Humboldt, Schuckmann, Ancillon, Daniels and Eichhorn, to which Hardenberg gave, on October 12, his ideas of a provincial constitution in Prussia. In the meantime the report of the whole cabinet, written by Humboldt, had been delivered to the king. This evaded the kernel of the entire question and became nothing but an attack on Hardenberg. And however well thought out the principles of Hardenberg's memorial were, and how they built up the communal, county, provincial and state assemblies and referred the discussion of the whole election problem to the *Reichstag*, to be decided for the whole empire, and how small the differences of opinion regarding the constitutional question among the ministers—yet the enmity between Humboldt and Hardenberg not only caused the defeat of all the cabinet's work, but led to most unpleasant arguments within the ministry. These ended in the dismissal of both

Humboldt and Beyme; and this again caused more dissension and a difference of opinion between the king and the minister of war, as the result of which von Boyen resigned, taking with him his chief of the general staff, von Grolmann.

Arrangements had been made at Carlsbad for future confidential discussions between the ministers of the different states. These were held at Vienna in the time between November, 1819, and May, 1820. Metternich here was compelled to make a few concessions to the middle states, but this had only a minor influence on the success of his whole plan. The resolutions concerning the power of the *Bundestag*, the army, the constitutions of the several states, the restrictions placed on the publication of the discussions in the *Landtag*, and the executive regulations of the Federated Union were all in accord with the desires of Metternich. As all the ministers signed these, they were accepted by the Frankfort assembly on June 8, 1820, as Vienna's final draft. The basic purport of Metternich's views, to maintain stability in his sluggish Austria, was shifted thereby upon Germany. Repression must be enforced in all the states, and Austria was saved for the present from the flood of national ideas. And by providing that no federal prince could be prevented by a separate constitution from the performance of his

federal duties the development of the constitutions of the individual states was greatly hindered. Prussia, which had at last succeeded in coming to a better understanding with the smaller states, because of the winning personality of Count Bernstorff, agreed to the resolutions. Ancillon wrote, according to his position, that "the Vienna final act has solved the problem of combining the sovereignty of the individual state with the welfare of the whole as happily as it could have been done under the given circumstances." And in Prussia all the opponents of Hardenberg and his constitutional plans rejoiced with Ancillon.

Still Hardenberg did not despair of final success, the more so as he soon after succeeded in placing the finances of the state in better order. By this financial success he removed one of the chief obstacles to an assembly; for it would have led to the bankruptcy of the state had a public discussion of its finances been made. After this regulation of the public debts, the crown definitely proposed the establishment of the *Reichsstände* in the law of January 17, 1820, which provided that no further loans were to be made without the consent of the *Reichsstände*. The king expressed thereby his unequivocal desire to fulfill his promise of May 22, 1815, despite all the subsequent insinuations and unto-

ward events. In February, 1820, he appointed a new commission which was to work out rapidly, within four weeks, a communal and county constitution which was to form the basis of the *Reichsstände*. But this plan of Stein was again destined to miscarry.

The removal of the great tax burdens from the peasants, even in the newly acquired countries between the Elbe and Rhine, was ordered in the comprehensive law of September 25, 1820; and in June, 1821, there came, as we shall briefly mention here, the last great reform of Hardenberg, the edict covering community division and the abolishment of the *Flurswang*. Since the days of Frederick the Great less than 3,000,000 acres had been measured and divided among the people, but this work was now taken up so vigorously that in a quarter of a century more than 40,000,000 acres were distributed. The farmers were now enabled to carry on a method of intensive cultivation, and the way was opened to the political arrangement of the village community.

Still the introduction of the communal regulation met with insurmountable difficulties. The conditions in East and West were too different. In the West there were but few great landed proprietors, and while the number of the communities was small, barely 5,000, they were

powerful, large and rich. Since the time of Napoleon they had been grouped in associations which were administered by burgomasters as officials of the government. In the East, on the other hand, there were more than 25,000 small and very poor communities, and nearly 15,000 great landed estates. After the terrible years of war and the famine of 1816-1817, the work of the farmer in the East had been particularly hard, if he would recover from the great sacrifices made for his country, or even maintain the possession of his farm. The government tried to relieve the greatest need by loaning money, building roads and establishing grain storage houses which were to keep the price of rye at one thaler per bushel. But despite this assistance many of the most respected families lost their estates, and many hundred farms had to be sold at auction. This frequent changing of ownership, as well as the growth of commerce, the freedom of travel and change of residence, the establishment of factories and distilleries in country districts, forced the landed proprietor to a different, more intensive type of cultivation, so that he really was no longer able to oversee the administration of the village or small community near by. Von der Marwitz admitted this in 1833. He professed to see in the whole idea of communal assemblies and agrarian legisla-



**The arrival of the Prussians at Waterloo.
From the painting by G. Bleibtren.**

tion that the oppression and destruction of the poor in favor of landed proprietors was the real aim. So he naturally made a determined resistance. But it was clear that, after the great sacrifices made by the nobility, the government had to proceed leniently with the taking away of the old, historically founded rights of the landed proprietors. The rescue of the peasant population from the personal bondage system had to proceed with due consideration for other rights.

These difficulties were, for the present, ignored. When Friese, after Herculean labor, submitted to the new commission the draft of his county constitution, it was discovered that although he had clearly realized the matter of unity for the state, he had entirely overlooked existing conditions. By suggesting the taking away of the rights of the landed proprietors, he made an administration of the country by the landowners impossible. Not only the county constitution but also the greater general constitution fell through once more. Frederick William was deeply disappointed, but requested a detailed report from his chancellor, before going to Troppau to a new European congress for the suppression of the Italian revolution. The chancellor once more gave the details of his plan: an upper house, composed of the indi-

vidual rulers, the high nobility, the high clergy and special officials selected by royal confidence; a lower house composed of representatives of the three classes. He proposed for them solely advisory votes; he would exclude them completely from foreign affairs and the army; the choice of the president of the assembly was to be left to the crown, and the publicity of the congressional discussions he would limit to the printing of the final resolutions and laws.

Hardenberg never received an answer to his latest proposal; the opponents of the constitution had won the king completely; for among them was now no less a person than the crown prince. The latter, influenced by Ancillon and the clever Swiss, Haller, could not see anything but revolution in the establishment of popular assemblies. Not in the evolution of given conditions along the lines of the changed present, but in the restoration of past institutions, did he see the ideal to be striven for. Not the unity of the state, but the unity of the geographically separated sections of the country, created in him sympathy and cordiality. The reality of the life of the state, one may say, offended in its nakedness his prudery, and his fantasy created a splendor and riot of color and glory around the men and institutions of the German Middle Ages which they had never

in reality possessed. He saw in the struggle of his ancestors against the estates and classes only the enmity these had caused; he did not see the tremendous structure which had thus been built up; he did not realize that only because of the firm protection of national rights had the nobility, bourgeois and peasant gained new power, and that by this strength the state itself had been created. With his whole heart and soul he therefore joined the reactionary movement, and, in the disgusted words of Gneisenau, "would try to turn back the waters to their source, rather than regulate their course through the plains."

In Troppau the crown prince captivated all hearts, but at the same time fell completely under the influence of Metternich. The king, too, in great worry over the Spanish and Italian revolutions, and their possible extension to Germany, was fully in accord with Metternich's plans. He gave his consent to the new principle which called on the powers to intervene in those states in which through revolution a change in government occurred. And, without informing his chancellor, he appointed a new commission to evolve a new communal order, chose the crown prince as its head, and appointed as members only opponents of Hardenberg.

As might have been expected, this commission

declined all the proposals of Hardenberg, it requested the king to forego the establishment of a general state constitution, and to discuss the matter of provincial and communal constitutions with the provincial estates. Once more Hardenberg urged the king to fulfill the promise of May 22, 1815, as the moment was auspicious to "give of your own free will a constitution." The king, however, decided upon the report of the commission, and ordered a new commission to work out a new regulation of the provincial estates and left the remainder of the constitutional programme "to time, experience, development of the matter and his own sovereign graciousness." On June 5, 1823, there appeared the law regulating the provincial estates, which only superficially mentioned the possession of real property as the basic condition of belonging to the assembly, and which named the discussion of certain laws and the administration of the community, under the supervision of the state, as the field of the new "estates"; otherwise each province was to have a separate law, while the assembling of the general *Landstände* was postponed for the present.

Thus the state, which heretofore had vigorously opposed all special class representation, voluntarily established the provincial estates, which were neither representative of the unity

of the state, nor built on a historical foundation. They lacked the secure basis of a county and communal constitution, by means of which alone the interests of the province could receive proper expression. They were not established according to the old historical division of districts, but the new division into provinces. They did not rest on the historical segregation of the estates or classes; for the old corporations no longer existed, and the bourgeois landed proprietor must be included in the first class, alongside the nobleman. The Church, which certainly had a historical right to representation, was completely ignored; and the formation of "curia" was out of the question, because of the small number of eligibles. It was no longer the plan to vote according to one's class, as had been the historical custom, but according to one's personal opinion.

The new law failed equally to satisfy the modern ideas of equal legislation. It gave to the first class (landed proprietors and nobility) one-half of all votes; of the other half, two-thirds were vested in the townspeople and one-third in the peasants. At that the "estates" were politically impotent, for, excepting their own local administration matters, they had only an advisory capacity and were without responsibility. On the other hand, since each province

obtained its own separate "charter," and the king's government was to offer taxation laws, especially, before eight different provincial estates for discussion, hence the segregated and particular life of these provinces was further developed, and the powerful development of the state as a whole was prevented. People even began to speak already of "the Prussian states" or "the kingdom of Prussia and His Majesty's other states"; it was no longer "the state of Prussia." The crown prince referred to the states as "particularly and before all other things the protectors of their own rights, the rights of the estates." The state, by surrendering its necessary duty of regulating the communal and county administrations to the eight separate provincial assemblies, as well as by the unequal division of the voting power, had created a further centrifugal force working for the ever wider separation of the estates. Instead of conciliation between the different districts, the seed for more dissension had been planted; and this was further assisted when, in the years 1825-1828, the several provincial assemblies introduced very similar county constitutions in all, according to which the urban and farming population was represented in the county assemblies in the proportion of one to ten, as compared with the landed proprietors.

As there was no publicity covering the discussions in these estates, the popular interest in them cooled quickly. And as the government was not represented in the assemblies, but could merely submit proposals and render decisions, which usually arrived too late, it followed that there was no opportunity to arrange compromises between the different opinions of the estates and the government. Necessarily there arose in the estates an increasing opposition to the central government, which the government could do nothing to prevent. Moreover, as only the real estate part of the public property was adequately represented, while the educated classes of the citizens in the towns were practically excluded, there was formed even outside of the provincial and county assemblies an ever-growing opposition party which became the more dangerous as it lacked a lawful medium of expressing itself.

Aside from all these difficulties, the new constitution needed not only a foundation, but also a roof, the *Reichstag*. But as the increase of the public debt had been made dependent on the consent of the latter, it might, in a moment of danger, paralyze the government by refusing financial assistance. The fulfillment of the promise of May 22, 1815, had not been fixed for a definite date; and the king had the legal

right to abolish that edict by simply issuing another one, supplanting it. But as the new constitution was neither the one announced in the edict of May 22, 1815, nor was the edict itself abolished, there remained a weapon in the hands of the opposition which was to show its cutting edge in later years.

At any rate, these were drawbacks which would make themselves felt only in due course of time, and which at that time were visible only to the sharp eyes of the statesmen. For the present most people still thought of the establishment of the *Reichstag*, even the crown prince himself, and men such as Stein accepted the offerings of the crown with thanks and recognized in this constitution, despite their misgivings, the first step to a representative parliamentary system. The provincial assemblies distinguished themselves, in spite of their differences and opposition, by careful and proper treatment of all proposals, as opposed to the violent, tumultuous behavior of the South German assemblies. Every attempt of the estates, however, to remove the basic principles of the social legislation of 1810 was refused by the king. Friction with the government naturally occurred in other matters, and the dragging along of administrative work, which was due to representative discussion, did not give any guarantee of con-

cord between government and subject. On the contrary, the differences became the more evident, as a new party was formed in the provincial assemblies as well as in the *Staatsrat* itself. This party was composed of all the opponents of the ministers, and it became so powerful that after 1827 proposed laws were no longer submitted *in toto* to the *Staatsrat*, but only those chosen by the king for submission. The party spirit communicated itself from the estates to the highest administrative bodies, and destroyed their repute and dignity. The constitutional question itself had come to a standstill with this legislation and, in so far as a union of the different sections of the country had been expected, it had not led to the desired result.

The finish of this movement was not seen by Hardenberg. He had accompanied Frederick William to Verona, although he had already lost the king's confidence, in order to take part in the third congress of the allied monarchs, in September, 1822. This had been called to discuss the Greek insurrection and its consequences for the Russian and Austrian relations with Turkey, and also the revolution which had broken out in Spain. Hardenberg died in Genoa November 27, and when after his death his two successors, the counts of Voss-Buch and Kleist von Nollendorff, died in quick succession,

the post of chancellor was not filled any more. The king conducted personally the entire administration with the aid of the respective ministers. Count Lottum was chosen to present reports to the king.

It was the intention of Metternich to solve the German question during the congress at Verona. That clever statesman desired to put in force further means of repression, to exclude publicity from all discussions of the provincial assemblies and the *Bundestag*, and to give the federation the right to change the constitutions of the various states, upon request of their respective governments. But he did not gain his object, not even when he assembled the statesmen of the several states in Vienna in January, 1823. Count Bernstorff vigorously opposed him, particularly as Metternich wanted to take the opportunity of using the differences between the government at Carlsruhe (Baden) and its assembly as a pretext to violate the federal rights. Count Bernstorff also saved the wording of the Carlsruhe resolutions as Metternich suggested a prolongation of them, and demanded their unanimous acceptance to make them valid. In the main, however, he agreed with Metternich, and the latter was able, during a visit in Tegernsee, to win over the liberal Bavarian minister, Zentner, the first knight of the representa-

tive system in Germany. The memorial of Zentner was supported by all the statesmen who rendered homage to the Austrian chancellor at Johannesburg. Then, on August 12, the assembly at Frankfort passed unanimously the prolongation of the laws covering the press and the control of the universities, and the federated states were obliged to abolish the abuses of their "chambers."

Prussia thus followed in the wake of Metternich in the questions of German policy and constitutional matters, worried by the fear of a coming revolution, yet holding, in a general way, to the legal procedures. Not so, however, in matters relating to the foreign policy, where Metternich finally suffered a complete defeat, caused chiefly by his own self-confidence, and by the disorderly financial and social conditions in the Austrian monarchy. Contrary to all his expectations, the insurrection of the Greeks against the Turks, after the ascendancy of the new czar, Nicholas (1825), had led to an understanding between England and Russia, on April 4, 1826, and this was followed by a treaty on July 6, 1827, between the two states. In the following year came the war between Turkey and Russia, after the annihilation of the Turkish fleet at Navarino; and France sent her troops to the Morea.

Later, however, after the death of the English minister, Canning, Metternich succeeded in estranging the English cabinet more and more from the Russian alliance. By the beginning of 1829 matters had progressed to the point where a war of Austria and England, on the one hand, against France and Russia, on the other, was generally expected.

CHAPTER VIII

THE REVOLUTION OF 1830

KING FREDERICK WILLIAM III had been a true and cordial friend of Czar Alexander. With the new czar, Nicholas, he was even more closely related; for in 1817 the latter had married Princess Charlotte, the eldest daughter of the Prussian king, and a lively and cordial intercourse had grown up since the wedding between the Russian and Prussian ruling Houses. The imperial children were received in Berlin with great pomp—great when compared with the thrifty and frugal disposition of the king in other matters—and many festivities were planned in their honor. On the occasion of the visit of the then grand duke Nicholas and his wife to Berlin in 1821 the gentlemen and ladies of the court, and even members of the royal family, engaged in an amateur theatrical production of the beautiful Oriental fairy tale “Lalla Rukh.” The splendor of this entertainment was long remembered.

With confidence in these cordial relations,

Czar Nicholas, whose successes in the first campaign against Turkey had been very moderate, paid a visit to the king in 1829. This was during the wedding celebrations of Prince William and the Princess Augusta of Weimar. The czarina was then at Berlin and her birthday was the signal for festivities which became famous in later years. The czarina had chosen for her favorite flower in early childhood the white rose, and in reference to this Potsdam gave a fête, which was called "The Fête of the White Rose," in front of the palace and on the great lawns stretching before it. In splendor this fête surpassed anything that the people had ever seen. It took the form of a tourney and cavalry evolutions, culminating in a public homage to the empress by the princes and the entire court. The costumes were all in the glowing colors and splendor of the Middle Ages.

It was natural that under such conditions Russian politics received all possible assistance from Prussia, and Nicholas succeeded in inducing his father-in-law to send General von Müffling to Constantinople. Through the latter's assistance the Peace of Adrianople was concluded on September 14, 1829, the complaisance of the two parties to it being explained by the fact that the Turkish government believed its end had come, while the Russian army, despite its vic-

tories, had reached the end of its rope and was unable to fight any longer. This peace granted to all nations free passage of the Bosphorus and into the Black Sea, and prepared for the independence of Greece, which was finally determined in the London treaty of February 3, 1830.

By these treaties Austria was completely outdone in the East by Russia, and had to submit to Berlin's interference in a matter which was so vitally important to its own development and to the maintenance of peace in Europe. The bright and important rôle which Metternich heretofore had played in the alliance of the great powers seemed gone. This was, however, not the aim but merely a side issue in the Prussian policy of maintaining peace in the East, and thereby preventing war in the rest of Europe. Frederick William saw the maintenance of European peace only in an alliance of the eastern powers, and as Metternich succeeded in lifting Austria out of its policy of isolation, the reestablishment of cordial relations between Austria and Russia appeared highly probable.

Peace, however, seemed doomed to destruction from another source in the summer of 1830. A general collapse of governments and finances appeared imminent. A revolution started in France in July, 1830; the Bourbons

were driven out of the country and Louis Philippe, of the House of Orleans, grasped the standard of the *fleur-de-lis*. In August Belgium staged an insurrection, severed its "unnatural" connection with Holland, and declared its independence on November 24. Serious disturbances took place in Parma, Modena, Ferrara and Bologna, which threatened the suzerainty of Austria in Italy. Finally, the Poles rose enthusiastically against Russian control and, on January 25, 1831, declared the House of Romanov deposed.

In this wild tumult of the national and political oppositions and interests, Frederick William maintained a careful attitude which would not permit the sparks to fly from the conflagration into his own state. He thus maintained the peace of Europe. Despite the threats of his Russian son-in-law, Frederick William recognized the "illegitimate" king, Louis Philippe, as the new ruler of France. He increased his Rhine armies, because the French supported the insurrection of Belgium and called loudly for the restitution of the Rhine as a frontier; but he refused the help which the king of the Netherlands asked of him. For in this case military assistance must have led to a general war. France threatened to send an army to Belgium, if Prussian soldiers interfered. France

now supported the principle of "nonintervention" in the domestic affairs of a state, in opposition to the principle laid down at the Troppau convention; but France immediately amended its own idea as relating to Belgium by saying that any interference in Belgian affairs gave France the right to intervene. Russia was anxious to draw the sword in defense of the legitimate ruler of France and against Louis Philippe, so prepared energetically for war; but Prussia's chief aim was to see that France's influence in Belgium should not become preponderant. A congress was called in London, at the instance of England and Prussia; but the passionate French demanded more and more loudly the incorporation of Belgium in France. Then Prussia mobilized its troops in the Rhine province and recognized Belgian independence under the newly elected king Leopold, of the House of Coburg. Frederick William firmly maintained this stand, and at length England and France took up arms to force the king of the Netherlands to let Belgium be freed from his rule. It was not until 1833 that complete cessation of hostilities could be announced, and it took six years more for the Hollanders to give in. The artificial "Netherlands" which the Vienna congress had created upon the demand of England thus split into its two natural halves, Holland and Bel-

gium. That this operation had been carried out without involving all Europe in war was due to the wise preparations and precautions of Frederick William.

Russia was in serious danger of losing the possessions which Alexander had obtained at the Vienna congress. The Poles had asserted their independence of Russia, as the Belgians had of Holland, and were fairly successful in their fight. Their insurrection, however, concerned Prussia more directly, because of the danger that the waves would dash over the frontier into West Prussia and Posen. When, therefore, the Russian armies, after a small victory, turned back before the gates of Warsaw and retreated before the Polish forces, Frederick William sent General Gneisenau with instructions to protect the 130 miles of Prussia's frontier with four army corps. Gneisenau found his death in the service of his country, dying on August 24, 1831, from an attack of cholera which made its entry from Poland into western Europe. The Prussian government went even further in the support of Russia. It made it possible for the Russian armies to use the frontier as a protection, to obtain provisions and supplies, and to cross the Vistula by means of boats and rafts obtained from Prussia. So Warsaw was once more conquered. Poland was now turned into a Russian

province and was treated with cruel severity. Frederick William, on the other hand, let all his Polish subjects who had taken part in the rebellion go free with a reprimand. Of more than 1,400 found guilty of insurrection, only twenty were sentenced, and they only to small fines. Nevertheless, the liberal South Germans went into ecstasies over the "fugitive noble Poles," who in their home country were making bitter opposition to German influence and Germanism.

One favorable result of the July revolution was soon noticed in Germany. The South German princes, whom Louis Philippe carefully sounded regarding the formation of a Rhenish federation, became highly indignant over such a proposition, and the consequent negotiations of the various states with Prussia led to a military conference in Berlin. After the *Bundestag* had neglected for fifteen years to prepare for the protection of the Federation, the states finally resolved to place in the field, aside from an army of 172,000 Austrians who were to be put on the upper Rhine, two mixed armies of Prussians and federal troops on the middle and lower Rhine, for which Prussia would supply 231,000 men, and the smaller states together 116,000.

Unlike the royal governments, the democratic leaders and speakers of Germany leaned toward France. Under the influence of the July revolu-

tion, though not, as Count Bernstorff wrote to the king, solely on that account, the indignation and displeasure in the middle states had increased greatly. In Brunswick, in Cassel, in Saxony and in Hanover it led to stormy attacks of the people against the governments, which now had to give their consent to the establishment of proper constitutions. In Bavaria and Württemberg there were troubles. In Nassau, and especially in Baden, the assembly minorities raged against all rulers and governments. Everybody stormed and howled for the destruction of all absolutism and governmental force, dreamed of republican constitutions, and expressed openly a preference for France. A number of newspapers were printed, which thundered in wordy diatribes against the "slaves of tyrants," preached hatred against Prussia, and praised the greatness of the French freedom. Rotteck and Wecker were the most violent of these speakers in the Baden assembly. In the Rhenish Palatinate the wordy attack was led by Dr. Siebenpfeiffer and a lawyer by the name of Wirth. The organization of a "German country along democratic lines" was their aim, and they declared impossible any acceptance of the principle of hereditary monarchy. They would consider the carrying out of reforms only on the basis of the absolute sovereignty of the

people itself. They had called a general meeting for May, 1832, which was to be held in Hambach, near Neustadt-on-the-Hardt, and nearly 25,000 people of both sexes assembled there to shout insults and threats unto all tyrants and to acclaim the praises of republican institutions. They reached the insanity of proclaiming that even the best ruler "by the grace of God" was a born traitor to the human race; and for many years after they failed to realize the political nonsense expressed in the sentence of Rotteck: "I would rather have freedom without unity, than unity without freedom!" The Hambach meeting had numerous smaller imitators.

It was clear that steps must be taken against such insurrectionary movements of the people. The Prussian government, after Count Bernstorff's attempts to create a sensible press law and to cause the publication of the *Bundestag* discussion in an annual report had failed, accepted with great satisfaction the proposals of Metternich for a control of the revolution; the more so as Ancillon had taken the place of Bernstorff, who had fallen seriously ill. Thus the immediate consequence of the Teplitz *Punctuation* and the Carlsbad resolutions was that the independence of the state and its right to decide upon its own affairs were surrendered again. The government of Prussia does not seem to have

considered the plan of winning the great majority of the malcontents by establishing the *Reichsstände*, which so often had been promised, and thereby withdrawing from the revolutionary movement one of the most just causes of complaint. All its plans, on the contrary, were directed toward ways and means of stemming the tide, and Prussia lost greatly in its dignity. It even submitted its own affairs to the control of the Federation; and that meant, to Austria. Metternich's demand for a complete abolishment of all constitutional rights did not meet with Prussia's approval, but an agreement of six articles was established and passed by the *Bundesrat* on June 28, 1832. According to this agreement the governments promised that any desire on the part of their estates and assemblies to abrogate or weaken the power of the supreme state power should be crushed at once. They also agreed that the provincial estates should not be permitted to refuse the necessary funds to carry on a legal government; that legislation passed by the state assemblies was not to interfere with that of the federal assembly; that any attack of the provincial or state assemblies on the Federation should be prevented; that a federal commission was to supervise the provincial assemblies; and that the definition of the federal laws should be subject to the federal assembly

alone. The repressive regulations covering the press, the universities and the *Burschenschaften* were made stricter, while the formation of societies and clubs, and the holding of public meetings were forbidden.

In view of the revolutions and the threatening attitude of the western powers, Frederick William naturally maintained and strengthened the alliance of the eastern powers. This view was shared, in even a greater degree, by the czar and by Metternich. Both wanted to retain the principle of nonintervention as regarding the French system, but Nicholas wished to declare war against France, as the source of the revolutionary propaganda. Frederick William emphatically declined to do this, when his son-in-law visited him in Schwedt; but after the czar had come to an understanding with Austria, in Münchengrätz, covering the Turkish question and also the principle of exerting at all times their combined forces to protect rightful intervention, Prussia joined the alliance and signed a new treaty on October 15, 1833, between the three eastern powers.

In consequence of this treaty there were held a number of conferences at Vienna, for the purpose of devising means to throttle the rebellions. These conferences lasted from January to June, 1834, and were shrouded in the deepest mystery.

In the meantime the more moderate among the liberals had begun to realize that little was to be gained by this stormy propaganda and this treasonable, or at least illegal, proceeding. But the radicals seriously considered, in connection with their friends in France, Italy, Switzerland and Poland, the starting of a revolution to "cut down the poisonous royal flowers." The *Burschenschaften*, in a meeting in Stuttgart, openly discussed the revolution which was to start in the spring, and, in fact, fifty conspirators surprised and overwhelmed the main guardroom in Frankfort-on-the-Main. They were unable to carry out their intention of dissolving the *Bundestag*, because the expected general insurrection did not take place. Silly and thoughtless as was this trick, it was undoubtedly the beginning of the revolution in Germany, and it clearly showed the connections with the foreign revolutionists. A strict investigation and severe punishment were therefore justified, the more so as a conscienceless demagogical press openly preached the Commune. The persecution of the demagogues and conspirators was carried on everywhere, even in Berlin, where no real "traitors" could be discovered, but where a number of impetuous students were turned over to the *Kammergericht* (supreme court) for sentence, chiefly for the crime of belonging to the for-

bidden *Burschenschaften*." The misery and the sufferings which these students had to experience are widely known because of the famous book of Fritz Reuter, *Ut mine Festungstid*; but more important in the consideration of the whole occurrence is the remark of one of the sentenced students who exclaimed: "I suffer rightfully because I have transgressed the laws of the state!" And most people will agree with the second part of the speech which this student (later the famous historian, Max Duncker) delivered: "He who never in the years of his youth wanted to reform the world, according to his own ideals, in his older age becomes but a lazy workman in the vineyard of the Lord."

The result of the Vienna conference did not quite meet the expectations of Metternich, but the above-named six articles which were considered the new federal laws (*Schlussakte*) contained regulations of such rigor that the government dared to publish them only partially. And what a triumph it must have been for Metternich's policies to find that even Prussia had acknowledged the federal arbitration principle, according to which the federal assembly was to have the final word in disputes between the government and the estates in constitutional matters.

Frederick William, thoroughly in accord with

the idea that the revolutionary movement must be combated with all seriousness, expressed to Prince Metternich his deep appreciation of the great honor which the minister had earned by his fight for the maintenance of the political principle. But he could still add, when he published the government's resolutions: "In Prussia the peace has never been disturbed." And it was true when he said that "in the confidence and the proven affection of his people he possessed the best guarantee for the maintenance of internal peace."

The same principle of maintaining present conditions, which he praised in this message, he followed in European affairs. The czar, despite all his respect for his father-in-law, would not easily yield his purposes, and had to be held back repeatedly from starting a war against France for the deposed Bourbons. Thus Frederick William had to work for the strengthening of the throne of the "citizens' king" in France. The common maneuvers of the Prussian and Russian armies at Kalisch were to announce to the world the union of the two countries, and the Triple Alliance between Russia, Prussia and Austria was solemnly renewed in the fall of 1835. Even when Russia agreed with England on the Oriental question, this did not lead to a dissolution of the Triple Alliance. On the contrary, the re-

newal of the old Quadruple Alliance now became imminent, while Prussia gradually attained to a dignity among the nations, which was heightened by the venerable personality of Frederick William, who had become the Nestor among the princes and rulers in Europe.

Thus the excitement of 1830 soon died away. The hopes for the unification of all Germany had not been fulfilled, it is true; and Prussia had even surrendered to the Federation privileges which hindered the carrying out of her own free will. Neither would the king change his policy of submission to Austria even when King Ernst August of Hanover committed a violation of the constitution. But the Prussian people no longer felt this encroachment upon their liberty of action in so great a measure. On the other hand, Prussia had laid within her domains the foundations of German unity. The various territories which the Vienna congress had turned over to Prussia in a torn and impoverished condition had been welded into a whole by means of an exemplary, just and honest administration. In place of the still lacking political union of Germany, Prussia had succeeded in establishing an economic union, which could not but have an important influence in furthering the other. As Frederick William I had smoothed the way for his great son, by his firm central

administration and his faithful and honest officials, so now a road was being built for the future, however far distant, for the greatest of his sons; and one could say rightfully: "In Prussia the service of the state is in itself almost a constitution."

CHAPTER IX

THE REORGANIZATION OF PRUSSIA

FROM the time of the rearrangement of Prussia's boundaries in 1815, King Frederick William had seen the necessity of a new division of his provinces of East Prussia, Silesia and other districts. This redistribution was accomplished with the old historical tact. Yet it was done with the firm resolution not to grant to any province, under the pretense of special privileges, an exception from the system of state administration. Despite the many objections raised against the separation of districts which had belonged together, and the joining of others which had been separated, the work was carried out so successfully that to this day the provinces of Brandenburg, Pomerania, Silesia, Posen, Saxony, Westphalia, East and West Prussia remain in exactly the form in which they were established at that time. The only changes necessary have been in the Rhineland, where two districts were afterward contracted into a single province. By request of the king,

the presidents of the provinces were placed at the head of the provincial government, as intermediaries between the king's ministers and his subjects. Administrative officials, as well as judges, have the usual misfortune that their names vanish with their work from the memory of posterity, and even the contemporary world usually hears only of the ability of the highest officers of the government. But the importance of the first presidents was so extraordinary that the names, Vincke, Schön, Merkel, Sack and Zerboni, still live and have a good sound in Westphalia, Prussia, Silesia, Pomerania and Posen. But as the newly planted seed produces little in the first years, until in the course of time it has developed its full strength and beauty, so it was that the new organisms of the state had to learn to appreciate the faith and care of the state under the silent influence of the years. They had to be thoroughly permeated with this faith and to grow with the old body of the state into an organic whole. A wound does not heal from yesterday to today, and one ought to be satisfied with having bandaged it carefully and skillfully.

In Posen—taking the individual provinces—the Polish nobles, who were friends of the French, and the Roman Catholic priests controlled the people completely. Commerce was stagnant, the

cities were devastated, and agriculture neglected. The hatred of the *Sarmaten* (Polish aristocracy) would not believe in a lasting union with Germany and openly explained that the land was a separate "state within a state." The natural aversion of the peasants toward the noble landed proprietor (*Pan*) was bridged by the activity of the priests in such a manner that these three most important classes found a common cause in their hatred against Prussia. Against this united national and religious resistance, and against the disinclination of the Poles toward German orderliness, education and cleanliness, the Prussian government at first attempted a policy of benevolence, which degenerated into weakness and proved insufficient. Prince Radziwill, whom, in order to honor the Polish nation, the king had placed as governor beside President Zerboni di Sposetti, was deeply grieved to find that, instead of the amalgamation which he had promised, there were signs of unrest and insurrection which broke out openly during the great Polish revolution against Russia. In spite of this, the German character and German thought made substantial progress, particularly through the many new schools. Their blessings became evident in the disappearance of the knout; in the strict regulation of agricultural conditions; in the introduction of the Prussian

agrarian laws of 1811 for the peasants; the reorganization of the financial system; the strengthening of the landed estates through the formation of credit banks for the nobility; and in the revival of trade and commerce and the establishment of civic order in the cities and towns.

How peculiar the difficulties were in Saxony one can realize from the fact that this province was made up of thirty-two separate and distinct territories, and that to these was added the original Saxon Mark, the *Altmark*. And how different were the economic interests of the Upper Saxons in Thuringia and the Lower Saxons in the *Altmark*, and how little importance the Elbe possessed for a large part of this territory, may be seen from the discussion of the question as to whether Magdeburg or Merseburg was to be the capital of the province. Nobility and bourgeoisie exchanged the *Rautenkrone* (the coat of arms of Saxony) for the Black Eagle of Prussia only with great reluctancy, and had a decided aversion to step from the easy-going, slipshod Saxon administration into the strict Prussian régime with its taxes and its military regulations. We must mention, as opposed to these sentiments, the calm and judicial tone in which the clergy composed its sermons concerning the homage to be paid to the new ruler. These sermons, although frankly expressing regret for

being compelled to leave Saxony, yet gave voice to a complete confidence in the just and faithful character of the Hohenzollerns. Surely such sermons could not have been preached if they had not touched a sympathetic chord in the hearts of the hearers. Hardenberg had been fortunate in choosing Frederick von Bülow as president of the new province. Bülow knew how to combine the superiority of the Prussian monarchical institutions with a tactful treatment of the wishes of the hitherto all-powerful nobility. The vice president of the Erfurt district, von Motz, was particularly successful in accomplishing excellent results in that neglected district. The surprisingly quick growth and improvement of the province in economical matters, and the care which was given to its schools and other institutions, soon created a change of sentiment which replaced the apologetic word of the king, "At any rate we are all Germans," by a healthy Prussian sense of honor.

In Pomerania the careful administration of the president, von Sack, succeeded in accomplishing the union of New Pomerania with the old section of the province, an amalgamation of two nationalities, the Swedish and German, which had been considered exceedingly difficult. Yet von Sack succeeded within a short period of time, and soon even here there was a thorough

conciliation between the former ruling classes, the nobility, the city of Stralsund, and the university of Greifswald, and the strict Prussian monarchical régime.

Infinitely more difficult, however, were the obstacles which had to be conquered in the two Rhenish provinces by the presidents von Ingersleben and the Count von Solms-Laubach. The vivacity of the Rhinelander did not welcome the sturdy, crude Prussian methods. The rapid changes of rulership among the former church dignitaries had left the Rhineland without the bond of fidelity which in monarchical countries unites the ruler with his subjects. The neglectful, slipshod administration of the Rhineland had filled the people with a dreary aversion for all monarchical forms, so much so in fact as to prepare the ground for revolutionary tendencies. The hatred of the bourgeois against the nobility was so great in the Rhineland that attempts were made to exclude the nobility entirely from all participation in the administration, and to employ only members of the citizen class, born in the province. Social equality was considered the palladium of human dignity. The state-conserving power of a landed nobility firmly attached to the country had been demolished by the losses during the tempestuous time of war, while French sentiments, the enthusiasm for the

ideals of 1789, filled heads and hearts. The French language was the medium of conversation among the aristocratic and distinguished classes. Besides, the Catholic faith firmly maintained its hold on the people despite all the republican dreams, so as to make the hatred of Protestant rule and of the Protestant part of the population almost a matter of religious command. Yet the patient justice of the Prussian government; the prudent development of economic resources, especially the construction of bridges over the Rhine; the decisive stand against Holland which attempted to bring the province into a condition of economic dependency; the influence of the new university at Bonn; and the closer relations with the rest of Central Germany; all these created in the course of time a consciousness of belonging to the German nation. Thus, instead of a people from which one had to fear revolutionary troubles, there grew up a people which became the guardian against all French attacks. The Rhineland had been almost on the point of renouncing its Germanic nature and accepting French nationality when Prussian administrative genius, so to say, regained it and led the erring daughter back to the heart of its mother. Not until some time after did the people of Germany realize the extent of the blessing conferred upon it by

the fact that the Rhine from Bingen to Emmerich was again made to serve trade and commerce under Prussian administration.

In Westphalia one can discover to this day the effects of Vincke, who was inordinately fond of traveling. He completely reorganized the old dukedom of Westphalia and the former bishopric of Paderborn. It is incredible what miserable conditions he found therein. The laxity and laziness of ecclesiastical rule had done comparatively little for the province; and whatever some of the bishops had managed to accomplish had been demolished by the rule of King Jérôme. Vincke passed from farm to farm in untiring efforts to improve the many and pressing needs of the people. Through the construction of a carefully planned system of roads and canals, the establishment of schools, the dredging of the Ruhr and the Lippe rivers, the poor inhabitants were at last enabled to enjoy the riches of their "red earth." *

The older provinces, too, required a thorough reorganization, as East Prussia and Brandenburg, in particular, had been terribly devastated by Napoleon's fury. During the months that elapsed between the beginning of 1813 and the battle of Leipzig Napoleon had tried to destroy

* The soil in Westphalia has a decided red color, due to the admixture of iron and alum oxides.

every vestige of prosperity still remaining here and there in the devastated land. Here it was the rare ability of the presidents, von Auerswald in East Prussia, Schön in West Prussia, Merkel in Silesia, and von Bassewitz in Brandenburg, which completed a task which was almost as great as the gigantic work of the Great Elector.

It was but slowly and gradually that the great wounds were healed. The enormous load of the public debt, under which the state suffered and under which the individual citizen was nearly crushed, lasted many years; and it prevented many classes of the population from participation in public affairs. Even the establishment of the municipal law had to be postponed in the new provinces. While the political literature of the day insistently demanded a constitution and the participation of the people in the administration of the state, the theorizers usually overlooked the fact that such participation must have its foundation and its training in local self-administration. When one considers the maze of districts and interests; the admixture of affection and hatred, confidence and aversion; the conglomeration of peoples used to the most varied laws, customs and morals; when one sees on the one side a vigorous advancement and on the other a frightened reluctance; on the one side a passionate desire for innovations and im-

provements preached by a vague theory of state rights, on the other a strong reactionary pressure toward conditions which belonged to a dead world—one can realize what tremendous efforts were necessary, what an enormous task it was to establish the union of the state despite all these differences, and to create in all the subjects a common love and affection for the Fatherland.

The more inclined Prussia was to meet the desires and wishes of the different provinces, the more it became evident that the first step in administration must be the harmonizing of all the branches of this varied population. The nature of things compelled Hardenberg to fall back upon the ideas of Stein, the establishment of a *Staatsrat* which he himself had avoided in his own chancellorship. The utmost unity and power of the highest authority of the state was the more necessary as the vanishing confidence of the monarch in his chancellor rendered the personal intercourse and direct report, which Stein had considered the first requirement of healthy development, of rarer and rarer occurrence. In this connection it was General von Witzleben, the shrewd, careful and diligent chief of the military cabinet, who always supported and applauded the constitutional plans and ideas of Hardenberg, and still retained the favor of the king. He thus earned high distinction be-

cause of his frequent conciliatory mediation. Hardenberg furthermore had lost some of his importance since the appointment of separate ministers for the various departments, being chiefly employed in conducting foreign affairs, while his position as chancellor had diminished in its significance in the course of the years. In addition, several of the higher officials were in direct opposition to the chancellor, and this condition contained grave dangers for the uniform conduct of state affairs. The danger became aggravated whenever Hardenberg gave voice to a particularly malicious bit of criticism. Schön, for instance, expressed his opinion frequently and took occasion to refer often to "men who would like to drive the people back into the machine work of 1806." Ways and means had to be found, therefore, in which the overflow of ability and force among the high Prussian officials might be collected so as to produce the best common efforts and the most advantageous harmony.

It was thus in the nature of things that the *Staatsrat* had to be revived, and on March 20, 1817, after a magic sleep of a full century, it had been reestablished along the principles of Stein. Consisting of the royal princes, the ministers, the chiefs of the central administrative authorities and thirty-four counselors appointed

by the king, this council was to discuss, according to the ideas of Stein, legislative and administrative measures as well as problems dealing with the competency of officials threatened with dismissal. The control of the various ministers, which Stein had planned to turn over to the *Staatsrat*, was changed to an examination of complaints and petitions, sent to the king and turned over by the latter to the council for discussion.

Because of the great difference of opinion among its members, the importance of the *Staatsrat* lost greatly in the years following 1827, and when the position of chancellor was abolished with Hardenburg's death, it followed that practically all the affairs of the state were again concentrated in the king, who communicated personally with the various ministers. Attempts to reestablish provincial ministries, proposed by Schön and Motz, or to introduce the system of prefectures, failed because of the king's clearer understanding of the matter, and after the provincial estates had been established it was necessary to stick to the ministers, because they alone maintained the administrative unity. The provincial presidents obtained in 1824 greater privileges, and each occupied the chair in the administrative body of his provincial capital. "The political union of the state," declared

Eichhorn, "is something quite different from a mere collection of its various parts." "It follows," he continues, "that I consider as the first of all administrative principles an uninterrupted chain leading from the highest point of the administration down to the lowest, and that the highest authority must make itself felt in the pressure of the lowest link of the chain. Where this condition does not exist, one cannot guarantee the excellence of the regulations nor their proper execution. The political expression of unity is—one must think involuntarily of Frederick William I—subordination. Where this is supplanted by coördination there are *two*, and no longer *one*."

And where could be found a better example of subordination than in the Prussian military system? This most glorious representative of Prussian unity, this remarkable realization of the union of state and people, the universal military compulsion, of course could not be reduced or hampered. As a matter of fact, there arose, even shortly after the war, voices of opposition, which considered it sufficient for the youth of the country to undergo a short period of training, if possible not more than three days, each year; while others favored a return to the old Prussian army system. The former acted in blind over-estimation of the efforts of the *Landwehr*, a van-

ity which became more and more firmly planted in the minds of the people; while the latter were afraid of the dangers of an armed populace. The seed which Scharnhorst had planted in the fertile soil, however, had sprouted too vigorously, and its productive force showed too clearly and had too many ramifications among the Prussian people. Frederick William held fast to the system and was in full accord with his minister of war, von Boyen, although he differed from the latter in the matter of the coördination of the *Landwehr* and the standing army. The king desired the union of the two corps of officers, while the minister wanted to keep them separated. The king finally enforced his plan, after the resignation of von Boyen.

The poor financial condition of the state showed its effects especially in the army, by preventing more than a limited and insufficient equipment and armament of the soldiers, and at the same time reducing the active force under arms to 115,000 men, or less than one per cent. of the population. This idea of a small, badly equipped army being cheaper for the nation was caused by the poor financial condition, and clung for many years. Yet there is no greater truth than that in the case of war, with a small standing army, a much greater percentage of older, trained men must be called to the colors, which

again has a far more disturbing influence upon the economic development and maintenance of a much greater number of families; while the withdrawal of such forces from productive work must undoubtedly damage the national wealth. Barely half of the physically fit could be trained in the army, and some of the generals recommended a two year training period in place of the three years, in order to be able to train more new men each year. The number of officers had been placed as low as possible, and their advancement and promotion were exceedingly slow, because the state had to be careful in its policy of pensioning the older generation. Even the general staff did not have one-half of the officers necessary in case of war. But Grolmann, as well as his successor, Müffling, was very active in the work of the general staff. Müffling, the old opponent of Scharnhorst, now defended his ideas. A step of unexpected consequences was the separation of the general staff from the ministry of war, especially in later years, when the ministry was involved in arguments and disputes with the parliament. But despite the lack of money and its consequent difficulties, the army remained healthy and fully up to the requirements of the time. It became gradually, as the idea of compulsory universal military service permeated the

whole people, the most important school for the development of a feeling of duty toward the state, and the leading factor in the final establishment of the unity of the country.

The school had perhaps as great an influence on the formation of loyalty as the army had. It is easily understood that in the years of foreign oppression the means for public education had been exceedingly small. In the new provinces, especially those which had been under the control of Napoleon, the educational system was in a miserable condition. Minister von Altenstein, who was called to the head of the educational department in 1817, did not judge too unfavorably when he called his department "almost woody and shriveled up," and said he "would have to inject some life into it and set it in motion." But he and his assistants, especially the great Sövern, whom Stein venerated as the "cornerstone, foundation and precious jewel of the nation," and the pious Nicolovius, succeeded in accomplishing excellent results. They held tenaciously to the idea of Frederick William I, of a universal compulsory educational system; and, building further upon it, they contemplated the establishment of a general educational law which was to become the model for the rest of Germany. For Prussia should, said Altenstein, in true continuation of the reform ideas of this

great period, "endeavor to fight for a place in the front rank of the civilized people of Europe, through its unique character of seriousness and ripeness."

The law remained but a proposal, for more pressing problems demanded solution. The government was expending its energies on such important legislative reforms that the educational legislation could not be carried out. In practice, however, the idea was the more successful. The elementary schools soon were frequented by more children than in any other of the large countries; while the teachers were men trained in the many new seminaries, who became luminaries in pedagogics, as, for instance, Diesterweg. The duty of teaching religion according to the majority belief in each school was carried out conscientiously, and *Simultan-schulen* (schools attended by both Protestants and Catholics) were established only in such communities as were too impoverished to maintain separate institutions for each.

The educated classes lived and breathed in an atmosphere of antiquity, and just as they had sharpened their own administrative ideas on the old Roman conception of the state, they now plunged deeply into the Greek world of beauty and art. After Voss had broken the ground by his translation of Homer's tales, Frederick the

Great's desire to see the work of the ancients translated into German was fulfilled, especially through Schleiermacher, who translated Plato in such a manner as to make him well known and well liked by the great mass of the German people. The teachers took up the classic courses with an enthusiasm based on their own love for their work, and for this reason it was but natural that colleges and universities should find special attention and care. As early as 1825 there were 133 colleges (*Gymnasiums*) in Prussia; and Altenstein, Süvern and Johannes Schulze watched over them like fathers.

Even art came into its own in Berlin about this time. Despite the poor general conditions in the state, art proved its educational influence. Johann Gottfried Schadow, the creator of the Quadriga of Victory on the Brandenburg gate, still worked in the capital, and with the skill of his chisel created many a monument to the great deeds of the wars of liberation. With the old faithfulness of his House, Frederick William honored the heroes of the war by every expression of royal gratitude. He did not hesitate to travel hastily to Kriblowitz, near Breslau, in order to visit the dying Blücher; and he gave instructions to the sculptor Christian Rauch, who had created the wonderful monument of Queen Luise in the mausoleum at Charlottenburg, to erect

monuments to the generals Blücher, Scharnhorst and Bülow. These later were followed by statues of York and Gneisenau. In honor of the whole nation he ordered the building of the great monument of the German nation on the Kreuzberg, by Rauch and Schinkel. The latter became the founder of a new period of architecture for the growing national capital. He had employed the Gothic style on the Kreuzberg, and in the new guardhouse, opposite the Blücher monument, he showed the surpassing beauty and power of Doric columns. Freely joining his own ideas to the spirit of antiquity, Schinkel created the *Schauspielhaus* (dramatic theater), the museum with its huge hall of columns, and the splendid bridge over the Spree, between the great avenue Unter den Linden and the royal palace. Berlin then commenced to become a really beautiful city. Theater and opera, under the management of the great Spontini, filled all the circles of Berlin's population with an absorbed interest.

The average citizen, it is true, did not know much about the leaders in the university and academy; even the philosophy of Hegel, which influenced so many minds, did not touch him. He continued, in the old-fashioned way, to drink his glasses of beer and to unload his absurd and nonsensical talk on politics—that is to say,

foreign politics; for the papers (*Vossische* and *Spencerische Zeitung*) were not permitted to discuss or mention internal politics. And he would never forego the pleasure of attending the great carnival held on the meadows of the neighboring village of Stralau once a year, during the great fishing in August. The crude and awkward jokes which accompanied this popular festival were far too funny and too pleasant to miss. Yet there was one scientist, strange to say, who actually became popular in Berlin, the physician Dr. E. L. Heim. Because of the extraordinary correctness of his diagnosis, he soon acquired the reputation of an infallible "doctor by the grace of God," while his personal character gained him the love and affection of both rich and poor.

Considerable appropriations were made for the high school of Berlin. In order to assist it and facilitate study, the royal library at this time was greatly enlarged and extended, as well as subsidized more generously; the most eminent teachers were engaged, and through them and through Hegel, in particular, Berlin became more and more an intellectual center. The greatest improvements date back, however, to the arrival of Alexander von Humboldt in Berlin, in 1827. He obtained there an influence lasting for several decades, an influence

which no other scientist has since been able to equal.

It was but natural that in Prussia the intellectual life could not be centralized, but that it had to be conducted through separate channels into all parts of the country. The government therefore decided to open a university in each province, and it is an extraordinary proof of the intellectual spirit in this state that despite the foreign oppression there were established universities in Berlin and Bonn, and reorganizations in Halle and Breslau. The removal of Frankfort University to Breslau; the union of the two destroyed Universities of Erfurt and Wittenberg into the single institution at Halle, and the choice of the city of Bonn for a university in the Rhineland, it is true, created a good many "particularistic" pains and called forth a torrent of clerical anger. But as one of the efforts of the times was the union of geographically separated districts, it was also necessary to attempt a reconciliation of the strictly clerical party with the state, and to avoid clerical disputes by bringing up the clergy in the free atmosphere of a German university. It was of incalculable value that the state, in addition to the Catholic academy at Münster, now possessed two "paritetic" universities, that is, institutions in which religious equality was one of the chief

points, those at Breslau and Bonn. "To give the youth the foundation on which to build their principles and ideas of life" was, according to Hardenberg's letter to Arndt on the occasion of the latter's call to Bonn, "not only the economical but also the spiritual aim of the universities." And even though there were, as we have noted, times in which the Prussian government, in overestimating the importance of a few individual excesses, took steps to curb the students and teachers, fearing dangerous plots against the state on their part, still the basic idea of educational freedom was retained. The fear that revolutionary teachers were over-influencing the minds of the students certainly was not well founded, at least the evil never spread so far as the government had supposed. The freedom of scientific teachings or scientific investigation has never been hindered by the Prussian government; and the educational administration did everything possible to bring the universities safely through the period of storm and excitement.

Although the principle of absolute religious equality in the state of Prussia had been expressed in the foundation of the "paritetic" universities in the most beautiful and fruitful manner, still the king considered his relation to the Protestant Church a matter of profound serious-



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ness and a true, honest fear of God. We have seen that as long ago as the acceptance of the Reformed faith by the Elector Johann Sigismund it had been the endeavor of the Prussian rulers to unite the two Protestant Churches, and plans were even discussed for a union with the Catholic Church. The final aim of all religious beliefs cannot be anything else than the worship of God by all humanity in the Spirit and in Truth. This must lead ultimately to an amalgamation, a union of the Churches. And if Frederick William I could see only clerical quibbles in the disputed points of the Lutheran and Reformed confessions, he expressed quite correctly the remarks to which the dispute led him. Nevertheless he failed to realize the actual differences, which, as one may say, lay more in the thoroughness of German thought and the religious depth and independence of German life than in the exact biblical words. His simplicity of thought and his clear mind saw not only the separating forces of the differences, but also the uniting power which is found in the active carrying out of religious teachings in ordinary life.

At the end of the eighteenth century, it is true, there had arisen a sort of religious indifference, a searching of the intellect beyond biblical truths and statements. But no people, and par-

- ticularly not the German people, can be satisfied with a merely critical investigation of religious documents. For the knowledge of having decided a theological question which had been in dispute offers to the sentimental heart of the German neither freedom of mind nor firmness of character. Deeper still than the desire to get to the bottom of religion and critical understanding of the teachings of the Church, there remains planted in the German heart the yearning to carry out the high ideal of Christian love and charity in his life, and to follow the dictates of a Universal Church, whatever he may think individually of the teachings of any one particular faith. This sentiment is the safest counterweight against the possible formation of many sects, such as were apparently to be fostered by the idea of Protestant independence and the individual responsibility of each person regarding his religious opinions. If we look into a mirror today, do we not see one and the same reflection, even though it be somewhat distorted by refraction in the glass and by the angle at which we view it? It was only the fierce fighting of two hundred years which could hide the truth, ever attacked and yet ever true, that all desires for religious truth can exist in peace side by side with one another, so long as they leave undisturbed the freedom of the conscience, and are

willing to recognize in the teachings and beliefs of the other Churches also the expression of a sincere religious faith.

In Prussia the civil equality of the two confessions had had a great influence upon the life of the people, and this legal equality was intensified by mixed marriages, which became more and more frequent, following the example of the ruling House. Both Reformed and Lutheran clergymen, Sack and Borowsky and Schleiermacher, supported vigorously the close union of both Protestant sects. And one of the greatest things in the rising of the people against Napoleon had been the turning of the hearts back to the Creator; for all the nation had thanked God unanimously for the divine guidance. They had not weighed the differences in opinion which humans held regarding the Savior and his work for humanity. The ground in Prussia was therefore well prepared for the reunion of the two Protestant sects, the sister Churches. Soon after the peace, King Frederick William reestablished the common consistories for both the confessions. He called together the Lutheran and Reformed clergymen to common synods, in January, 1817; he appointed a commission for the working out of a uniform liturgy, and published, on September 27, 1817, a proclamation to the consistories, which was written by Bishop

Eylert and concurred in by the leading theologians of Berlin.

Proceeding from the principle that the main point was the establishment of the Holy Communion according to the words of the Bible, and that the meaning of this communion was a matter of personal opinion for the individual to decide, the king announced his decision of attending Holy Communion on the day of the Reformation together with the Lutherans. After many disputes and much discussion, the third return of the fête of the Reformation, October 30, 1817, was the day on which in Prussia the Lutherans and Reformed Protestants came together in Holy Communion in the spirit of pure evangelistic thought, and formed a union, within which every individual could live according to his own idea of the teachings regarding the sacrament of the Holy Communion. What centuries had attempted in vain had now been brought to a conclusion which perhaps might still be the cause of many a quarrel and which the strict and narrow minds of the Lutherans might combat, especially in districts like Holstein, Saxony and Hanover, where they lived unmixed with the Reformed, but one which by reason of its inherent truth had become immovable.

Thus the king had found the possibility of a

union, not on the basis of an artificial, cleverly thought out formula which could never have gained universal consent, but in the conviction that the simple biblical faith of the original Christians was worth more than the critical definition of Bible teachings, and that freedom of conscience and of scientific investigation remain secured to the community. If the Universal Church signifies the confession of faith on the part of all Christians, then this union was undoubtedly the greatest accomplishment of the Protestant spirit since the days of the Reformation. And as the introduction of the Reformation was due solely to the action of the ruler of Prussia, the new accomplishment of the union was also the result of the work of the state church régime, of the king personally. Frederick William carried out this work with diligence and love until his death.

While at one time the strict Lutherans found support in the separation spirit of the different districts, and both fought against the monarchical constitution, it now came to pass that the unity of the Evangelical Church, the common religious faith of the vast majority of the subjects, became useful for the establishment of a united state.

The king soon took another step, the consequences of which clearly showed that the exist-

ence of the religious union could only be secured by a new common religious constitution. Schleiermacher had said that the state constitution and the church organization are dependent one upon the other; but how could any one think in those days about the gradually reawakening synodal life? The king, it is true, called provincial synods as early as 1815, and intended to follow them later with a general synod; but after the happy religious days of 1817 the county synods alone maintained a pitiful existence. It was self-evident that in those times, when the world stood at the zenith of its enthusiasm for romantic poetry, the ugly shabbiness of the Protestant Church service, still further shriveled by an exaggerated rationalism, must make a painful impression. For how could this church service elevate a people filled with love and enthusiasm for God and a deep sentimentality, through a sermon on moral platitudes? Nobody felt more keenly than the king that an orderly church community requires a common cult, and he who was filled with piety as but few other men believed he was merely fulfilling the requirements of his supreme bishopric when he personally searched the old Lutheran manuscripts in order to study carefully the liturgy questions. Out of these personal efforts of the king and his many conversations with the clergy

a new ritual was issued in 1821, which the king recommended to the parishes for general use.

Opposition promptly developed from all sides. Schleiermacher, both in his official capacity and as author of the booklet *Pacificus Sincerus*, attacked the pamphlet issued by the king: "Luther in regard to the Prussian church ritual." The small circles of intelligent educated people which had been formed all over the country under the leadership of such noblemen as the Herr von Senfft-Pilsach and the pious Baron von Kottwitz, and especially the Old-Lutheran preacher in Breslau, Scheibel, declared their vigorous opposition. It was only after the king had caused amendments to be worked out which left to the individual parishes the choice between the new and the old ritual, that the new one was accepted by the majority of the parishes before 1830.

The Catholic Church was always treated with a ready understanding, as had been the custom in Prussia. And, thanks to the clear comprehension which the Prussian ambassador at Rome, Niebuhr, showed for the nature of the Catholic Church; thanks to his open esteem of Catholicism as the Christian faith; and finally, thanks to the unusual readiness with which the Prussian government offered to endow the new bishoprics which were to be established—the

negotiations with Cardinal Consalvi led on, July 16, 1821, to the papal bull *De Salute Animarum*. Repeatedly recognizing the wonderful complaisance of the king, "in whom he found not only a Protestant ruler but also an heir of Theodosius the Great," the pope transferred to the state his own privileges and rights of suzerainty at the elections of the bishops, the supervision of the schools, examination of candidates; the right to be the sole mediator between the bishops and the pope, and to decide upon the admission of the various religious orders into the state.

However, so great an indulgence contradicted the very nature of the Catholic Church, and although Rome may let its principles rest for a while, it never completely surrenders them. Neither was the Prussian government able to keep the full letter of its promise about the bishoprics. Even in the lifetime of Pope Leo XII, the Catholic opposition became more and more noticeable. While the bishops received promptly from the state the endowments and salaries promised them, they did not get the source of the endowment, the real estate property. The failure to surrender this was characterized far and wide as "Church robbery," although everybody knew well enough that the state at that time was not even in a position to fulfill the

promise given so light-heartedly by Hardenberg. A more significant opposition developed, especially in the Rhineland, where many mixed marriages were concluded between Protestants and Catholics. These marriages the Catholic Church still persisted in classifying as illegal and void. A cabinet order of 1825 applied the Prussian law of 1803, regarding mixed marriages, to the western provinces, according to which rule the religious education of children was to be decided by the father. Bunsen, the new Prussian representative at Rome, opened negotiations with the pope concerning this law, and obtained the issue of a papal order to the bishops of the Rhineland, dated March 25, 1830, which he considered a great success. In this order bishops were permitted to give the blessing of the Church to such mixed marriages, provided the parents promised to educate the children in the Catholic faith, and the Catholic bride was especially warned beforehand that such a marriage was a deadly sin. Attempts to cause a retraction of this grave insult to the Protestant Church were without success; and after the death of the venerable archbishop, Count Spiegel of Cologne, with whom an agreement had been reached on June 11, 1824, which agreement was concurred in by the bishops of Trèves, Münster and Paderborn, a lenient carrying out of the papal order was out of the

question. The reason was the election of the priest Freiherr Clemens August von Droste-Vischering, to the office of archbishop, in May, 1836.

Droste had been recommended by the crown prince himself, but he lived in a spirit of sternest intolerance toward the Protestant Church. Frightened by this incredible mistake, even a cardinal exclaimed to Bunsen: "Is your government completely insane?" Despite his solemn promise to obey and recognize the laws of the state, the new archbishop actually dissolved the Bonn convention, persecuted the followers of the mild theologian Hermes and forbade priests to give their blessing to mixed marriages. At the same time he announced to the minister that the Church is of equal rank with the state, that any and all supervision by the state was unnecessary and inadmissible, and that the formation and installation of the clergy depended solely on the bishops. It would have been impossible to deny the legislative powers of the state in a more simple and categorical manner. All attempts which Bunsen, Count von Stolberg, and even a cardinal made to induce the "stone-hearted man" to give in were unsuccessful. The pope himself disapproved of the agreement with the Prussian government, and flung the most dreadful curses against Prussia in an "allocution"

which he sent to the representative of the Prussian ambassador in Rome.

What had been the result of all the conciliatory methods toward the Catholic Church? In Prussia the government saw in Rome its deadly enemy. There was too sharp a difference between the power which bases its sole authority upon the subordination of the conscience to spiritual control and the state which considers the freedom and independence of the individual conscience a necessity of life. The insults of the pope were accompanied by inciting pastoral letters of the archbishop. As early as October 31, 1836, Droste declared that he considered himself no longer bound by the instructions, and it had come to the point where, as Count Anton Stolberg expressed it, "it was a question whether the king or the archbishop was to hold the rudder." On November 20 the prelate was arrested and placed in lenient custody at Minden; after protracted discussions and disputes within the government, he was ordered to withdraw to his home estates. Notwithstanding all his obstinacy, Droste always showed a firm, strict and evenly balanced will-power. The archbishop Dunin, of Posen, however, who now also forbade the contraction of mixed marriages, no sooner gave the Prussian government a promise than he withdrew it again, so that he had to

listen to an exclamation of President Flottwell: "You have cheated me, I despise you!" Deposed and sentenced to imprisonment in a fortress by the *Kammergericht*, he was pardoned by the king under the condition that he withdrew for good from his diocese; in spite of this promise he returned to Posen, and was promptly sent to the fortress of Colberg, October, 1839.

In principle, however, the state yielded completely and permitted the Catholic priests, in a cabinet order dated January 28, 1838, to make inquiries concerning the religious education of the children of such mixed marriages, and left the decision in the matter to the bishops. A new commission also debated a new general clerical-political legislation, and the king declared his readiness to form a separate division for Catholic matters in the ministry of public worship and instruction, under the Catholic under-secretary von Duesberg. New allocutions of the pope kept the Catholic part of the population in continual excitement, and the schism between the Catholics and the state remained as the sorest point of conflict in an otherwise peaceful, contented and reorganized Prussia.

CHAPTER X

THE BUILDING OF THE ZOLLVEREIN

DURING the closing years of Frederick William III's long reign, the legal system of Prussia was much improved. It was in the Rhineland that a desire for the revision of the Civil Code first awakened. Yet the peculiar conditions in this province had a hindering and obstructing influence. As early as the Vienna congress (1814) there had been a demand for a uniform code of law for all of Germany. Heedless people thought it easily possible to build up such a uniform, general civil law on the doctrines of justice and philosophy. Professor Thibaut of Heidelberg University, in a pamphlet which was hailed with great satisfaction and applause, asserted the necessity of a "general, universal, uniform civil code." This idea was opposed by Savigny in October, 1814, with the assertion that laws were not created by the philosophical speculations and ideas of the lawmakers, but by the spirit of the people, and were dependent upon the entire state of education and culture of the

nation; that in the careful examination of the present law, concerning its origin and development, there would be found the indications for the formation of new laws, corresponding to the demands of the times.

It may seem as though such a statement underestimates the power of the human will to create new things; yet in the new districts turned over to Prussia it was soon seen that the difference in the laws was an almost insurmountable obstacle to harmony. In addition to the three great legislative codes—the *Allgemeine Landrecht*, the Common Law, and the *Code Napoléon*—there were innumerable special rights and codes. Everybody hated the Roman as well as the French law as “drops of foreign blood in the body,” and overlooked completely that the former had been thoroughly permeated by German thought, and that the latter had taken over bodily many German institutions. But a general idea of uniform law, a firm demand for a common code, did not exist in these different districts. It became clear that the educational conditions and the economic situation in the various provinces must be equalized a good deal more before it was possible to build a common foundation for a new civil code. This condition explains why the revision of the *Allgemeine Landrecht*, ordered by the king, made such slight progress, especially

because his presupposition of the "estates" had fallen through during the extensive reform legislation.

Prussia finally had to abandon the idea of carrying out the principle of a uniform law code in Prussia itself, and to be satisfied with the reintroduction of the *Landrecht* in the old Prussian provinces, and to leave in the other districts the Common Law, and in the Rhineland even the *Code Napoléon*. The real union of the state could alone abolish this unnatural condition and the examination of the evolution of German law, the influence of economic conditions and the union of the entire territory of the state into an economic entity—these were the suppositions on which to build the principle: "In the monarchy only *one* internal civil code can be possible." The revision of the *Landrecht* was not complete even in the last years of King Frederick William III, although it had been planned to complete it before attempting to introduce it in the Rhine province. The discussions anent the revision of the criminal code of 1827, which had been worked out by Minister von Kamptz, never were carried to completion; the summary process alone was subjected to a thorough improvement by a cabinet order of June 1, 1833.

The government realized that it would be impossible to finish a complete revision of the

common law within the time limit set by the conditions; but it was not satisfied with merely deciding doubtful and questionable legal points by means of a large number of separate decrees. The ministers of justice, Kirchseisen, Danckelmann, Kamptz and Mühler, endeavored with all their means to bring the common, as well as the provincial, law to a definite revision. At the time of the death of the king the work had progressed so far that a "Civil Code for the Prussian States," excepting the legislation covering churches, schools, personal rights, inheritance regulations and business contracts, was ready, as well as plans for a law covering the regulation of the courts, and the civil and criminal procedure, and for twenty-five provincial legislations.

The most important work, however, after the peace and independence of the state had been gained by fighting, was of course the reorganization of the finances. And as soon as the government approached this field, so torn and ruined by Napoleon, it became aware of the incredible confusion. There was no possibility of working out any kind of a budget, or getting an idea of the total amount of the debts. And yet, money had to be raised as quickly as possible in order to assist the impoverished agricultural population, and to meet the demands of individuals,

which were made upon the state in heretofore unheard-of amounts. This was the more difficult, as the loosening of all economic bonds, the free development of trade and the whole liberal legislation of Stein and Hardenberg made necessary a completely new treatment of the problem of finance and taxation. It was at the same time necessary to keep in mind the far-away goal of the economic union of the state and its subjects. Under these conditions the first debates, which were held in the *Staatsrat* in the matter of the budget and the revision of the taxes, remained without a definite result. Yet with all their vagueness they were exceedingly profitable. The plan of the minister of finance, Bülow, was to improve the conditions on the Berlin Bourse, which permitted the state bonds to drop to the low quotation of 65, and which forced the value of real estate to one-half and even one-fourth of its actual worth. He planned to do this by the introduction of a tax on abattoirs and mills, a tax on tobacco, beer and spirits, and the abolishment of excise taxes.

This plan met with violent opposition. The indirect taxes seemed to the *Staatsrat* and to the provincial assemblies of notables a black sin; the abolishment of the unequal property tax (East Prussia paid 639 thalers, the Rhineland 4,969

thalers per 20 square miles) seemed far more necessary; and the direct tax and its further development seemed alone worthy of humanity. Especially Wilhelm von Humboldt pointed out the necessity of a reform which was to be uniform, systematic and closely connected with the constitutional reforms. Finally, Bülow had to turn over the office of minister of finance to Klewiz, retaining only the ministry of commerce. Of all his plans only the customs law was passed and enforced; and even this was but of short duration, for on June 11, 1816, all tariffs on inland waters and interprovincial trade were abolished, while on August 1, 1816, the king acknowledged the principle of free imports for all future times.

The customs law which finally was applied to all the Prussian states was constructed by Chief Director of Taxes Maassen, and was dated May 25, 1818. While all other countries with the exception of England maintained prohibitive import tariffs, the Prussian state abandoned the principles of the old state and was satisfied with very moderate duties on manufactured goods. Colonial goods, however, had to pay a duty of twenty per cent., as the impoverished state had to find a source of revenue somewhere. For this reason, and because it was figured that one-half of the imported goods were reexported, as

well as for the sake of pressure on the neighboring small states which would induce them to form an economic union with Prussia, the government demanded comparatively high duties on transit goods. Only a few protective tariff duties were reserved as an emergency weapon against the trade despotism of England; and in the simplified laws of 1821 all differences between the various provinces were abolished.

The taxation laws of 1819 and 1820 were exceedingly simple. The property tax had to be collected in the provinces according to the old system, because the new division could not be completed in time. In addition there was an income tax and a class tax; the indirect taxes only touched the abattoirs and mills in the larger cities, while the tax on beer, wine, brandies and tobacco did not inconvenience the consumer at all.

With this tariff and taxation law the economic union of the state and its subjects had been placed on a sound foundation, and they had been joined together by a kind of putty which outlasts almost any other kind. The moral unity, which was contained in the universal military service law, was now reënforced by the powerful influence of similar material needs and interests. And herein lay, as we shall see later, the seed for the formation of the

united empire; it was the beginning of the free trade movement which was to spread over all Europe.

It is truly remarkable how after all the misery which the people had suffered, and all the loads which they had carried, trade improved and prosperity lifted its head among the people, under the influence of this legislation. The state further came to the assistance of commerce by the excellent postal service, which surpassed, under the management of Postmaster General von Nagler, the famous administration of Thurn and Taxis. The construction of wide, firm roads was also carried on with the greatest energy. Within the short period of eleven years, 1817-1828, the mileage of post roads (*Chaussées*) was doubled, from 2,153 miles to 4,792 miles, at a cost of 21 million thalers. In fifteen years (up to 1831) the density of population increased from 2,000 to 2,521 heads per *Geriertmeile*, or, roughly, 125 per square mile. Berlin soon had more smoking factory chimneys than the whole industrial state of Baden; and the Rhenish centers of industry showed astonishing gains. Industrial taxes doubled within ten years. The import of cotton yarn and nearly all other foreign goods doubled within twenty years. The total value of imports and exports and transitory goods amounted in 1828 to nearly triple the

total of 1796. The receipts of the post office between 1823 and 1830 rose from 2.9 to more than 4 million thalers.

The main problem still remained to be solved, the gathering of an exact knowledge of all the public debts contracted during the misery of the Napoleonic oppression, the wars of liberation, and the taking over the new territories and districts, each of which had its own quota of public indebtedness. And after this must come the establishment of a regular yearly budget with the intention of reducing the public debt. But the situation was so involved that the regulations concerning the arrangement of the public debt could not be issued until January 17, 1820. Instead of the former debt of 54½ million thalers in 1806, there was discovered a total debt of more than 200 million thalers, of which only eleven million consisted in non-interest-bearing paper money. The state now became the guarantor for this whole debt with all its public domains, its entire assets and forests, and promised, in addition, to incur further obligations only in coöperation with and by the consent of the *Reichsstände*.

This was a law of the most decisive importance. For while the Prussian rulers, in their inordinate sense of duty, had used only a very small part of the revenue from the crown's do-

mains and the public funds, the constitution of the state gave the king the right to use the revenue of these domains for the expenses of the royal household, and only directed the surplus to be used for the purpose of the government. In this new order the king voluntarily turned over to the state the free use of all the revenues of the public domains and forests, thereby surrendering the financial foundation of his House into the hands of the state. He asked only the small sum of two and one-half million thalers for the purpose of paying all the expenses of his household. Thus of his own free will and without obligation he fixed the administration of the royal House along the lines of constitutional countries, with the sole provision that this private income for expenses was to be legally fixed and inviolable. The hopes of the friends of a constitution were raised still higher by that other section of the law which made the increase of the public debt dependent upon the consent of the *Reichsstände*. It was, in fact, this provision which later served to reopen the constitutional question, after it had been allowed to fall into a state of coma. A separate commission was appointed to handle the administration of the public debt; and President Rother conducted its business and that of the marine administration so efficiently as to bring the state

bonds into better repute. In 1820 they were traded on the bourse at Leipzig; in 1824 at Hamburg and Frankfort; and in 1829 they reached par value once more. In 1835 the state treasury showed a cash balance of forty million thalers.

The Bank of Prussia, however, could not meet all its debts until 1840. For even now no state funds were turned over to this institution; while the confiscation of all its mortgage funds in Poland by Napoleon and the king of Saxony had robbed it of almost one-half its total assets. Of the claims outstanding, amounting to 27 million thalers, more than 8 millions were found absolutely worthless; 15 millions brought no interest at all, and there was a deficit of fully 7 million thalers! Moreover, this terrible financial condition had to be covered carefully with the mantle of secrecy, for otherwise the bank would have gone down completely. Rothschild even offered to form a corporation to take the place of the state institution. Under these extremely difficult conditions high praise should be given to the financier Friese. He had done excellent work for the government in the labors of new and extensive legislation. Then, on the separation of the bank from the ministry of finance, he became president of the bank, and left at his death, in 1837, a deficit of only $2\frac{1}{2}$ million

thalers. Every bit of the profit of those years had been used for the cancellation of the old liabilities. It should be considered a splendid piece of work on his part that he had not only reduced the debts by so large an amount, but had raised the business of the bank, as well as the cash on hand, to five times as much in 1829 as it had been in 1818. The amount of business had jumped from 44 to 232 millions and the cash on hand from one million to five millions. The total quick assets rose from a little over one million to thirteen millions.

But what extraordinary difficulties had to be met in the fixing of the budget! In every department the aim was to save to the utmost. Especially in the army the administration was placed on the lowest possible allowance. Yet after all reductions had been made by the financiers, Hardenberg and the king himself, there still remained a deficit of ten million thalers in a yearly budget of only fifty millions. Hardenberg thought of meeting this with a class tax, but there was the most vigorous opposition against this in the *Staatsrat*. The princes objected to thus increasing the load on the shoulders of the poor man, and the king would never consent to place such a burden on his faithful people. Privy Councilor Hoffmann had started from the principle "that the aim of political

economy is not to be found in the largest possible accumulation of property, but in the well-being of the people; the state therefore should protect the workingman against the superior force of the employer." Hardenberg, on the other hand, was absolutely right when he told his opponents that the principle of the private citizen's finances, "the expenses must be kept down in proportion to the income," could only lead to ruin if employed in the budget of a state. He demanded the abolishment of the manifold variety of taxes and asserted the impossibility of making any further reductions in the expenditures.

The king finally decided to raise the revenues of the state by five millions. Besides the tariff, fixed in 1818, and the taxes introduced in 1819, there was to be added a property tax on real estate; a class tax divided into twelve classes; the abattoir and mill tax, the salt tax and a very small trade tax. The class tax was paid by only six-sevenths of the population, the inhabitants of the 132 larger cities paying the abattoir and mill tax in its place. Later there followed a few stamp taxes, among which was a newspaper stamp tax, and this was the sum total of the taxation reform.

All of this work, however, did not remove the deficit, and the minister of finance, von Klewiz,

finally sent in his resignation. He had found additional trouble from the treasury, the public debt commission, and the general control committee, at the head of which von Ladenburg worked with exemplary efficiency. Von Klewiz's lack of success, however, was not due to his individual efforts or lack of efforts, but was inherent in the system itself. The minister of finance had merely the responsibility for the revenues of the state, and while he was made the scapegoat of the general denunciation of the impoverished and chaotic condition of the finances, he had in fact not the slightest idea of their exact state. While he had controlled the revenues, he had no control whatever over the expenditures. He could not present a general review of the budget every three years, as the king had ordered. Following his resignation the king sent the budget for an opinion to Schön, Vincke, President Schönberg in Merseburg and President von Motz in Magdeburg. Motz offered to assume the troublous position if given a seat and vote in the general control committee for the minister of finance, and if there was a centralization of the revenue and treasury department, and fixed impassable budget limits. The king promptly chose this courageous man for the post, and soon it became evident how correctly he had grasped the

situation. The deficit had existed only in the scattering of the treasury and revenue offices; in reality there was no deficit at all. On July 1, 1825, Motz became minister of finance; in 1828 the entire revenue and treasury organization was overhauled and reestablished on a uniform basis, the payment of the surplus cash from the branch offices into the main treasury was ordered and thereby a better general idea was gained of the cash on hand. On May 29, 1826, the general control committee was abolished, and the entire management of the state's household was turned over to the minister of finance. Despite the undervaluation of the Prussian domains, especially in East Prussia, and a terrible commercial panic which wrecked 70 banking houses and 3,600 other business houses, Motz could hand the king, on May 30, 1828, a report of his department which showed, in place of the former deficit, a surplus of four million thalers, after deduction of four millions for the state treasury. Counting "accounts and claims due," the surplus was more than seven million thalers.

Most of this returning prosperity was due to trade. The geographical dismemberment of Prussia with its frontier of 4,828 miles, and its small bits of foreign territory lying within its own confines, compelled the government to enter into friendly trade relations with its

neighboring states. It must draw the German countries into a customs union (*Zollverein*) unless it desired to surround its own people with barriers and kill them in an economic sense. The tariff law of 1818, by its clauses covering reciprocity, indicated that the idea of free trade must form the basis of negotiations with the other states, and the Prussian ministers, especially J. A. F. Eichhorn, the referee on internal German affairs in the foreign office, declared repeatedly the readiness of the government to negotiate with the individual states for the benefit of a free trade through all Germany, based on justice and reciprocity. The income which would be turned into the state treasury from the duties and fees was to be turned over to the various governments, while their territories would have the whole Prussian state as their market place. Thereby at the same time the flourishing trade of smuggling, with all its insidious consequences, would be abolished.

To wait for a regulation of these matters by the Federated Union (according to article 19 of the federal constitution) was useless, because of the opposite interests of Austria and the influence of the foreign powers on federal affairs. And there was only a single man, the eminent Friedrich List, who realized even for a moment that Prussia intended to lead all the other states

to free trade by means of separate treaties. The general opinion among the people was strongly in favor of the abolishment of the Prussian tariff laws, and even the clever memorandum of the Baden scientist Nebenius, concerning free trade within Germany, made this demand and hoped for an understanding with Austria and the federation. For this reason a separate tariff treaty was made with only a single small state—that of Schwarzburg-Sondershausen—on October 25, 1819, whose prince submitted to the Prussian tariff regulations, without surrendering any other administrative rights. In payment he received the sum of 15,000 thalers annually, calculated on the number of the inhabitants of his state.

For many years this was the sole tariff treaty. In the federal conferences the abolishment of the Prussian tariff laws was demanded with ever-increasing bitterness. Nassau, Hesse and Anhalt-Koethen, in the fear of losing some of their sovereign rights, resolutely declined all offers of treaties, and used the most violent language against Count Bernstorff. Even the abolishment of the duties for crossing the Elbe and the freedom of shipping on the river could not be fully established, because of the enormous amount of smuggling carried on from Koethen. The vicious wordy war which Hesse conducted

against Prussia in the tariff matter was finished comparatively easily by the construction of the great road Berlin-Cologne, and the use of this road for the purpose of trading with Würzburg, in place of the former route via Hanau; Prussia also agreed to the formation of the South German *Zollverein* between the states of Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Nassau, Darmstadt and the Thuringian districts. But it decided not to invite any other states to join its own *Zollverein* and rather to await the respective proposals from the small states. These came slowly and gradually. In 1822 the prince of Rudolstadt joined the Prussian system, and in 1826 and 1828 the two dukes of Anhalt did so.

No definite results, however, could be achieved so long as Prussia had not succeeded in arranging its own finances satisfactorily, in order to be able to bear temporary losses in revenue; and so long as Berlin maintained the plan to introduce its tariff system "from frontier to frontier." It was not until Minister von Motz had regulated the finances and had conceived the great idea of concluding a customs treaty with the two larger South German kingdoms, over the heads of the intervening small states, that a wholesome change in the economic dismemberment of Germany could take place. Bavaria and Württemberg made a tariff treaty with

each other, to the terror of Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt and Nassau. It caused, therefore, no great surprise in Berlin when the Darmstadt minister, du Thil, in order to relieve the financial difficulties of his country, came in the deepest secrecy to the door of the Berlin ministry of finance. Von Motz was instantly ready to conclude even a disadvantageous treaty, in the hope that other states would follow the example of Darmstadt; and Eichhorn reported to the king that the proposed treaty would give all the financial advantages to Hesse-Darmstadt, but would give Prussia the great political gain of capturing the good will of the small princes.

The treaty was signed on February 14, 1828, and it built the foundation upon which was subsequently erected the economic union of Germany. Darmstadt accepted the Prussian tariff and promised to introduce the Prussian system of "consumers' duties." The control of the main customs houses, forming a precedent for all subsequent treaties of this kind, was placed in the hands of the two states jointly; the receipts in customs duties were divided according to the proportion of the population in the two states, and changes in any of the regulations were to be made only after a mutual agreement; the administration itself remained separated in the two states. Rejoicing greatly in the signing

of this important treaty, Eichhorn wrote: "The possibility of a common tariff system for two states which are geographically independent of each other has hereby been proven." Du Thil sent an enthusiastic letter to Motz in which he praised the latter as the pioneer of the new economic union of the German countries.

On the 18th of January of the same year, Bavaria and Württemberg had signed their tariff treaty, and, as is but natural in the treatment of such problems, had come to similar solutions. However, the treaty proved impracticable, as had been expected in Berlin and in Stuttgart, because the territory covered was too small, the revenues too low, and the two states themselves cut off from the sea. The Central German states, which had grown wildly excited and provoked over the Prussian-Darmstadt treaty, and had declined all the former advances of Prussia, nevertheless had no intention of surrendering to the Munich court and the Bavarian tariff system. On the contrary, these states—Saxony, Hesse, Hanover, Nassau and Frankfort (the Free City)—signed the *Central-Zollverein* (Central German Tariff Union) on September 24, "tentatively as a sort of protection against the Prussian tariff system," as Metternich expressed it. Austria, of course, was exceedingly wroth at the develop-

ment of the Prussian *Zollverein*, which finally would give it, as every one realized, a dominating influence over the smaller states. For a similar reason the treaty between the two South German kingdoms, under suspicion for some time because of its constitutional form, was not exactly hailed with joy in Vienna.

The Central German Tariff Union had been based on the fear of the small states of losing their independence. It was formed with the assistance of Metternich and the trade policy of Great Britain,—the Saxon ambassador had asked London for effective protection against the Prussian tariff system. This union separated Germany into three economic groups. "It is just like those miserable, jealous, anti-national small cabinets," wrote the old Freiherr von Stein, "to unite with foreign countries and submit to foreign whips rather than sacrifice the gratification of their paltry jealousy to the general national interests."

The Central German Tariff Union had no stability; it lacked the money necessary to the building of roads; the local industries (especially that of the *Erzgebirge*) could not suffer the losses; and its territory was attached to Prussia by thousands of threads. Yet the Union gave the allied countries the temporary opportunity of carrying out their intention of destroying the

transit trade of Prussia. Nevertheless, Prussia decided to await silently the proper time of re-opening tariff negotiations with the other states. As Motz explained later, the "neutral union," under the guidance of Austria, with its tendency to maintain unbearable conditions, forced Prussia to go farther and to build up its great trading system. The tariff war between the three tariff systems could not help but do great damage to the whole country.

It was then that Minister von Motz decided to treat the central territories as the enemies which they were, and to negotiate directly over their heads with the South German *Zollverein*, instead of proceeding on the former principle of "frontier to frontier." Even here he was ready to pocket economic losses for the sake of political gain. Similar thoughts filled Bavaria and Württemberg, for conditions were too evident, showing clearly that healthy development could take place only through connection with the large Prussian market. This feeling was particularly strong in the Stuttgart publisher and bookseller Freiherr von Gotta, a shrewd and far-seeing business man. He discussed the matter with the Bavarian minister Count Armannsperg, went to Berlin and was received there with open arms by von Motz. As early as December he was able to report from South Germany, after his

return, that King Ludwig and Count Armannsperg were filled with great ideas, which followed the line of reasoning of Motz, relative to a union of Prussia with Bavaria and Württemberg. And three weeks later he declared that the Stuttgart court, too, had approved of the main principles of the Prussian regulations. By means of negotiations with Gotha and Meiningen a direct trade route was opened between the South and the North, driving the first wedge into the Central German *Zollverein*. After long and weary arguments the treaty was actually signed in May, 1829, and Motz could look back with pride upon a work which was accomplished solely because of his care and the comprehensiveness and grandeur of his ideas. "In this union, based on the similarity of interests and their natural foundation," writes Motz himself, "there will again grow up a truly united Germany, internally and externally strong and free, under the guidance and protection of Prussia. May the things still lacking be added soon, and may those that have been accomplished be expanded and retained with the utmost care."

The momentum of the basic principle itself drove the movement onward, and even the after-effects of the July revolution were fruitful and salutary. Maassen, the new minister of finance, followed in the steps of von Motz after the lat-

ter's death. On August 29, 1831, Hesse joined the Prussian system, and a second breach had been made in the *Central-Zollverein*. On October 31, 1833, Prussia, Saxony, Thuringia, Anhalt, both Hessian districts, Bavaria and Württemberg formed the *German Zollverein*, joined later by Baden (1835), Nassau (1836), Frankfort-on-the-Main, Brunswick, Lippe-Schaumburg, Lippe-Detmold, Waldeck and other small territories. Barring Austria, the *Zollverein* comprised all the German countries, except Hanover, Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Strelitz. It extended over a territory covering 16,490 square miles, with 28,500,000 inhabitants. These were all now united in an economic sense, although still scattered and torn politically.

No wonder Austria looked with extreme disfavor upon this *Zollverein*, for not only did its own trade suffer materially, but its political importance had been greatly diminished. "Prussia undertakes now the positive leadership of Germany," writes one of Austria's statesmen, "while Austria retains nothing but the empty formalities." A French economist characterized the formation of the *Zollverein* as nothing more nor less than "the reestablishment of German unity." "What a splendid picture," this Frenchman says, "to see a great people return from the verge of dissolution to a national life!



The Death of a Patriot.
The printer, Palm, executed by Napoleon.
Painting by Joseph Weiser.

This is a fact of such importance that, were it further completed, it would constitute a new center of gravity in the balance of power in Europe."

About the time of the formation of the *Zollverein* another event took place in the world which had an incalculable influence upon all life and existence, and upon the later political union of Germany: the invention of the steam railroad. In 1826 England commenced the construction of long railroad lines, and as early as 1828 von Motz planned to unite the Rhine and the Weser by means of a railroad. The first railroad line in Germany was built in that year from Nürnberg to Fürth, in Bavaria. Friedrich List, the literary supporter of the new science of political economy, worked out a comprehensive plan for a net of railways covering all of Germany, firmly convinced that after the successful formation of the *Zollverein* it required only a new and faster means of transportation, "in order to make Germany become the chief industrial nation of Europe."

The first Prussian railroad was opened in 1838, between Düsseldorf and Erkrath, the second between Berlin and Potsdam. Great had been the astonishment of the Berliners when in 1815 the first public cabs (thirty-two of them) had been placed in service, and many discussions were

started concerning the impossibility of finding enough people to patronize these cabs. Barely twenty-five years later they witnessed with awe and misgiving the starting of the first train to Potsdam. But the surprise was boundless when it became evident that the new means of communication and transportation revolutionized all ideas of trade and industry; that both increased and prospered in a manner never even dreamed of; and that the capital of the nation had stepped from the quiet life of a "home town" into the whirl of an international market place. Fears and doubts had been voiced regarding the ability of the railroads to pay for their cost of operation, and regarding the destruction of the mail coach system; while many people called attention to the large sums invested in the great country road system which, it was feared, were lost. These anxieties soon proved groundless. The immediate future showed that with every increase in the facilities of transportation the volume of the latter increases, and that the national wealth also must proportionately increase.

Serious as the fears of the Prussian statesmen may have been, no better example of their capability can be mentioned than the formation of a code of railway laws, November 3, 1838, which required no changes or amendments during the next half century. The crown prince, in

particular, had seen at once the value of the railroads and was always urging their extension and improvement. The king, despite the natural aversion of old age against radical innovations, fully realized their importance and set aside the sum of 1,000,000 thalers in his will for the construction of a railroad line connecting the eastern part of the state with the western. The different German tribes came into closer relationship, they came to know each other better, and through increased communication soon learned to overcome and forget the silly aversions against one's neighbors which are based chiefly on ignorance. Thus the greater ease of transportation and travel did its share toward the gradual unification of the empire.

A new life, rich in its promises, was thus stirring in every nook and corner of the country as the days of Frederick William III drew to a close. His last official act was the laying of the cornerstone of the noble monument to Frederick the Great, which is admired daily by thousands and thousands of tourists in Berlin, at the head of the famous boulevard Unter den Linden. Soon afterward, on June 7, 1840, the aged king was gathered unto his fathers. He had suspected that a change of the constitution would be demanded by the people sooner or later, and one of the clauses in his last will and testament pro-

vided for a full conclave, including every member of the royal House, in case any of his successors decided to surrender some of the powers of the crown and establish a constitutional monarchy in Prussia. He could take with him into the grave the knowledge and conviction which was expressed on the day preceding his last birthday, on the occasion of the opening of the new railroad from Cologne to Belgium, in the words: "The faith of the German people rests on a firm foundation, on the inherited love and affection for king and Fatherland, and on the clear understanding of our national advantages, our national morality."

CHAPTER XI

THE FIRST YEARS UNDER FREDERICK WILLIAM IV

EVERY state, to be successful, must have the support and the confidence of the best of its citizens, for a state is the concrete product of the moral and spiritual ideas of the citizens. Moreover, it reacts upon them and affects their development. It is the duty of the state, not to satisfy the wild desires and constantly changing opinions of the various political parties, but to control and guide the growing forces and utilize the sum of the best ideas of all citizens. These ideas change continually and advance unceasingly to higher planes of spiritual and moral knowledge. However difficult, or impossible, it may be to deduce the laws of human evolution from the bare facts of history, it would be like despairing of humanity, and even the Eternal God, to deny that the human race, created in the image of God, has endeavored to grow continually more worthy of, and more like, the Almighty. We need only

think of the transition from barbarism through the intellectual paganism of Greece and Rome to Christianity. True, abominable crimes have been committed in modern times; unrestrained emotional outbursts may have attempted to distort the image of civilization, to belittle its effect; for every advance in culture represents a loss in some other direction, and of two steps which humanity takes forward one must often be retraced. But no one can deny that the spiritual knowledge of humanity has become richer and riper, and that the moral consciousness has become purer and finer.

True, when human life flows on and on, in a wider and larger stream from century to century, fed by thousands and tens of thousands of new sources of spiritual knowledge and moral regeneration, it cannot be avoided that here and there a torrential brook undermines the banks, or a flooded river overflows into the adjoining meadows. And it should be counted a great merit on the part of the Hohenzollerns that they recognized this condition and that they not only built dikes and dams to hold in check the raging waters, but that they dredged new channels for them and deepened their beds. They did not stand aside and aloof from the nation, but always worked in the front rank. Even before the people themselves had a clear knowl-

edge of their own thoughts and needs, the rulers grasped these ideas and brought them, if possible, to realization.

And this was the opinion of Frederick William IV, the new king, who now succeeded his father upon the throne. "It represents wisdom on the part of the government," he writes, "to anticipate the necessities which are created by the moral state of the ideas of the majority. Why? In order to give in advance that which later might be demanded as a concession. If you know that a flood is coming, dig or dredge a channel so that the water may run into it. If you wait with the digging until the torrent arrives, the banks of the canals will be broken and the devastation will be worse than ever. It is also sometimes possible to direct the waters into the sand, in order that the sand may absorb them."

When Frederick William IV ascended the throne of Prussia, there was naturally the hope that he would understand and fulfill the pressing demands of the times. The radical party, it is true, demanded with insolent tone and intemperate language the abolishment of the monarchy, the banishment of the rulers, the overthrow of the Church, and the equal partition of all property. Especially in Baden the radicals demanded a republic with social-democratic

principles. They published pamphlets and newspapers, and held excited meetings. Their connection with the revolutionary parties of France, Italy, Switzerland and Poland was no longer denied. There could be no question that such treasonable propaganda had to be curbed with all the force of the existing laws. But alongside of this party, or rather directly opposite, there stood the large number of the most educated and most patriotic Prussians, who now requested a constitutional assembly based on the population, and, with still greater insistence, a united and firm administration for the whole empire. They confidently expected that the new ruler, whose vivacious character and generous soft heart were well known, would grant to the nation a participation in the affairs of the state, and a voice in the German empire.

At the very opening of his reign, Frederick William IV captured the hearts of the whole German nation by his upholding of German honor. Thiers, the new prime minister of France, declared that the treaty of the three eastern powers with England, for the protection of Turkey against the viceroy of Egypt, signed on July 15, was an insult to France, and there was started in the latter country a wild clamor for war and for the Rhine as a frontier. At this, the German nation arose in its full power, ready

once more for the clash with France which Paris threatened. "They shall never, never have it—the free, the German Rhine!" Frederick William IV shared the feeling of the patriots, and in order to strengthen the bonds of friendship with Austria he even declared his readiness to defend the Italian possessions of the Austrian crown—to the great surprise of Metternich. The king ordered General von Grolmann and Colonel von Radowitz to prepare plans for the expected French campaign. The danger of war was fortunately averted by the appointment of Guizot in place of Thiers as the leader of the ministry in France.

In the meantime King Frederick William took steps in internal affairs which encouraged the people in their greatest hopes. The commission appointed to investigate the demagogic disorders was dissolved, and a general amnesty for all political offenders was announced; Arndt was restored to office and Jahn received once more the freedom to choose his residence where he pleased. Boyen was recalled to office and given a seat in the *Staatsrat*; and the censorship of the press was relaxed as much as was possible in connection with the federal regulations. The insurgent archbishops of Posen and Cologne were released from prison, and a special Catholic division was established in the ministry of

education. These last steps caused grave deliberations, but they served to fill the Catholics with new confidence in the government. The reopening of negotiations with Rome, particularly in connection with the problem of mixed marriages, gave promises of restoring the state-Church rights in a firm, orderly manner.

The highest expectations were raised by the solemn speeches delivered by the king on the occasion of the coronation at Königsberg and in Berlin. In lofty and enthusiastic words he declared his burning love for the German and the Prussian Fatherland, his confidence and faith in the people, and his honest, unconditional surrender to the welfare of the state. The people, in their enthusiasm, overlooked the fact that he gave no definite political promise of any kind. "God bless our dear country!" the king cried in the great assembly in Königsberg, under the open sky. "Its existence has been a source of envy, and often futile imitation. We possess unity between head and members, ruler and people, and an all-embracing splendid unity in the endeavor to reach the great goal of general welfare, in sacred faith and true genuine honor. From this spirit there has arisen that veracity which is without an equal today. May God preserve our Prussian people to Germany and to the world, diverse and yet one—like the precious

metal 'bronze,' which, although cast from many different baser metals, represents a single combination that knows no other rust than the ennobling, beautifying influence of the centuries."

In Berlin, where the provincial estates assembled to render homage to the new ruler, he said, also under the open sky, through a pouring dismal rain: "It shall be my particular aim to maintain the Fatherland in the position to which it has been elevated in the course of a history which stands without a parallel, and in which it has become a shield for the protection of peace and safety in Germany. In all regards I shall try to govern in such a manner as to make all people recognize in me the son of my memorable father and never-to-be-forgotten mother. But the paths of kings are tearful, when the heart and spirit of their people refuse to assist them with a ready, helping hand." For this reason, he said, he wished to ask of his nobles, citizens and country folk the grave question, which in his enthusiasm and love for the glorious country and his faith in his true and loving people, seemed uppermost in his mind: "Will you help me, with your heart and your brain, with word and deed and concentrated effort, in the sacred faithfulness of Germans and the still more faithful love of Christians, to preserve and maintain Prussia as it must and should be main-

tained if it would not succumb? Will you help me to develop still further those qualities through which Prussia has risen to equality with the other great powers of the earth—honor, truth, faithfulness, a yearning for light and truth, development in the wisdom of age while still retaining the power and spirit of youth?"

A "Yes" from thousands of throats answered the king, and this "yes" the king accepted as the promise of mutual love and faith between himself and his people, a promise which, he declared, "gave him courage, strength and comfort, and which he would not forget until his hour of death." The sentimental people listening to him were deeply touched. His words reached sympathetic heartstrings which they caused to vibrate in unison. The events in Königsberg also brought general satisfaction and applause. Only a few more thoughtful heads looked deeper into the matter, finding little reason to be greatly encouraged.

It was not long before the enthusiasm of the people themselves subsided considerably. When the king was asked by the unanimous vote of the Prussian provincial estates to issue a written constitution, he gave an evasive answer in which some professed to see a definite promise. This idea annoyed the king, who had not intended a promise; and in order to correct the erroneous

impression he issued a cabinet order on October 4, 1840, addressed to the minister von Rochow. In this he declared he wished to "oppose emphatically the idea of his having given his consent to the request for a constitutional programme along the lines of the promise made on May 22, 1815, which had been handed to him by the assembled delegates from the provincial estates." He was just as cautious when his attention was called to the pamphlet of President von Schön, *Whence and Where?* in which he justified the request of the estates. As for the pamphlet of Dr. Jacoby, *Four Questions of an East Prussian*, in which the doctor claimed the establishment of the *Reichsstände* as a "proven right," the king turned the offending document over to the prosecuting attorney for action.

The king refused to listen to the Breslau magistrate who asked for the freedom of the press and the establishment of the *Reichsstände*; and this action wrecked at one stroke all hope of his granting the similar petitions from the provincial estates of Posen and the Rhineland. On the other hand, it must be admitted that other provincial estates, especially those of Brandenburg and Pomerania, warned the people of the destructive ideas of the times. Thus there was disclosed a deep-lying difference in opinion concerning the fundamental views of a state.

Under these confused conditions, one can easily understand the doubts of many of the ministers and generals as to whether an administration continued along the former lines could hope to unite the nation, or keep it united, without the establishment and active assistance of the *Reichsstände*. The differences between the various provinces apparently could only be met and conquered by the assembling of a general representative congress. Moreover, the immediate needs of the state required such a step. How else could the state place the loan which was necessary for the construction of the railway joining the center with East Prussia, when the law of January 17, 1820, distinctly stated that such a loan could only be issued with the consent of the *Reichsstände*?

The king, however, was at heart opposed to granting any constitutional rights. It was impossible for him, in his friendship for Russia and Austria, to think favorably of a system which these two states opposed so vigorously, a principle whose beginning, according to his own opinion, lay in the revolution, and whose acceptance he thought must lead to further revolutions. How could he be expected to expose the firm construction of the Prussian state to influences which in France, in England, in Belgium and in the South German states had cre-

ated such dangerous conditions? Frederick William IV never had the slightest intention of thus strengthening the power of opposition against himself. He was thoroughly convinced that he was working in the best interests of the state, and that he was meeting all reasonable desires, if he developed and strengthened the provincial administrative constitution, in the creation of which he had taken such an important part.

As early as February, 1841, he began his work on the provincial estates. Under the impression that the innovation would bring a more lively and interested participation, he ordered that the estates be chosen and assembled anew every two years, and that their deliberations receive a certain, though small, degree of publicity. He furthermore planned the assembling of the several provincial estates in a general *Landtag* (congress), which he would announce according to the needs of the times and his own opinion. He also desired the formation of committees which would administer affairs relating to the state debt and which would give their consent to the necessary railroad loan. Metternich warned the king emphatically not to assemble a general *Landtag*, for the delegates would arrive as representatives of the provincial estates and would disperse as members of the *Reichsstände!*

Committees of the various estates assembled on October 18, 1842, but in their limited and modest rôle they expressed neither the wishes of the people nor the requirements of the government. They declined to give their consent to the issuing of the loan, on the plea that such action exceeded their powers, and even the king could not help but admit that the *Reichsstände* alone had the right to do this. In dismissing the delegates, the king said they had "acted entirely in his sense," that is, "they had been delegates and representatives of their estates and their rights and also advisers to the crown, and had not been representatives of the winds of passing opinions and the ideas of the day." But by this action he had again established the feeling of opposition between the government and the estates. He had also greatly underestimated the strength of public opinion and the virility of the national ideas and conceptions. The cry for the *Reichsstände* now found an echo in all classes of the population, and the idea of a national Germany, of a complete revision of the federal constitution, entered into all the growing thought of the people.

Not only the journalists and writers in the daily press, but all the leading men of the professions and sciences, the nobility and the bourgeoisie, demanded the premier position in the

empire for Prussia, and the revision of the Prussian system of government in a constitutional manner. In the Königsberg *Landtag* it was the *Oberstburggraf* von Brünneck, the brothers Auerswald; the vice marshal of the *Landtag*, von Saucken-Tarputschen, Landrat von Bardeleben, and others, who demanded the constitution. Later it was the Pomeranian nobleman von Bülow-Cummerow, who in his pamphlet, *Prussia, its Administration, Constitution and its Relation to the German Empire*, declared that Prussia's most urgent problem was to rearrange its provincial estates in a more compact representative assembly which possessed more comprehensive rights and privileges, to form a closer union with the central states, and to exclude Austria from all participation in the affairs of Germany.

The opposition of the estates soon became so pronounced and strong that the government was no longer equal to resisting it. The representation of the government in the provincial estates was very small and insufficient, hence the differences of opinion prevailing between the estates and the government could not be clarified or smoothed over by proper and careful debates. A new cause for friction also arose from the proposal of the king to add another class to the three main estates (nobility, citizens and peas-

ants), calling it the *Herrenkurie*, which was to consist of the mediatized rulers and the members of the various governing houses, of whom there were but very few among the Prussian nobility. The latter had paid with their blood and property for Prussia's rise and given freely of everything in support of king and country, while the majority of the mediatized rulers had not been added to Prussia until 1815, and had therefore not had an opportunity to show their fealty toward the state.

Outside the estates, the complaints over the painful disillusionment penetrated into wider circles and grew more bitter from day to day. The periodical press, the newspapers, pamphlets and poems, expressed more and more openly and vigorously the thoughts of the people regarding the demolishing of their first hopes; and even the more vigorous censorship could not stop the gradual spread of the wishes, hopes and endeavors. In all the meetings of scientific men, speakers freely talked about them; and directly under the eyes of the king, in the Berlin University, August Boeckh, professor of philology, admonished the students to prepare themselves for the day of freedom.

In addition to all these general causes of discontent, there should be mentioned the peculiar relationship of the Churches. The great collec-

tions taken up for the construction of the Cologne Cathedral had brought together the Catholics and Protestants, and the king had celebrated the laying of the cornerstone on September 4, 1842, by a speech in which he referred to this work as a sign of the unity of the empire and the peaceful and cordial relations between the two confessions. But while the king clung to the principle expressed by him at the time of his ascension to the throne, "I and my House will serve the Lord," and repeatedly declared his full belief in the biblical truths, the people began to accuse him of favoring the Catholics and of attempting to oppress the freedom of conscience. His marriage with the Catholic princess Elizabeth of Bavaria (1823) had antagonized many people, and although the then crown princess turned Protestant about six years later, this could not eliminate all the doubts and misgivings of her subjects. The small parishes of old-style Lutherans, who remained aloof from the union of the two Protestant churches, were treated so carefully and generously that the people in general began to doubt the maintenance of the union. After a visit to England, in connection with the discussion of Oriental problems, the king made great efforts to establish a Protestant bishopric in Jerusalem, and it was stated openly that the king contem-

plated changing the constitution of the Protestant Church into an episcopal one. He had granted to the Catholic Church a separate department in the ministry of education and had yielded in the question of mixed marriages, and the direct intercourse of the bishops with the papal headquarters at Rome. This Church was now conducting a vigorous propaganda which the Protestants attempted to combat by the formation of the Gustav-Adolph society. The liberal teachings in both Churches—by Professor Hermes in the Catholic and David Strauss and Bruno Bauer in the Protestant—were suppressed; but the reactionary forces in the Catholic Church were permitted to show their full power in the solemn exhibition of the “Sacred Coat” at Trèves. The extravagant claims concerning the miraculous healing power of the “Sacred Coat” scandalized even Catholics. Dissensions arose between the two extremes of their Church; and the German-Catholics, under the guidance of Ronge and Czerski, branched off from the Church of Rome. At the same time the “Friends of Light” quit the Protestant faith under the leadership of Pastor Ulrich and Professor Wislicenus. The two new sects only increased the general dissatisfaction; for they were unable themselves to establish a new confession or Church because of their accen-

tuation of the dogma of reasoning, negative criticism.

L. Feuerbach went much further than that, for he absolutely and categorically denied the existence of a hereafter, and his atheistic ideas fitted well into the social-democratic teachings and into the transformation of political freedom into socialistic abandon which was being preached everywhere by the German radicals, such as Rüge, Robert Blum and others, under the influence of the Frenchmen (St. Simon, Proudhon, Ledru Rollin and Le Blanc). French and Swiss pamphlets, thousands of leaflets, some of them even from the United States of America, and cartoons of all kinds, contributed to call the attention of the people to the poor population in Silesia, the Ore Mountains and the Voigtland. These pamphlets represented the rising power of capital as an immoral one, which could only be demolished by the expulsion of the detestable ruling "despots," and the establishment of a republic.

CHAPTER XII

EVENTS LEADING TO THE REVOLUTION OF 1848

UNREST stirred in all the fields—political, clerical, religious—and social differences agitated the people. The demand for liberty was everywhere. The old enthusiasm for the Poles received new support in the arrest of the leading Polish agitator, Mierolawski, who had planned a general Polish insurrection in 1846. No one seemed to mind the fact that the republic of Cracow was forcibly annihilated and had been incorporated in the Austrian monarchy, thereby dealing a severe blow to the German trade; but the fact that the “beloved” Poles were unsuccessful in their insurrection stirred the masses to a frenzy of bitterness. The derision and abominable insults which the Poles in their own section, despite the leniency of the Prussian government, had heaped upon all the Germans, were forgotten and disappeared behind the nimbus with which the people surrounded all insurgents. The abominable treat-

ment of the nobility in Galicia by Austria, where the government stood inactive while the Ruthenian peasants calmly murdered the majority of the Polish nobility, passed unnoted.

Finally, the enthusiasm for national freedom chose a worthy object, the liberation of the Schleswig-Holstein dukedoms. The German ruling House which governed them and also governed the kingdom of Denmark in a so-called "personal union" was on the point of dying out. In this circumstance there lay a hope that at last the attempts of the Danes to "assimilate" this German territory would cease; for the dukedoms would come under the rule of the male descendant, the duke of Augustenburg, while the kingdom would remain under the sovereignty of the daughter of the king. The famous "Salic law," forbidding females to inherit, did not apply to Denmark, but did apply to Schleswig-Holstein. But King Christian VIII issued an "open letter" in 1846, in which, despite the fact that Schleswig was "indissolubly connected" with Holstein, he decreed the complete absorption of Schleswig by Denmark. This high-handed action on the part of Denmark constituted nothing more nor less than a deliberate insult of the whole empire; and without a dissenting voice, the German patriots raised a vigorous protest.

We shall see presently how deeply involved Prussia was in this matter; but at first Berlin was too much occupied with its own difficulties and troubles to intervene. The king had turned over his plan for the extension and development of the constitution of the estates to Count Arnim-Boytzenburg, and had discussed with him the question of assembling a general *Landtag*. The king was willing to grant to this assembly the right of voting on propositions involving taxation or loans, but this privilege was to be exercised only by committees which were to work in conjunction with the administration of the public debt. There seemed to be a fear in the mind of the king that otherwise the privilege might be used to hamper the granting of loans in times of war. Count Arnim opposed the plan vigorously, pointing out to the king that such committees were not in accordance with the law of 1820; he also demanded that the general assembly be convened every fourth year, and that it be composed of two sections, an upper and lower house. He declared that the king's idea of forming in the assemblies a fourth class of royal princes, the *Herrenkurie*, could only result in the formation of two antagonistic parties: on one side the *Herren* and the nobility, and on the other the citizens and peasants. To establish a representative system solely on the

basis of number of people was not the intention of Count Arnim, but even his ideas were so strongly opposed to the opinions of the king that, in the summer of 1845, he found it advisable to resign his post. The king now turned over the discussion of his general plan to the ministers von Bodelschwingh, Savigny, Uhden, Canitz, and the court marshal von Rochow. This commission, too, had grave doubts as to the feasibility of the plan, and the chief criticism was again that of the *Herrenkurie*, practically siding with Count Arnim. Court Marshal von Rochow pointed out, as had been shown in the provincial assemblies, that no matter what sort of representation was decided upon for the new *Landtag*, it would certainly absorb many of the privileges and sovereignties of the crown. And the main objection was again the question of financial administration. Nearly all the members of the commission seemed to take for granted that in case of war, should there be any dearth of funds, the government could not obtain them by means of loans, except it assembled the promised *Reichsstände*. On the other hand, it appeared reasonable to argue that the law of 1820 provided for this emergency also, without the convening of the *Reichsstände*. On March 11, 1846, this commission met in Berlin, the ministers of the state being present, with the king's brother,

Prince William of Prussia, the future Emperor William, in the president's chair.

Until that time Prince William had fulfilled his military duties and obligations, and had devoted much of his time to the education of his children, Prince Frederick William and Princess Luise, in which he was ably assisted by his wife, Princess Augusta. Because of the fact that the marriage between the king and Princess Elizabeth of Bavaria had remained childless, Prince William of Prussia was the heir presumptive. This position carried with it the duty to become familiar with all the branches of administration, and it was enhanced still further by the last will and testament of King Frederick William III, in which he admonished all the princes of the royal House, and especially those in line of succession, to take counsel together on all matters pertaining to changes in the constitution which might involve the loss of some of the rights and privileges of the crown. Such changes required the unanimous consent of all "agnates," that is, direct descendants who might some time become heir presumptives. No one, probably, was more deeply impressed with the importance of the moment than the prince; no one felt more strongly than he did how large a part of its absolute privileges the crown intended to surrender. He freely admitted that

he was not yet fully convinced of the necessity of the central assembly of the provincial estates, but he expressed it as his opinion that a wise government should from time to time investigate whether or not the existing institutions really expressed the ideas of the times, and whether they required a revision or amendment. Prussia had succeeded in making great progress along these lines, and the provincial estates had been established.

Perhaps it would have been possible to make these estates sufficient had the government not formerly given such far-reaching promises. The demands of the people were chiefly for greater publicity of administrative matters and a more intimate participation in them; but the promise of the king had gone further and had included the early establishment of a general central assembly. All the ministers, except von Rochow, declared that there was a general demand for a constitution. Von Bodelschwingh stated that the greatest drawback of the several provincial assemblies was that the state had no representatives in them; and that the natural consequence was that the state was actually divided and torn into eight separate and distinct administrations and was greatly in need of a common point of interest for these eight provincial assemblies.

These reasons convinced the prince; and he thereupon gave his consent to the establishment of a general *Landtag*, although he did not approve the contents of the plan submitted. "A new Prussia," he declared, "will be formed with the publication of this law. The old Prussia will die. May the new be as great and splendid as the old has been in honor and glory!" Truly, it was a tremendous decision on the part of the prince to break suddenly with all the forms which had created the state; but after he once had made the decision, he held firmly to its execution, and he it was who, in later years, brought to the new Prussia honor and glory such as it had never known before.

On February 3, 1847, the law was published, which called the provincial estates to a general *Landtag* on April 11, and which gave three regulations regarding its constitution. But the king was grievously mistaken when he called attention to the date of the order (February 3, the date of the famous appeal *To My People* by Frederick William III in 1813) and expressed his hope of seeing in this new regulation the beginning of a new epoch, in which the full confidence of the people would conquer the busy enemies who desired to force themselves between the king and his people, enemies who would change dissension to weakness, and weak-

ness to revolution, and erect on the ruins a country of godlessness, lawlessness and disorder.

The people were greatly disappointed when the text of the order became known, for the least that had been expected was a regular recurrence of the assembly, and its participation in the general plan of legislation. It was found that the first of these demands had been denied and the second had been limited to the discussion and voting on new taxes and loans. All other revenues of the state by direct and indirect taxation, all expenses and the entire legislative programme, were excluded from discussion in the *Landtag*, while the privileges of deciding on petitions and resolutions were restricted by the formation of the *Herrenkurie*, with its separate sittings, and by the conditions of a two-thirds majority vote on all bills.

The joy and enthusiasm which the king had expected to create with his work remained conspicuous by their absence. On the contrary, exclamations of discontent and displeasure arrived from all sides. The provincial estates thought their privileges had been restricted, and especially in the old provinces there were many complaints regarding the preference of the *Herrenkurie* to the old nobility. Anyway, no one wanted an expansion of the established estates, but a complete revision of the constitution of the state

along parliamentary lines. Many people took the stand that these new regulations could not be considered laws, but merely projects, which ought to be submitted for decision to the provincial estates. Herr von Bülow-Cummerow criticized the new regulations in a sharp but absolutely correct pamphlet; H. Simon, a leading lawyer of Breslau, advised the provincial estates in his pamphlet, *Accept or Decline?* not to appear at all in the general *Landtag*, because they would lose by their appearance all their previous labors for a new constitution. The more liberal circles among the people, however, did not wish to go so far as that, for they expected to present in the *Landtag* their demands for a fulfillment of the promises of 1815, and the law of 1820. To soften the dissatisfaction, the government met the general desires halfway by proclaiming several liberal laws. These permitted the quitting of the state Church without loss of citizens' rights; established public courts of justice, in both criminal and civil actions; and established chambers of commerce and commerce courts.

At the opening of the promised general *Landtag*, on April 11, 1847, in the White Salon of the Berlin palace, the king made an eloquent speech. In it, however, he destroyed at one blow any hopes for a parliamentary revision of the consti-

tution which the delegates may have had. "No power on earth," exclaimed the king, "shall induce me to change the natural relation between ruler and people into a conventional, constitutional form. And never shall I permit that a written piece of paper should interfere and intervene between our Lord in heaven and this country, to govern us with its paragraphs and replace the old sacred faithfulness." Again he said, speaking to the delegates from the estates, that "they were German estates in the old accepted sense; that is to say, before all they were representatives and guardians of their own rights, the rights of the provincial estates, by whose confidence they had been sent to this assembly."

The opinions of the various delegates, however, were entirely different, and because of this difference of opinion the *Landtag* took a course which was directly opposed to the ideas of the king. Even the first discussion concerning the answer of the *Landtag* to the speech of the king brought out the opposition in full force. It was with the greatest difficulty that an adjustment was reached between the plan of the commission and that of Count Arnim. But if the king had attempted to represent in his opening speech the new regulation as a completion of the legislation of 1820, the men of the opposition, such as Count Schwerin and Count von Auerswald, and even

Count Arnim, pointed out the insufficiencies of the new law, declaring that the promised and deserved rights and privileges had not been given. The final result was that the answer to the opening speech did not contain a direct demand, but that it simply expressed the hope that the king would realize the justice of the representatives' objections, and would, in his wisdom, find a way to satisfy them. The monarch was deeply grieved to find that where he had thought to grant rights and privileges, demands were made on him, and he emphasized in his reply that he did not recognize any other rights than those mentioned in his order. At the same time, however, he still maintained that the present constitution was capable of further development and he agreed to assemble the *Landtag* again within four years.

This promise by no means satisfied the clamorous representatives. New resolutions were submitted in the *Landtag*, demanding an extension of the constitution; a regular general assembly every two years; free discussion of contemplated new laws; a vote in all matters pertaining to the public debt and to loans, without which the latter would not be legal; collaboration in all laws pertaining to taxation, and control of the other revenues of the state; the abolishment of the special committees and commis-

sions; and other innovations. All of these resolutions were passed with great majorities. Far more significant and important, because of immediate practical influence, was the refusal of the *Landtag* to pass the royal plans for a new income tax, a state guarantee for the small country banks intended to lighten the burden of the peasants, and the railroad loan. As long as the *Landtag* did not possess the rights of the suggested *Reichsstände*, especially control of the state budget, the delegates declared that they did not consider themselves legally entitled to vote on matters which by law should be decided by the *Reichsstände*. Only a very few men dared at that time to defend the crown, but among them was the Landrat von Manteuffel and the delegate of the nobility from Jericho county, Otto von Bismarck-Schönhausen.

If the discussion of these plans had brought forth questions of conscience among the delegates, the matter was still worse when the elections for the various committees took place. None of the delegates wanted to see these committees established; for it seemed a foregone conclusion that these committees would try to assert the rights and privileges of the general *Landtag* as well as the united provincial estates, and that hence they would probably be considered as good as the promised *Reichsstände*. They

would either have to remain dependent upon the government and become its tools, or else, if they succeeded in utilizing certain weaknesses of the government by skillful advances, would become a decidedly objectionable controlling power and even a kind of coördinated government. The election itself finally took place, with 58 delegates refusing to cast their vote and 158 voting under the distinct condition and with the understanding that the committees should not be entitled to exercise the rights of the plenum. One of the Rhenish delegates, elected to one of the committees, declared frankly that he would accept the honor but would see to it that nothing was decided or undertaken by his committee which would in any way interfere with the rights of the *Landtag*. The majority of the Brandenburg delegates announced "they did not take part in the election because of their satisfaction with the plan, or because the plan was in full accord with their own consciences, but solely from a sense of obedience to the express order of the king, and in the full confidence and belief in the promised extension of the general constitution."

"I only endeavor," Frederick William IV had said in his opening speech, "to fulfill my duty according to the best of my knowledge and conscience, and to deserve the thanks of my people

—even though I should never receive them!” And despite the sharp opposition, all the delegates realized that the action of the king was dictated solely by his sense of duty. He had placed all his thoughts and actions at the service of the country. None the less, as a natural consequence of the dispute, the chief applause fell to the lot of the leaders of the opposition, such as Count Schwerin, Alfred von Auerswald, Georg von Vincke, Camphausen, von Beckerath, Hansemann. This *Landtag* showed none of the excesses of the South German assemblies, but continued to act in a manner which seemed suitable to a people who had always received the necessary reforms from the crown before they had found time to realize their necessity.

Yet, because of this very calmness of the *Landtag*, it was a fatal mistake to deny these most earnest desires, these most serious endeavors of the nation. The hopes which the people had held, of a modern constitutional Prussian monarchy and a greater power in Germany's affairs, shrank in an appalling manner. The discontent became still more ominous, because of the new revolutionary movements in Switzerland, Italy, France and even Austria, which would certainly react upon Prussia in the same manner as the July revolution in 1830. The former hopes of the German patriots, to find

in Prussia the champion of their rights, changed to a flood of gibes and insults, as if all chance now was lost to see Prussia in the rôle of a creator of German unity. And the unity of Germany appeared more important than the different views concerning the reforms in the administration. The people wanted, above all things, to be German, no matter whether the Germany of their dreams was as liberal and constitutional as they hoped. This view was vigorously defended by the *Deutsche Zeitung* in Heidelberg, edited by Gervinus and Häusser, and owned by the historians Johann Gustav Droysen and Georg Waitz, and the lawyer Georg Beseler. While the radicals under von Struve demanded categorically a social-democratic reform, the liberals discussed the creation of a general parliament of the *Zollverein*, or, better still, the establishment of a German parliament, in addition to the *Bundestag*. The plan for a German parliament was finally adopted as the best upon which to concentrate effort. Bassermann offered a resolution to that effect in the Baden assembly, Heinrich von Gagern in the Darmstadt assembly; and all Germany applauded the suggestion with unbounded enthusiasm.

CHAPTER XIII

THE REVOLUTION AND THE NEW PARLIAMENT

THOUGH the *Landtag* was, as we have seen, in direct disagreement with King Frederick William IV as regards its own nature and its powers, yet it continued its sessions in Berlin, and the committees carried on their deliberations throughout 1847. In the first week of March, 1848, the discussions concerning the new criminal code had begun. Suddenly, on March 7, the king dismissed the *Landtag*, with the promise of recalling it periodically and of restricting the privileges of the committees. This complaisance no longer satisfied the constitutional enthusiasts. The revolution had just broken out in Paris (February 28); and in all the central and smaller German states liberal ministries were forced into power, the so-called March cabinets. Fifty-one influential and representative men assembled in Heidelberg and declared their unanimous and emphatic demand for a new German parliament. Naturally, however,

there was a wide difference in their opinion as to details. Some asked a German republic, others a reëstablishment of the imperial crown of Germany. A committee of seven men was appointed to discuss the matter of a general mass meeting, later called *Vorparlament* (advance parliament).

The committee issued invitations to all the members and delegates of the Prussian and German provincial estates to meet at Frankfort on March 30. Heinrich von Gagern and his brother Max, filled with the idea that a parliament could not exist without a government, succeeded in winning the consent of the Baden, Württemberg and Saxon governments for a temporary central administration. The king of Württemberg declared that Prussia could have the leadership, provided it would recognize the constitutional parliamentary system. Delegates of the governments were to go to Berlin to carry the programme into execution. The demand was for a single leader at the head of all Germany, with responsible ministers, a senate of the individual states and a house of representatives with one member for every 70,000 inhabitants.

As a matter of fact, King Frederick William IV had already dispatched General von Radowitz to Vienna with a plan for the complete revision of the federal constitution. Metternich, under the influence of the serious news from

Paris, hesitated to deny the proposed strengthening of the military power and the federal privileges of legislating for trade, commerce, customs and transportation. The result was that the various German governments were invited to meet in general conference in Dresden on March 25.

In the short week that elapsed, events moved with lightning rapidity. A revolution broke out in Vienna, Metternich was forced from power (March 13), and the state conference was compelled to grant an Austrian constitution. King Frederick William was forced to see the principality of Neuenburg secede from Prussia, and to witness with his own eyes tumultuous mass meetings, almost directly under the windows of his palace, while from all parts of the provinces news came of troubles and disorders. Riots occurred continually in the streets of Berlin; wild speeches for freedom and liberty were made at every corner; and only by using the garrison of the capital was the king able to prevent an actual revolution. On the 8th of March the king promised a greater freedom for the press, and on the 14th he reconvened the general *Landtag* for April 27. In the meantime great masses of Poles and Rhinelanders had flocked to Berlin in the anticipation of a real revolution, and under their inciting influence the riots became worse

every day. On the 15th of March barricades appeared here and there, and a few pitched battles between the garrison and the people were fought. Just before midnight on March 17-18 the king signed an order which granted a parliamentary constitution, freedom of the press, and a full reform of the German federal constitution, while the *Landtag* was convened for April 2.

These promises were received by the people with signs of the wildest joy, and thousands upon thousands assembled before the palace, shouting "Hurrah" for the king. But this turn in the events did not suit the radical branch of the agitators, incited to more violence by the mass of laborers and the strangers who had flocked to the capital. A huge crowd of workmen, half-grown boys, salesmen, students, and all the tramps and vagabonds in the city, broke into yells of derision, and demanded the immediate dispersing of the military. They threatened to storm the palace and surged toward the sentinels at the gates.

On the evening of March 18, the king, looking from the windows upon the turbulent mass, ordered the officer in charge to clear a space directly in front of the gate. While this order was being executed, a workman struck the rifle of one of the sergeants with a club and it went off

into the air; at about the same time another soldier stumbled and his rifle went off. No one was hit, but the two shots unloosed the worst passions in the crowd. The great mass of the people of Berlin were quietly at home, or were watching anxiously from afar the tumults in front of the palace. As if by magic, barricades were thrown up in all parts of the city. Crowds rushed through the streets, yelling: "They are killing us! Treason! Treason! They are murdering innocent people!" Calmer minds caused a huge white flag, bearing the word *Missverständniss* (Misunderstanding), to be carried through the streets, but it was in vain. The long-expected, greatly feared revolution had broken out at last!

Completely crushed and terrified by the catastrophe, the king could only, after long and urgent appeals from his suite, be brought to give an order to Commanding General von Prittwitz, to "clear the streets around the palace." The 12,000 soldiers under the general accomplished the task quickly; and by midnight the king was able to give the restraining order not to advance any farther against the mob. The whole series of events had taken place in a scant three hours. During the same night the king wrote a proclamation, addressed to his "Loving Berliners," promising the immediate

withdrawal of the troops if the barricades were demolished. The king even extended this promise, against the urgent advice of Prince William and General von Prittwitz, when deputations from the citizens told him frankly in the morning that no barricades would be demolished until after the military had been withdrawn. Bodelschwingh was ordered by the king to tell the deputation that the military would be withdrawn from the streets, but would keep possession of the largest public buildings; and the anger of the prince of Prussia over what he considered a deplorable weakness did not change the situation. The troops were actually withdrawn into their barracks, and some of them even left the city, under the gibes and insults of the mob. Berlin was left in the hands of the most reckless and ignorant of her people.

The greatest fury of the mob was directed against Prince William, whom the king dispatched at once on a mission to London—for his personal safety! A new cabinet was formed under the presidency of Count Arnim-Boytzenburg, composed chiefly of the more moderate leaders of the opposition in the *Landtag*, like Count Schwerin, Auerswald, Camphausen and Freiherr Heinrich von Arnim. The latter took the portfolio of foreign affairs. But all this

yielding seemed of no avail. The promises of the citizens' deputation to restore and maintain order was worthless; and the newly formed municipal guard could not protect the king from the most vituperative insults. The bodies of those who had been killed in the fights over the barricades during the night were carried into the court of the royal palace; and the king and queen were compelled to appear and to remain bareheaded before the line of bodies, while furious speeches and solemn sermons were hurled against every form of royalty.

Freiherr von Arnim hoped to force a change in public sentiment by directing the eyes of the whole people to the situation in the German empire. He distributed early in the morning of the 21st of March large posters throughout the city of Berlin, headed *An die Deutsche Nation* (To the German Nation). In these he declared that the closest relationship between the peoples and the rulers was the only salvation from the present great peril. The king, who "had placed himself at the head of the United Fatherland in order to save it," was hailed as "the constitutional ruler, the new king of the free and regenerated German nation"; and the maxim was expressed that "Prussia henceforth is a part of Germany." Surrounded by his ministers and generals, preceded by the black-red-gold ban-

ners, King Frederick William IV actually rode through the streets of Berlin, as stated in the poster, and promised repeatedly, while stopping to address the people, to restore Germany's liberty, order and unity. Shouts which referred to him as the "German emperor" he ignored absolutely. In a second proclamation he promised the assembling of a general German convention of the estates, in connection with the *Landtag*, which general assembly was to discuss ways and means for defending the country against external attacks, for introducing a constitutional parliament, and for the regeneration and foundation of the new German empire.

Even now, however, the king was not safe from the mobs. When the bodies of those that had been killed in the night of March 18 were carried to the great cemetery in the *Friedrichshain*, near Berlin, the long cortège was directed past the royal palace; and the king had to step out on the balcony, remaining bareheaded until the last of the coffins had passed. "We crawled, all of us, on our stomachs at that time," the king admitted afterward.

A veritable flood of attacks, insults and sarcastic remarks now swept in from all the world to fall upon the head of King Frederick William IV. Newspapers and periodicals in Germany, as well as in foreign countries, berated him

mercilessly for having first given orders to shoot into the people, and having then yielded to grant each and every demand. It was difficult indeed to fight against such accusations. The promise which the king gave to a Polish deputation, to reorganize their province, did not help the situation, although the requests of the most radical of the opposition were thereby fulfilled. On the contrary, a revolution took place in the province of Posen, in which the Poles attacked with the utmost cruelty all the German-born inhabitants. This uprising was not under control until May 9.

The king, meanwhile, took up another question with great vigor, that concerning the Schleswig-Holstein succession. He hoped in this way to reestablish the respect with which Prussia had been treated in the empire. King Frederick VII, of Denmark, as related before, had decreed the immediate incorporation of Schleswig in the state of Denmark, despite the old law forbidding a separation of the two countries, Schleswig and Holstein. The inhabitants of Schleswig-Holstein fought this violation of their rights with all their power and occupied the fortress of Rendsburg. Frederick William IV recognized their demands for an independent, united existence under the leadership of the prince of Augustenburg, and sent troops on

April 10 into the disturbed country. The Prussian troops were reënforced by order of the *Bundestag* by troops from Hanover and Brunswick. On April 29 the Prussians under General von Wrangel stormed the Danewerk, and on May 1 they crossed the Danish frontier into Jütland. This undoubtedly legal and correct proceeding of the troops drew little attention at the time, but was destined to have the most far-reaching consequences for Prussia.

The kingdom was not able, as events served to show, to recover at once from the severe blow to its prestige caused by the Berlin uprising. Time was necessary to reestablish the old esteem in which it had been held throughout Germany. Hence the new German parliament, which according to the deliberations of the "advance parliament," and with the specific consent of the *Bundesrät* and the separate governments, met in the Church of St. Paul at Frankfort-on-the-Main, on May 18, 1848, had to forego the idea of a Prussian head. The *Bundesrat*, also, when the plan of Dahlmann came up for discussion—suggesting the establishment of the old German empire under the Hohenzollern—simply shelved it. Duke Ernst of Coburg and his brother, the prince consort of England, condemned the idea as "bad and impractical." Yet this Dahlmann project, backed by a committee of seventeen,

was a masterpiece of clarity, strength and brevity; a project which, as Prince William of Prussia pointed out, had sprung from a genuine and true German heart and which deserved the recognition and thanks of the entire Fatherland.

Frederick William himself was far from pleased with the idea of becoming emperor of Germany. He still wished to turn over that honor to the emperor of Austria, as hereditary "honored head of the German nation"; while he himself preferred the modest rôle of a German king, crowned in Frankfort, or of an imperial archduke-commander-in-chief under Austria. The expulsion of Austria from the empire, which larger and wider circles of patriots considered necessary, he declined to consider. It even came to the point where the duke of Coburg, a German prince, demanded the abolishment of the standing army and the nobility, and a reorganization of the whole state on the model of the United States of America. Under these circumstances it is clear why the Frankfort parliament, after many debates, conceived the idea of electing Archduke John of Austria as *Reichsverweser* (imperial administrator, or vice regent), in order to have some sort of central authority. Archduke John had married a bourgeois girl. For this reason, as well as for an alleged toast which he is reported to have offered

one day, "No Prussia, no Austria: a United Germany!" the people had taken a personal fancy to him. By electing him the parliament also defeated the aims of the radicals, who wanted a republic, and the social-democrats, who demanded a "many-headed" central administration. John was elected on May 29, and took the oath in the general assembly to recognize and defend the law which would provide for the establishment of a temporary central authority. Immediately afterward he induced the *Bundesrat*, through President von Schmerling of Austria, to turn over to him all its rights and privileges—although the law which he had just sworn to suspended the *Bundesrat*. Shortly after he formed a *Reichs-cabinet*, and his recognition in office by the various German and foreign governments followed. But in nearly all the states the troops refused the oath of allegiance to him; they would not even obey him. The Prussian order was: "The troops will obey the new *Reichsverweser*, when their king places them under his command!"

The longing for German unity among the delegates to the Frankfort parliament was so strong that they were glad to have achieved something, although it was a sorry and unhappy institution. Their own position in the parliament was still so insecure that they could not

undertake at once the discussion of the new constitution, but had to enter into a long, weary dispute of five months regarding the so-called "fundamental and basic rights" which the republicans persisted in bringing to the front.

In the meantime the united *Landtag* had met in Berlin, there to give its consent to the introduction of a new election law, with universal voting privileges, worked out by the Camphausen cabinet. Immediately after passing this law, the *Landtag* dissolved, to make room for the new national assembly, created under the new election law. This assembly met for the first time on May 22, 1848, in Berlin, to discuss the introduction of a constitution for the kingdom of Prussia. Unfortunately it had neither the moderate and capable members of the old *Landtag*, nor of the Frankfort parliament, so that it was not equal to the task. One of the projected plans for a constitution, built by Camphausen along the lines of the extremely liberal Belgian constitution, was rejected by the assembly without discussion, simply because it provided for an upper house. The assembly appointed a commission under Waldeck to work out another plan. Despite the fact that the radical party thus held the upper hand in the assembly, its actions were not radical enough to suit the mob. The street crowds howled and shrieked when

the delegates left the building, insulting and hissing the liberals and conservatives, and on several occasions barely missing hand-to-hand encounters with them. The municipal guard was unable to give the delegates a real protection, and was still less capable of curbing the mob which grew worse and worse. On June 14 the mad crowd stormed the big Berlin arsenal (*Zeughaus*).

The economic situation naturally suffered greatly under the influence of the disturbances. No merchant dared to make contracts. The Danish fleet blockaded the Baltic ports because of the Schleswig-Holstein quarrel and caused enormous damage to Prussian trade. It was impossible to do anything because Prussia had no fleet of her own. Popular sentiment became less and less favorably disposed toward the national assembly, and the king was furious over its incompetency and its makeshift work in the matter of working out a constitution. He finally formed a new cabinet under the leadership of Rudolf von Auerswald.

A conflict between the soldiers and citizens in Schweidnitz induced the assembly to pass a resolution requesting the minister of war to issue an order to all officers of the army, instructing them to work actively and sincerely for the realization of a constitutional monarchy, or, in

case they considered that against their honor and belief, to resign from the army. When the minister of war refused to consider this request, the king was weak enough to form still another cabinet, under the leadership of von Beckerath, in which the liberal General von Pfuel became minister of war. The new minister actually obeyed the demand of the assembly for this extraordinary regulation. Despite all these concessions, the mob which daily assembled outside the *Schauspielhaus* remained master of the assembly. The latter declared null and void the "kingdom by the grace of God, the nobility, orders and titles." And when a new revolution broke out in Vienna in October, the Prussian assembly even demanded protection for the freedom of the people of Vienna.

At this point the king took a hand in the game. On November 2, urged by Herr von Bismarck-Schönhausen, he appointed the count of Brandenburg, who had maintained order and quiet in Silesia in a highly effective manner, prime minister of Prussia. Director von Manteuffel was made minister of the interior. A deputation of the assembly which called on the king at Potsdam, to file protests, was not admitted; and the assembly itself was adjourned from the 8th to the 27th of November. Martial law was declared in Berlin. On the 10th of November

General von Wrangel returned to the capital with his troops from the Danish campaign. An armistice had been concluded with Denmark under the influence of Russia and England, an armistice somewhat unfavorable for the dukedoms Schleswig and Holstein. The left wing of the assembly, the liberals and radicals, resisted the order for their adjournment. They asserted, with sovereign contempt for the rights of the king, that the ministry was not entitled to collect taxes; and they attempted to hold independent meetings in several places. The right wing, conservatives, clericals and agrarians, went to Brandenburg, as ordered by the king, but could not there gather the necessary quorum. It was now the turn of the king, and he dissolved the assembly entirely, and declared the Waldeck project to be the legal constitution of the state.

At last the king was master again in Prussia, and from his own power he had granted and given a constitutional parliament which satisfied the most far-reaching demands of the liberals, and which was acclaimed with intense joy everywhere. But simply for the reason that this constitution had been given by the crown itself it displeased the social-democrats. The king smoothed all difficulty by making a provision in this new constitution that its text might be re-

vised in the next *Landtag*, which was convened for the 25th of February, 1849. The delegates for this *Landtag* were chosen by general and equal suffrage, but the *Landtag* itself did not last long. It was, as we shall see later, dissolved by order of the king, in April of the same year. The crown thereupon issued a new election law, on the three-class system; and, as the social-democrats refused to take part in any election along such lines, the new *Landtag* based on this election succeeded in working out a constitution, with which the king believed he could govern the country. On January 31, 1850, this new constitution of Prussia was proclaimed as the law of the land, and on February 6 the king took the oath of allegiance and fealty to the constitution in a solemn assembly of the delegates of the two chambers, the ministers and the princes of the royal House. Prussia thus definitely became a constitutional monarchy.

CHAPTER XIV

CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE LESSER GERMAN STATES

GERMANY, notwithstanding her triumph of 1815, regained neither her ancient unity nor her former power, but still continued to be merely a confederation of states, bound together by no firm tie and regarded with contempt by their more powerful neighbors. The German Confederation did not even include the whole of the provinces whose population was distinguished as German by the use of the German language. Several of the provinces of Germany were still beneath a foreign scepter; Switzerland and the Netherlands had declared themselves distinct from the rest of Germany, which, hitherto submissive to France, was in danger of falling beneath the influence of Russia, who ceaselessly sought to entangle her by diplomatic wiles.

There were still, however, men existing in Germany who hoped to compensate the loss of the external power of their country by the internal freedom that had been so lavishly prom-

ised to the people on the general summons to the field. The proclamation of Calisch and the German federative act guaranteed the grant of constitutions. The former Rhenish confederated princes, nevertheless, alone found it to their interest to carry this promise into effect, and, in a manner, formed a second alliance with France by their imitation of the newly introduced French code and by the establishment, in their own territories, of two chambers, one of peers, the other of deputies, similar to those of France; measures by which, at that period of popular excitement, they also regained the popularity lost by them at an earlier period throughout the rest of Germany. Liberty was ever on the tongues of the most devoted servants of the state. The ancient Church and the nobility were attacked with incredible mettle in order to suit the purposes of ministerial caprice. Prussia and Austria were loudly blamed for not keeping pace with the times—with the intent of favorably contrasting the ancient policy of the Rhenish Confederation. None, at that period, surpassed the ministers belonging to the old school of Illuminatism and Napoleonism in liberalism, but no sooner did the deputies of the people attempt to realize their liberal ideas than they started back in dismay.

The first example of this kind was given by

Frederick Augustus, Duke of Nassau, as early as the September of 1814. Ibell, the president, who reigned with unlimited power over Nassau, drew up a constitution which has been termed a model of "despotism under a constitutional form." The whole of the property of the state still continuing to be the private property of the duke, and his right arbitrarily to increase the number of members belonging to the first chamber, and by their votes to annul every resolution passed by the second chamber, rendered the whole constitution illusory. Trombetta, one of the deputies, voluntarily renounced his seat, an example that was followed by several others.

The second constitution granted was that bestowed upon the Netherlands in 1815, by King William, who established such an unequal representation in the chambers between the Belgians and Dutch as to create great dissatisfaction among the former, who, in revenge, again affected the French party. This was succeeded, in 1816, by the petty constitutions of Waldeck, Weimar and Frankfort. Maximilian, King of Bavaria, seemed, in 1817, to announce another system by the dismissal of his minister, Montgelas, and, in 1818, bestowed a new constitution upon Bavaria, but the old abuses in the administration remained uneradicated; a civil and

military state unproportioned to the revenue, the petty despotism of government officers and heavy imposts, still weighed upon the people, and the constitution itself was quickly proved illusory, the veto of the first chamber annulling the first resolution passed by the second chamber. Professor Behr of Würzburg, upon this, energetically protested against the first chamber, and, on the refusal of the second chamber to vote for the maintenance of the army on so high a footing, unless the soldiery were obliged to take the oath on the constitution, it was speedily dissolved.

In Baden the grand duke Charles expired, A.D. 1818, after having caused a constitution to be drawn up, which Louis, his uncle and successor, carried into effect. Louis having, however, previously, and without the consent of the people, entered into a stipulation with the nobility, to whom he had granted an edict extremely favorable to their interests, Winter, the Heidelberg bookseller, a member of the second chamber, demanded its abrogation. The answer was, the dissolution of the chamber, personal inquisition and intimidation, and the publication of an extremely severe edict of censure, against which, in 1820, Professor von Rotteck of Freiburg, supported by the poet Hebel and by the Freiherr von Wessenberg, administrator of

the bishopric of Constance, protested, but in vain.

At the same time, that is, in 1818, Hildburghausen, and even the petty principality of Lichtenstein, which merely contains two square miles and a population amounting to five thousand souls, also received a constitution, which not a little contributed to turn the whole affair into ridicule. To these succeeded, in 1819, the constitutions of Hanover and Lippe-Deilmold, the former as aristocratic as possible, completely in the spirit of olden times, solely dictated and carried into effect by the nobility and government officers. The sittings of the chambers, consequently, continued to be held in secret. The dukes of Mecklenburg abolished feudal servitude, which existed in no other part of Germany, in 1820. In Darmstadt the constitution was granted by the good-natured, venerable grand duke Louis (whose attention was chiefly devoted to the opera), after the impatient advocates, who had collected subscriptions in the Odenwald to petitions praying for the speedy bestowal of the promised constitution, had been arrested, and an insurrection that consequently ensued among the peasantry had been quelled by force. Petty constitutions were, moreover, granted, in 1821, to Coburg, and, in 1829, to Meiningen.

In Württemberg, the dissatisfaction produced by the ancient despotism of the government was also to be speedily appeased by the grant of a constitutional charter. The king, Frederick, convoked the Estates, to whom he, on the 15th of March, 1815, solemnly delivered the newly enacted constitution. But here, as elsewhere, was the government inclined to grant a mere illusory boon. The Estates rejected the constitution, without reference to its contents, simply owing to the formal reason of its being bestowed by the prince and being consequently binding on one side alone, instead of being a stipulation between the prince and the people, and, moreover, because the ancient constitution of Württemberg, which had been abrogated by force and in direct opposition to the will of the Estates, was still in legal force. The old Württemberg party alone could naturally take their footing upon their ancient rights, but the new Württemberg party, the mediatized princes of the empire, the counts and barons of the empire, and the imperial free towns, nay, even the agnates of the reigning house, all of whom had suffered more or less under Napoleon's iron rule, ranged themselves on their side. The deputy, Zahn of Calw, drew a masterly picture of the state of affairs at that period, in which he pitilessly disclosed every reigning abuse. The king,

thus vigorously and unanimously opposed, was constrained to yield, and the most prolix negotiations, in which the citizen deputies, headed by the advocate, Weisshaar, were supported by the nobility against the government, commenced.

The affair was, it may be designedly, dragged on *ad infinitum* until the death of the king in 1816, when his son and successor, William, who had gained a high reputation as a military commander and had rendered himself extremely popular, zealously began the work of conciliation. He not only instantly abolished the abuses of the former government, as, for instance, in the game law, but, in 1817, delivered a new constitution to the Estates. But the Estates refused to accept of liberty as a boon, and rejected this constitution on the same formal grounds upon which they had rejected the preceding one. The Estates were again upheld by a grateful public, and the few deputies, more particularly Cotta and Griesinger, who had defended the new constitution on account of its liberality and who regarded form as immaterial, became the objects of public animadversion. The populace broke the windows of the house inhabited by the liberal-minded minister, von Wangenheim. The poet Uhland greatly distinguished himself as a warm upholder of the

ancient rights of the people. The king instantly dissolved the Estates, but at the same time declared his intention to guarantee to the people, without a constitution, the rights he had intended constitutionally to confer upon them; to establish an equal system of taxation, and "to eradicate bureaucracy, that curse upon the country." The good will displayed on both sides led to fresh negotiations, and a third constitution was at length drawn up by a committee, composed partly of members of the government, partly of members belonging to the Estates, and, in 1819, was taken into deliberation and passed by the reassembled Estates. This constitution, nevertheless, fell far below the mark to which it had been raised by public expectation, partly on account of the retention, owing to ancient prejudice, of the permanent committee and its oligarchical influence, partly on account of the too great and permanent concessions made to the nobility in return for their momentary aid, partly on account of the extreme haste that marked the concluding deliberations of the Estates, occasioned by their partly unfounded dread of interference on the part of the congress then assembled at Carlsbad.

In Hesse and Brunswick all the old abuses practiced in the petty courts in the eighteenth century were revived. William of Hesse-Cassel

returned, on the fall of Napoleon, to his domains. True to his whimsical saying, "I have slept during the last seven years," he insisted upon replacing everything in Hesse exactly on its former footing. In one particular alone was his vanity inconsistent: notwithstanding his hatred toward Napoleon, he retained the title of prince elector, bestowed upon him by Napoleon's favor, although it had lost all significance, there being no longer any emperor to elect. He turned the hand of time back seven years, degraded the counselors raised to that dignity by Jérôme to their former station as clerks, captains to lieutenants, etc., all, in fact, to the station they had formerly occupied, even reintroduced into the army the fashion of wearing powder and queues, prohibited all those not bearing an official title to be addressed as "Herr," and reëstablished the socage dues abolished by Jérôme. This attachment to old abuses was associated with the most insatiable avarice. He reduced the government bonds to one-third, retook possession of the lands sold during Jérôme's reign, without granting any compensation to the holders, compelled the country to pay his son's debts to the amount of two hundred thousand rix-dollars, lowered the amount of pay to such a degree that a lieutenant received but five rix-dollars per month, and

offered to sell a new constitution to the Estates at the low price of four million rix-dollars, which he afterward lowered to two millions and a tax for ten years upon liquors. This shameful bargain being rejected by the Estates, the constitution fell to the ground, and the prince elector practiced the most unlimited despotism. Discontent was stifled by imprisonment. Two officers, Huth and Rotsmann, who had got up a petition in favor of their class, and the Herr von Gohr, who by chance gave a private fête while the prince was suffering from a sudden attack of illness, were among the victims. The purchasers of the crown lands vainly appealed to the federative assembly for redress, for the prince elector "refused the mediation of the federative assembly until it had been authorized by an organic law drawn up with the coöperation of the prince elector himself." This prince expired A.D. 1821, and was succeeded by his son, William II, who abolished the use of hair powder and queues, but none of the existing abuses, and demonstrated no inclination to grant a constitution.

Charles, Duke of Brunswick, was at Paris, squandering the revenue derived from his territories, on the outburst of the July revolution, which drove him back to his native country. His obstinate refusal to abolish the heavy taxes,

to refrain from disgraceful sales, to recommence the erection of public buildings, and to recognize the provincial Estates, added to his threat to fire upon the people and his boast that he knew how to defend his throne better than Charles X of France, so maddened the excitable blood of his subjects that, after throwing stones at the duke's carriage and at an actress on whom he publicly bestowed his favors, they stormed his palace and set fire to it over his head, September 7, 1830. Charles escaped through the garden. His brother, William, supported by Hanover and Prussia, replaced him, recognized the provincial Estates, granted a new constitution, built a new palace, and reestablished tranquillity.

In Saxony the progress of enlightenment had long rendered the people sensible of the errors committed by the old and etiquettish aristocracy of the court and diet. As early as 1829 all the grievances had been recapitulated in an anonymous printed address, and, in the beginning of 1830, on the venerable king, Antony (brother to Frederick Augustus, deceased, A.D. 1827), declaring invalid the settlement of his affairs by the Estates, which evinced a more liberal spirit than they had hitherto done. A popular tumult ensued, which was quelled but to be, a few weeks later, after the revolution of July, more disas-